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Abstract
In the era of multicore processing, formal verification is more important than ever. This the-
sis narrows the gap between the increased complexity of control flow patterns, often spanning
across multiple threads, and the stringent need for accuracy. We introduce a sound verification
logic designed to efficiently handle programs with complex control flow patterns.
We advocate for an extension of separation logic that can uniformly handle exceptions,
program errors and other kinds of control flows. This approach is supported through a uniform
mechanism that captures static control flows (such as normal execution) and dynamic control
flows (such as exceptions) within a single formalism. Following Stroustrup’s definition [94,
70], our verification technique could ensure exception safety in terms of four guarantees of
increasing quality, namely no-leak guarantee, basic guarantee, strong guarantee and no-throw
guarantee.
A second component of our verification logic handles Pthreads barriers. Unlike locks and
critical sections, Pthreads barriers generate complex control flow and resource ownership ex-
change patterns. They enable simultaneous resource redistribution between multiple threads
and are inherently stateful, leading to significant complications in the design of the logic and
its soundness proof. We equip our logic with a novel mechanism for explicitly capturing and
reasoning about barrier behaviour.
The last essential component of our proposal consists of a novel predicate pruning tech-
nique targeting user-defined disjunctive predicates. Although we will introduce a Hoare logic
that successfully verifies programs with exceptions and barriers, in order for our proposal to
gain acceptance, it is not sufficient to work we must also ensure that verification can be done
quickly and precisely. Our proposed predicate specialization and pruning mechanism is de-
signed with this goal in mind.
Our barrier extension can be viewed as an instance of a highly specialized verification
logic that relies on user-defined disjunctive predicates. We address the performance penalty
associated with the proof search induced by disjunctive predicates in general and by our barrier
handling in particular, by proposing a predicate specialization technique that allows efficient
symbolic pruning of infeasible disjuncts inside each predicate instance. Our technique is pre-
sented as a specialization operation whose derivations preserve the satisfiability of formulas,
while reducing the subsequent cost of their manipulation. Initial experimental results have
confirmed significant speed gains from the deployment of predicate specialization. It yields up
to a 10 fold increase in discharging proof obligations generated by the verification of general
sequential programs and up to 37 fold increase in the speed of barrier reasoning.
As support for our proposal, we showcase a program verification toolset, that uses our logic
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The explosive growth in the software industry has led to a vast assortment of software being
created to control computer systems involving almost all aspects of our lives. While some of
these software components have been successfully built, there are also many software compo-
nents whose quality has continued to plague the users who are stuck with them. This in turn
pushed the need for better software engineering guidelines that would help in the creation and
quality control of software systems. Traditionally, software quality control relied on simplistic
methodologies e.g. peer inspection and repeated regression testing. Though such methods can
often discover the presence of problems, they cannot guarantee bug-free and/or low-defects
software, and unfortunately these are exactly the guarantees that we would expect for the com-
plex software tasked with controlling safety critical systems.
Two high-profile examples of safety critical software failures are the Mars Climate Orbiter
which crashed due to an incorrect conversion to metric units, and the Ariane 5 failure due to
a floating-point conversion which raised an exception that was not properly handled [30]. The
latter example is particularly significant for us since it highlighted the need for considering all
manner of control flows, particularly those that are related to exceptional scenarios. While it
might be challenging to investigate and consider all corner cases it is precisely these cases that
could haunt us if our software is not adequately prepared for them.
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Formal methods aim to address this issue with surgical precision: they aim for proving
software correctness and thus for guaranteeing that systems never fail [74, 46]. Program verifi-
cation is one successful approach to proving software correctness by focusing on proving spe-
cific, user provided, correctness statements [49, 48]. Such statements are typically expressed
in rich specification logics that allow for expressive yet concise specifications and more impor-
tantly are designed with the goal of lending themselves to systematic checking by verification
systems [35].
An example of a logic that is suitable for specification and verification is Hoare logic [47].
It was designed to help describe, modularly, the effect of sequential programs. The Hoare logic
approach consists of constructing triples of the form {P} c {Q} where c is a code sequence
while P andQ denote abstractions of concrete program states. Each such abstraction represents
a set of reachable concrete states which can be viewed as one abstract program state. A triple
is said to hold if and only if whenever c is executed from a concrete state that is captured by an
abstraction in P then, if c terminates, it will do so in a state whose abstraction can be described
by Q.
The core of Hoare logic is comprised of a set of axioms which define triples corresponding
to the basic statements in the programming language. However, depending on the programming
language of choice, on their specific features and the logical framework chosen for expressing
the program state, different Hoare logic variants can be constructed.
For example, many commonly used programming languages have complex memory mod-
els in which resources can be allocated on the stack or on the heap. Heap allocation introduces
an extra hurdle, as it facilitates sharing and aliasing of resources which requires the abstraction
mechanism to be able to capture aliasing in a preferably concise manner. One particularly el-
egant and concise framework of expressing and reasoning about such sharing and aliasing is
separation logic [57, 86].
As the common usage of separation logic revolves around abstracting and reasoning about
program states, typical models for separation logic are centered on abstractions of machine
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states with both stack and heap stores. Thus, the basic separation logic assertions capture
allocatedness facts of the form x 7−→a read as x points-to a heap location containing value a. In
order to concisely capture non-aliasing information, on top of the common logic connectives
of first-order logic, separation logic also exhibits two new connectives: separating conjunction
∗ and separating implication, −−∗. The separating conjunction assertion p1 ∗ p2 holds if and
only if there exists a division of the current heap such that one sub-heap satisfies p1, the other
satisfies p2 and the two sub-heaps are disjoint. Embedding heap disjointedness in the definition
of the connective ensures a clutter free mechanism for capturing non-aliasing information.
The advantage of a concise and precise logics has led to several automatic or semi-automatic
verification tools being developed: [9, 42, 75, 58].
Concurrency is another language feature with a big impact on the abstraction formalism. In
the last decade, languages that take advantage of the multicore/multiprocessor hardware plat-
forms have become mainstream. Thus verification tools are expected to cater for multithreaded
programs. O’Hearn, in [80], introduces an extension of Hoare logic, Concurrent Separation
logic (CSL), with the goal of allowing a form of parallelism in the verified program. One big
advantage of CSL is that it maintains the Hoare Logics modularity even at the concurrent com-
putation level: a correctness proof for the entire program can be constructed by verifying each
of the parallel computations individually. Since then, a considerable body of work has focused
on allowing in the verified program various forms of communication and synchronization while
still maintaining the guarantee that no races occur.
Recently, concurrent separation logic has been used to formally reason about shared-memory
programs that use critical sections and (first-class) locks [80, 51, 43, 50]. Programs verified
with concurrent separation logic are provably data-race free. However more sophisticated syn-
chronization mechanisms are inherently trickier to reason about. The general assumption is
that other mechanisms can be implemented with locks, and that reasonable Hoare rules can be
derived by verifying their implementation. Indeed, the first published example of concurrent
separation logic was implementing semaphores using critical sections [80]. Unfortunately, not
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all synchronization mechanisms can be easily reduced to locks in a way that allows for a rea-
sonable Hoare rule to be derived. Therefore, despite fundamental theoretical advances such as
Hoare logic, separation logic, CSL, plus a frenzy of further developments that tackle complex
verification problems, support for specifying and verifying several important language features
of modern programming languages is still lacking. As a consequence, languages are often too
complex to fully analyse, causing verification tools to omit some of the fancy features. For in-
stance, an essential feature of modern programming languages often overlooked in verification
is the ability to generate complex non-local control flows, e.g. exception handling .
Exception handling is an important mechanism for dynamically altering control flows. It
is instrumental for building robust software with good error handling capability. However, ex-
ceptions are often omitted during the initial formulation of program analysis and optimization.
Furthermore, with respect to the shared memory paradigm, there is a considerable chal-
lenge in verifying programs in the presence of the complex control flow patterns generated by
the use of sophisticated synchronization mechanisms. The Pthreads-style barriers are a prime
example of such a synchronization mechanism that is surprisingly often used in practice 1 and
yet has been overlooked by current verification systems.
When a thread issues a barrier call it waits until a specified number (typically all) of other
threads have also issued a barrier call; at that point, all of the threads continue. Even the
common barrier usage exhibits complex control flow patterns: usually programs with barriers
use multiple threads advancing in lockstep through a complex computation such that they will
not “step on each others toes” when accessing shared data, the usual access pattern is concurrent
read exclusive write. Thus in common usage, barriers are implicitly associated with a complex
resource ownership redistribution. The hardship of verifying multithreaded programs with
barriers lies in designing a mechanism for encoding the complex control and fractional resource
ownership change patterns associated with barriers.




The principal goal of this thesis is to introduce a sound verification logic designed to efficiently
handle programs with complex control flow patterns. The logic will explicitly and precisely
track control flows essential to the verification of the program like various exception related
flows however it will also incorporate abstractions required to maintain modularity and avoid
the exponential blowup when reasoning in a multithreaded setting. We will also describe sev-
eral contributions related to the integration of our verification logic in order to broaden the
applicability of an existing verification tool chain.
The first problem we tackle is the lack of a high level programming language which can be
middle ground between programmers and verification tools. When considering the traditional
approach of converting programs from high level languages to machine code, the target code
often turns out to be too cryptic (or low level) for program analysis. Our goal is to design
an intermediate, minimal but expressive, core language which can be easily analysed and ma-
nipulated, and to show that this language can handle major language features by translating a
significant imperative source language into it. The translation to the core language enables us to
easily analyse and optimize the code, while not sacrificing the flexibility and rich characteristic
of the source language.
Therefore we first design an intermediate, expressive, syntactically simple, core language
focused on simplifying the task of program verification in the presence of complex control
flows. The insight underlying the core language is that it is possible to simplify the verifica-
tion effort by recasting in one syntactically simple form most of the control flow generating
mechanisms.
Secondly, we advocate for an extension of concurrent separation logic that can uniformly
handle exceptions, program errors and other kinds of control flows. This is elegantly achieved
by designing our extension for the syntactically simple structures of the core language. Our
logic treats exceptions as possible outcomes that could be later remedied, while errors are
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conditions that should be avoided by user programs. This distinction is supported through a
uniform mechanism that captures static control flows (such as normal execution) and dynamic
control flows (such as exceptions) within a single formalism. Following Stroustrup’s definition
[94, 70], our verification technique could ensure exception safety in terms of four guarantees of
increasing quality, namely no-leak guarantee, basic guarantee, strong guarantee and no-throw
guarantee.
A third component of our verification logic handles Pthreads barriers. Unlike locks and
critical sections, Pthreads barriers generate complex control flow and resource ownership ex-
change patterns. They enable simultaneous resource redistribution between multiple threads
and are inherently stateful, leading to significant complications in the design of the logic and
its soundness proof. We equip our logic with a novel mechanism for explicitly capturing and
reasoning about barrier behaviour.
As support for our proposal, we showcase a program verification toolset, based on the
HIP verifier [78, 20], that uses our logic to automatically prove the correctness of programs
with the features discussed so far. Unfortunately, the inherently complex ownership exchange
patterns require HIP to support a shared resource ownership accounting scheme. Therefore
we introduce in HIP a fractional ownership control mechanism based on the binary tree model
described by Dockings et al. in [28].
The last essential component of our proposal consists of a novel general predicate prun-
ing technique targeting disjunctive predicates. Although we will introduce a Hoare logic that
successfully verifies programs with exceptions and barriers, in order for our proposal to gain
acceptance, it is not sufficient that it works but it needs to work fast too. Our barrier extension
can be viewed as an instance of a highly specialized verification logic that relies on user-defined
disjunctive predicates. Therefore we will incorporate our new predicate pruning technique into
our verification logic in order to greatly speedup the verification process.
In general, separation logic-based abstraction mechanisms, enhanced with user-defined
disjunctive predicates, represent a powerful, expressive means of specifying heap-based data
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structures with strong invariant properties. However, expressive power comes at a cost: the
manipulation of such logics typically requires the unfolding of disjunctive predicates which
may lead to expensive proof search.
We address the performance penalty induced by disjunctive predicates in general and by
our barrier handling in particular, by proposing a general predicate specialization technique that
allows efficient symbolic pruning of infeasible disjuncts inside each predicate instance. While
specialization is a familiar technique for code optimization, its use in program verification is
new. Our technique is presented as a specialization operation whose derivations preserve the
satisfiability of formulas, while reducing the subsequent cost of their manipulation. Initial
experimental results have confirmed significant speed gains from the deployment of predicate
specialization. It yields up to a 10 fold increase in discharging proof obligations generated
by the verification of general sequential programs and up to 37 fold increase in the speed of
barrier reasoning.
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
The contributions of these thesis can be organized by four main vectors:
A core language with unified control flows
(Chapter 2, first presented in [25] )
• We propose a core language, Core−U , with a novel view of the control flows unifying
both normal and exceptional executions. This new design is supported by a pair of
unified constructs that are considerably more general than previous approaches. Due to
this unification of the control flows, the core language is easier to analyse and optimize.
• We define a translation from an expressive Java-like imperative language into our core
language. The translation is based on rewrite rules and illustrates how advanced language
features, such as try−finally and multi-return functions, can be easily captured by our
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core language. Moreover, we prove two important properties of the translation, namely
completeness and termination.
• We provide a set of optimization rules for our language, designed to reduce the im-
plementation overhead. These rules are specified at a high-level which facilitates both
human understanding and the construction of correctness proofs. While the set of opti-
mization rules is by no means exhaustive, these rules can help support better practical
prospects for our core language. For all the rules we supply correctness proofs, which
are also meant to illustrate the ease of designing optimizations and proving them correct.
A Specification Logic for Exceptions
(Chapter 3, first presented in [37])
• We introduce a specification logic that captures the states for both normal and exceptional
executions. Our design is guided by the novel unification of both static control flows
(such as break and return), and dynamic control flows (such as exceptions and errors).
• We revisit exception safety guarantees as introduced in [94], and extended in [70]. Ad-
ditionally, we improve the strong guarantee for exception safety. To support a tradeoff
between precision and cost of verification, our verification system is flexible in enforcing
different levels of exception safety.
• We introduce a set of very simple Hoare rules for Core−U .
• We have included the above features in the HIP verifier and validated it with a suite of
exception-handling examples.
Pthreads Barriers in Concurrent Separation Logic
(Chapter 4 , first presented in [52] and extended in [53])
• We give a formal characterization for sound Pthreads barrier definitions.
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• We extend the Core−U verification logic with a natural Hoare rule for verifying barrier
calls and include it in the HIP verifier.
• We give a formal resource-aware unerased concurrent operational semantics for barriers
and prove our Hoare rules sound with respect to our semantics. Our soundness results
are machine-checked in Coq
• We add support for a fractional resource ownership accounting scheme to the entailment
procedure in the SLEEK separation logic entailment checker [20] which is the core of
the HIP verifier.
• We describe a solver for the binary tree domain proposed by Dockings et al. in [28] as a
model for fractional resource ownership accounting.
Specialization for Pruning Disjunctive Predicates to Support Verification
(Chapter 5, first presented in [21])
• We propose a new specialization calculus that leads to more effective program verifi-
cation. Our calculus specializes proof obligations produced in the program verification
process, and can be used as a preprocessing step before the obligations are fed into third
party theorem provers or decision procedures.
• We adapt memoization and incremental pruning techniques to obtain an optimized ver-
sion of the specialization calculus.
• We included our specialization calculus in the HIP/SLEEK together with the previous
extensions.
• We apply the specializer to barrier definitions. The use of our specializer yields dramatic
reductions in verification times, both for large sequential programs and programs em-
ploying barrier synchronization. Even for simple examples with barrier usage we show
a specialization induced speedup of up to 37 .
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1.3 Outline
In Chapter 2 we describe the formal preliminaries. We introduce SrcLang, the target language
of our verification solution together with a syntactically simple core language to which the
input language can be translated and for which we have designed our verification logic. We
will also describe a specification language with support for capturing various control flow types
and barrier related assertions.
In Chapter 3 we will elaborate on common expectations for exception safety guarantees
and introduce a set of elegantly simple rules for verifying programs with exceptions.
In Chapter 4 we further extend the exception logic by adding support for barrier reasoning
through a novel mechanism for describing barrier behaviours. Furthermore, we will introduce
a Hoare rule for verifying barrier calls which is surprisingly simple when compared to the
complex synchronization pattern the barriers introduce. We will outline the soundness proof
for our logic and also describe the work required to integrate our verification logic into an
existing verification toolset.
In Chapter 5 we describe the last essential component of our proposal which consists of a
predicate specialization and pruning technique targeting disjunctive predicates and showcase
how it can be applied to our verification logic with impressive verification time improvements.
Chapters 6 and 7 conclude the thesis with discussions on related work and possible direc-
tions for future research.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we will describe SrcLang, a Java-like programming language and the specifica-
tion language we will use as the target of our verification solution. The programming language
is endowed with rich syntactic constructs which induce complex control flows: it supports ex-
ception handling and also multithreaded programming through the presence of fork/join state-
ments and barriers as synchronization mechanisms.
We will also introduce a syntactically simpler core language to which the input language
can be reduced and for which we have designed a verification logic targeted in proving cor-
rectness of programs with exceptions and barriers. We will define a small-step semantics for
the core language. We will also describe a separation logic based specification language with
support for capturing various control flow types and barrier related assertions.
We conclude the chapter with a translation from SrcLang to the core language followed
by a set of optimization rules for the core language, designed to reduce the implementation
overhead. These rules are specified at a high-level which facilitate both human understanding




As input language for our system, we consider a Java-like language which we call SrcLang.
Although we make use of the class hierarchy to define a subtyping relation for exception ob-
jects, the treatment of the other object-oriented features, such as instance methods and method
overriding, is outside the scope of the current work. We have opted for a first-order imper-
ative language that permits only static methods and single inheritance. These simplifications
are orthogonal to our verification goals. We have originally intended for our language to sup-
port only exception handling and barrier related features. However, we were pleasantly sur-
prised that other complex features with respect to how control flow is transferred such as the
break/continue statements, the try with multiple catch handlers construct, the finally construct,
and other more fancy features, such as the multi-return function call ([91]), can be unambigu-
ously expressed in terms of simpler constructs of our core language and thus are easily handled
by our verification logic.
We outline the full syntax for the input source language in Figure 2.1. Notice that most
of SrcLang’s syntactic constructs are straightforward therefore in the rest of the section we
elaborate on the slightly less common features like the multi-return function calls and clarify
the allowed interactions between concurrency and exception handling in SrcLang.
We represent the multi-return function call in our language as (m −→v ) with −−→λv.e. Evalu-
ating such a form involves evaluating the inner application, (m −→v ), in a context with n return
points. The first return point is for the context of the call itself. The other n− 1 return points
are captured by return points of the form λv2.e2, . . . , λvn.en. If the application eventually re-
turns a value val to a return point of the form λvk.ek, then vk is bound to the value val and
expression ek is evaluated in the caller’s context. The return construct, ret−i e, specifies that
the result of evaluating expression e is to be returned to the i-th return point of the caller.
The second peculiar SrcLang language feature are the concurrency related statements:











V ::= pred self::pname〈−→v 〉 ≡ Φ inv pi pred declaration
B ::= barrier self::bname〈−→v 〉 ≡ barrier declaration∨
(requires Φpr ensures Φpo)
D ::= class c1 extends c2 {−→t f} data declaration
t ::= c | p user or prim. type
M ::= t m [with n] (
−→
t v)[throws t+]
requires Φpr ensures Φpo {e} method declaration
w ::= v | v.f variable or field
e ::= v variable
| k primitive constant
| new c new object
| v.f field access
| (t) e casting
| throw e throw exception
| break [L] | ret−i e break and return
| continue [L] loop continue
| w:=e assignment
| e1; e2 sequence
| (m −→v ) with −−→λv.e multi−return call
| {t v; e} local var block
| if e then e1 else e2 conditional
| let v=e1 in e2 local binding
| L : e labelled expression
| fork (m(−→v )) thread creation
| join (tid) thread join
| barrier v barrier call
| e1 finally e2 finally




| while e1 requires Φpr ensures Φpo {e2} loop
Figure 2.1: Source Language : SrcLang
method m with arguments v. The fork returns the thread identifier of the child thread. Con-
versely, the join (tid) waits until the child thread finishes. Finally barrier v blocks the
calling thread until all other threads have issued a similar barrier call for barrier v.
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With regards to the interaction of exception handling with multithreaded computations the
crux of the problem lies in how to minimize the disturbance an exception in one thread has
on the other threads. There are two possible approaches: either disallow exceptions to esca-
late beyond the thread boundary or allow them but in a deterministic fashion, only at specific
program points. Java for example, supports both approaches. In Java there are two mecha-
nisms for thread execution, each with its own approach to exception handling: i)providing a
run method when extending the Thread class or when implementing the Runnable interface
ii) implementing the Callable interface by providing a call method.
In the first case, the run method does not allow a result to be returned, either normal or
exceptional. The return type is void and the method header does not allow any checked excep-
tions to be declared while any unchecked exceptions occurring at runtime are routed automat-
ically to a thread specific UncaughtExceptionHandler handler. The common usage of this
method has the threads store their results in a shared resource.
The behaviour in the second case is more refined. However, exceptions still can not be
automatically escalated beyond the thread boundary. If a thread has encountered an unhandled
exception, its execution finishes without interfering with any of the other threads. However,
the result of the computation including the exception can be retrieved by the get method in
the Future class. The get method is allowed to throw ExecutionException exceptions which
encapsulate the actual exception thrown during the threads execution.
We postulate that both behaviours can be easily handled by our verification logic. However
in the rest of the presentation, for simplicity we will adopt the Runnable approach with no
exceptions allowed to escape the threads.
SrcLang allows for functions (and loops) to be decorated with pre and post conditions
which are pairs of formulas expressed in a separation logic specification language described in
§2.4. SrcLang is also equipped with mechanisms for describing inductive predicates (predicate
definitions) and specifying barrier behaviour (user-defined barrier definitions). Barrier defini-
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tions are given as sets of pre and post conditions1. Unlike SPEC# or ESC/Java, where even
specifications for exceptions are captured by a special syntax for exceptional postconditions,
we aim for a unified logic that is capable of capturing all kinds of control flow jumps through
specialized constraints included in the specification language. The specification constraints
allow explicit capturing of control flow jump information, in particular the class of language
constructs that generated a given control flow jump. Furthermore we introduce the concept of
control flow type to denote classes of such language constructs. Thus the specification con-
straints in effect capture control flow types. These specifications are verified automatically by
our tool.
2.2 Control Flow Hierarchy
Our proposal is based on a novel view of non-local purely sequential control flow types 2, in
which both normal and abnormal control flows are being handled in a uniform way. We will
organise these control flow types into a tree hierarchy, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The control
flow type hierarchy incorporates all the possible control flow types: both the ones pertaining
to user-defined exceptions and the predefined flow types. Thus it incorporates all language























Figure 2.2: A Subtype Hierarchy on Control Flows
1barrier definitions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4
2 We use the term sequential control flows to denote control flows occurring within a thread
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Each arrow c2→c1 denotes a subtyping relation c1<:c2. In this tree hierarchy, exc captures
dynamic control flows due to exceptions, while local captures static control flows, such as:
brk to denote the break out of a loop, cont to denote a jump to the beginning of a loop and
ret to signal a method return (covering also methods with multi-return options [91]). The
control flow norm for normal execution is a special instance of this static control flow that
will be transferred to the default next instruction for execution. A key feature of static control
flows is that they can be efficiently implemented as local control transfers through either direct
or indirect jumps. On the other hand, dynamic control flows from exceptions would involve
non-local transfer of control via catch handlers present in the function calling hierarchy at
runtime. All control flow types are subtypes of >. All control flows that can be ‘caught’ by
our language are placed under the c−flow category, while the abort category denotes control
flows that cannot be caught. abort includes program errors, program termination by halt,
and non-termination by hang. The latter could, in principle, be used by our language to reason
about non-terminating behaviors but this aspect is not addressed in this work.
The use of a tree hierarchy, rather than a lattice, for our control flow is important for finite
abstraction. A useful property of the tree hierarchy is that every two nodes of the tree, say c1
and c2, are either mutually-exclusive, as denoted by ∀c·(c<:c1 =⇒ ¬(c<:c2)), or they overlap,
as denoted by c1<:c2 ∨ c2<:c1. This property is helpful for formal reasoning since we can
statically determine disjointedness of two flow types with the help of only their subtyping
relation. This decision allows us to build finite set abstractions required to model multiple
flows. While exceptions in Java are implicitly organised as a hierarchical tree, the previous use
of effects-based type system does not require this finitary abstraction property.
Although other systems enforce the restriction that the try-catch construct applies only
to exceptional flows, our unified view on control flows allows us to generalize the try-catch
construct across the entire domain of control flow types. This domain extension permits a
much more streamlined verification mechanism.
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2.3 Core Language
In this section we introduce a concise language, Core−U , to which SrcLang can be translated.
Core−U has the benefit of allowing a much simpler formulation of the verification rules. In
designing Core−U we aimed for:
• Unified Constructs : To minimise on language features, our language should unify to-
gether constructs that have similar functionality, where possible.
• Syntactically Minimal : To keep our language small, we shall aim for fewer and simpler
constructs, where possible. This can make our language easier to formalise and analyse.
• Expressively Maximal : We strive to provide language constructs that are as general
as possible, to allow them to be used in more scenarios. The acid test is whether the
language can succinctly encode more advanced language features.
• Computationally Positive : The language should not hinder efficient compilation. Firstly,
it supports a set of optimization rules. Secondly, intermediate steps used to make the
language easier to analyse can be directly removed later by efficient compilation.
The unified view of control flows presented in §2.2 lies at the heart of our core language. An
unexpected benefit is that our core language with exceptions is as small as the corresponding
core language without exceptions. Designing analyses and optimizations for the core language
is therefore much simpler than it would be for the source language.
2.3.1 Syntax
We will detail the key Core−U constructs meant to allow us to take full advantage of the
complex control flow hierarchy introduced above. Also, a list of the syntactic constructs of
Core−U is given in Figure 2.3.
In previous core languages with exceptions for Java, such as [64] and [60], a variable v











D ::= class c1 extends c2 {−→t v} data declaration
V ::= pred self::pname〈−→v 〉 ≡ Φ inv pi pred declaration
B ::= barrier self::bname〈−→v 〉 ≡ barrier declaration∨
(requires Φpr ensures Φpo)
ft ::= c | predef flows flow types
M ::= t m(
−−−−−→
[ref] t v) requires Φpr ensures Φpo {e} method decl
e ::= fn#x output (flow&value)
| v.f field access
| w:=v assignment
|m(−→v ) method call
| {t v; e} local var block
| if v then e1 else e2 conditional
| fork (m(−→v )) thread creation
| join (tid) thread join
| barrier v barrier call
| try e1 catch (ft[@v1] v2) e2 catch handler
fn ::= Ex(ft) | fv | ty(v) | v.1 flow
t ::= c | p user or prim. type
w ::= v | v.f var/field
x ::= v | k | new c | (fv, v) | v.2 basic values
(vars, consts, . . .)
Figure 2.3: Core Language : Core−U
on the exception object in v. In our approach, we unify both these constructs with the ft#v
statement which has the effect of explicitly generating a control flow of type ft with return
value v. With this construct normal flow is realised by norm#v while exceptions of the same
type as the object indicated by v may be thrown using ty(v)#v which also ensures that the
returned value is the exception object. The type of a raised exception object v is captured as
its control flow. The function ty(v) returns the runtime type of an exception object pointed
by v. In case v=null, it returns a special nullPtrExc flow type. This unified construct is a
generalization of the exception mechanism used in Java since we allow each flow type to be
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unrelated to the type of the value being thrown. For example, we may use exc#13 to raise
an exception with integer value 13. This is not directly expressible in Java, though it could be
mimicked by a user-defined exception that embeds an integer value.
The core language allows the embedding of control flows directly as values, by allowing a
pair of control flow and its value (fv, v) to be specified. With this notation, we make explicit
the distinction between the control flow corresponding to an exception and its return value.
Furthermore, we can save each exception and its output value as an embedded pair that could
be later re-thrown. Operations v.1 and v.2 are used to access the control flow and the value,
respectively, from an embedded pair in v.
Another major construct of our language is a try-catch mechanism of the form:
try e1 catch ((c@fv)#v) e2 which specifies a control flow c and two bound variables to cap-
ture a control flow type fv and its thrown value v, provided that fv<:c. This try-catch construct
is more general than that used in Java since it can capture not only exceptional flow, but also
normal flow and other abnormal control flows due to break, continue and return statements
that can be translated to the corresponding control flows. As a pleasant surprise, the usual
sequential composition e1; e2 is now a syntactic sugar for try e1 catch ((norm@ )# ) e2
whereby each denotes a distinct anonymous bound variable. Although this desugaring sim-
plifies the verification process by making explicit the control flow paths, in this presentation
we will still use the e1; e2 for conciseness.
With the ft#v and try e1 catch ((c@fv)#v) e2 statements it is easy to reduce various
traditional statements to one of the two expressions:
x ⇒ norm#x
continue ⇒ cont#()
throw v ⇒ ty(v)#v
return x ⇒ ret#x
break L ⇒ brk−L#()
continue L ⇒ cont−L#()
While the previous rewritings are intuitive, rewriting a labeled while loop to use our structures
is a bit more involved as Core−U makes explicit several control flow jumps tipically hidden
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in common languages. For example the destination points of break and continue control flow
jumps become try/catch statements in Core−U .
L : while e1 {e2} ⇒

try {bool v; v:=e1;
while v {





Note that while Core−U may appear inefficient due to an apparent need to unwind through
a nested series of handlers, we emphasize that our primary goal is to make program codes easier
to analyse. For actual execution, we could use compilation techniques to ensure that every static
control flow is efficiently implemented by either a direct or indirect jump into its corresponding
handler code. Moreover, we could also use a similar optimization to efficiently implement
some of the dynamic control flows. Under suitable conditions, we can use an optimization
rule, called throw-catch linking, that could directly link a throw operation for an exception
with its intended handler through a parameterized jump (see § 2.5.2 later).
We point out that the fork/join/barrier statements carry forward from SrcLang: a fork
operation, fork (m(−→v )) creates a new thread which executes the method m with arguments
v returning the thread identifier of the child thread, the join (tid) waits until the child thread
finishes while a barrier v call blocks the calling thread until all other threads have issued a
similar barrier call for barrier v.
2.3.2 Semantic Model
In this section we will introduce an erased operational semantics for Core−U . We use erased
semantics to denote language semantics which use a machine model with few or no virtual
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components, one that is close to the on-chip implementation.
Note that we will use Γ to denote the code memory, basically Γ is a function from function
names to function definitions. For simplicity of the presentation we will elide adding Γ to the
program state.
We use σ to model a thread state as a triple of stack s, heap h, barrier map b. Local variables
and other meta variables live in the stack s, which is a function from variable names to values
(either a constant, an address or a pair of control flow type and value). In contrast, a heap h
contains the locations shared between threads; heaps are partial functions from addresses to
objects. We use the notation with c[f1 7→ν1, .., fn 7→νn] for an object value of data type c where
ν1, .., νn are current values of the corresponding fields f1, .., fn. We also equip heaps with a
distinguished location, called the break, that tracks the boundary between allocated and unallo-
cated locations. The break lets us provide semantics for the x:= new e instruction in a natural
way by setting x equal to the current break and then incrementing the break. Since threads
share a common break, there is a covert communication channel (one thread can observe when
another thread is allocating memory); however the existence of this channel is a small price to
pay for avoiding the necessity of a concurrent garbage collector.
Finally, in modeling barriers, we associate to each barrier a pair of integers: the number
of threads that are synchronized by the barrier and the number of threads that are currently
waiting. The barrier map b is a partial function from addresses of barriers to pairs of positive
integers.
In the style of Hobor et al. [51], our operational semantics is divided into three parts:
purely sequential, which executes all of the instructions, except for barrier, fork and join, in
a thread-local manner; concurrent, which manages thread scheduling and handles the barrier,
fork, join instructions; and oracle, which provides a pseudosequential view of the concurrent
machine to enable simple proofs of the sequential Hoare rules.
For the purely sequential semantics, the form of the step judgment is (σ, c) 7→ (σ′, c′),
where σ is the thread state and c is a command of our language with the observation that if the
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step relation reaches a barrier or fork or join call then it simply gets stuck. Later in this section
we will elaborate on the purely sequential semantics, however we will start with the concurrent
and oracle semantics.
Concurrent Semantics
We define the notion of a concurrent state as a four-tuple (Ω, thds, h, b) of scheduler Ω (mod-
eled as a list of natural numbers representing the thread identifiers), a list of threads thds , heap
h, and the barrier map b. The scheduler encodes the order in which threads get execution rights:
a scheduler Ω = 5, 3, . . . would have thread 5 execute until it blocks on a join or barrier call,
then pass control to thread 3 which will execute until it blocks and so on. A thread contains
its stack (the state store s) and a concurrent control, which is either Running(c), meaning the
thread is available to run command c, or Waiting(bn, c), meaning that the thread is currently
waiting on barrier bn ; after the barrier call the thread will resume running with command c.
Before we run a thread we transfer the heap and barrier map into the thread. When we suspend
the thread we remove the heap and barrier map and transfer it to the next thread. The concurrent
step relation has the form (Ω, thds, h, b) ; (Ω′, thds ′, h′, b′). It has only six cases; it relies on
the CStep-Seq case to run all of the sequential commands:
thds[i] = (s,Running(c))
(
(s, h, b), c
) 7→ ((s′, h′, b), c′)
thds ′ = [i 7→ (s′,Running(c′))]thds
(i :: Ω, thds, h, b) ; (Ω, thds ′, h′, b)
CStep-Seq
That is, the thread whose thread id is at the head of the scheduler is selected to run. Before
the sequential step relation is applied to the chosen thread, the heap and barrier map are trans-
ferred into the thread. If the command c is a barrier, fork or join call then the sequential relation
will not be able to run and so the CStep-Seq relation will not hold; otherwise the sequential
step relation will be able to handle any command. After a sequential step is taken, the heap and
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barrier map are taken out of the thread state and reinsert the modified sequential state into the
thread list. Since we quantify over all schedulers and our language does not have input/output,
it is sufficient to utilize a non-preemptive scheduler.
For example, given a machine with one thread with some stack s and running the expression
















The second case of the concurrent step relation handles the case when a thread has reached
the last instruction, which must be a skip:
thds[i] = (s,Running(skip))
(i :: Ω, thds, h, b) ; (Ω, thds, h, b)
CStep-Exit
When the end on a thread is reached a context switch to the next thread occurs.
The interesting cases occur when the instruction for the running thread is a barrier or fork
or join call ; here the CStep-Seq rule does not apply. The concurrent semantics handles the
barrier call directly via the next two cases of the step relation. First, if a thread executes a
barrier but is not the last thread to do so:
thds[i] = (s, (Running (barrier bn; c)))
thds′ = [i→ (s, (Waiting(bn, c)))] thds
b[bn] = (waitingcnt, totalcnt)
b′ = [bn→ (waitingcnt + 1, totalcnt)] b
waitingcnt + 1 < totalcnt
((i :: Ω), thds, h, b) ; (Ω, thds ′, h, b′)
CStep-Suspend
After it increments the waiting threads counter of the bn barrier, CStep-Suspend checks to see
if the barrier is full by comparing the waiting threads with the total expected number. Because
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the barrier is not full, the thread is suspended and the context is switched.


















If the barrier is ready, then instead of using the CStep-Suspend case of the concurrent step
relation, the CStep-Release case is applied:
thds[i] = (s, (Running (barrier bn; c)))
thds′ = [i→ (s, (Waiting(bn, c)))] thds
b[bn] = (waitingcnt, totalcnt) b
′ = [bn→ (0, totalcnt)] b
waitingcnt + 1 = totalcnt
transition threads (bn, thds′) = thds′′
((i :: Ω), thds, h, b) ; (Ω, thds′′, h, b′)
CStep-Release
The first requirement of CStep-Release is exactly the same as CStep-Suspend: the thread must
be suspended. However, now all of the threads have arrived at the barrier and so it is ready. The
waiting threads counter is reset. Finally, the suspended threads are simultaneously resumed
by the transition threads predicate which changes to the Running state all threads that are
currently in the Waiting state for barrier bn. If in the previous example the second thread also


















The last two cases describe the fork and join. When encountering a fork operation, fork
(m(−→v )), a completely new thread is generated, the stack is initialized by copying the values
corresponding to the method arguments from the stack of the calling thread, the body of method
m is retrieved from program memory Γ, and the thread is set to execute the method body.
thds[i] = (s, (Running (fork (m(−→v )); c)))
Γ[m] = void m(
−−→
t w) {e} tid = fresh tid()
thds′ = [i→ ([res→ tid]s, (Running c))] thds
ns[−→w ] = s[−→v ] thds′′ = [tid→ (ns, (Running e))] thds′
((i :: Ω), h, thds, b) ; (Ω, h, thds′′, b)
CStep-Fork
Note that we enforce the Java Runnable approach by allowing as fork arguments only
functions without a return value. Also note that we rely on a special variable res to convey
the operation result, the id of the newly created thread. Furthermore, the assumption that
the remaining scheduler Ω will contain the newly created tid is acceptable as the domain of
the scheduler list is not restricted to some statically defined thread ids, it is the set of natural
numbers.
Lastly, in order to execute a join on a given thread id the semantics require that the thread
be finished, in the (Running skip) state.
thds[i] = (s, (Running (join (tid); c)))
thds[tid] = (s′, (Running skip))
thds′ = [i→ (s, (Running c)))]thds
thds′′ = free(tid, thds′)
((i :: Ω), h, thds, b) ; (Ω, h, thds′′, b)
CStep-Join
Given two threads, the first having finished its execution when the second executes a join 1
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We denote the oracle semantic step by (σ, o, c) 7→ (σ′, o′, c′). Here the sequential state σ and
command c are exactly the same as in the purely sequential step. The new parameter o is an
oracle, a kind of box containing “the rest” of the concurrent machine—that is, o contains a
scheduler and a list of other threads. The oracle semantics encapsulates the concurrent and
purely sequential semantics in a “sequential looking” semantics thus providing a clean abstrac-
tion of the concurrent machine.
The oracle semantics behaves exactly the same way as the purely sequential semantics on
all of the instructions except for the barrier, fork or join calls, with the oracle o being passed
through unchanged. That is to say:
(
σ, c
) 7→ (σ′, c′)(
σ, o, c
) 7→ (σ′, o, c′) os-seq
When the oracle semantics reaches a barrier, fork or join instruction, it relies on the consult
operation to consult the oracle o to determine the state of the machine after the instruction:
d = barrier bn ∨ d = fork (m(−→v )) ∨ d = join (tid)
consult(h, b, o) = (h′, b′, o′)(
(s, h, b), o, d; c
) 7→ ((s, h′, b′), o′, c) os-consult
The consult operation would either execute the operation according to the concurrent semantics
or if other threads need to be waited for, the consult operation unpacks the concurrent machine
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stored in o and runs all of the other threads until control returns to the original thread. Consult
then returns the current h′ and b′ (that resulted from the barrier call, fork or join) and repackages
the concurrent machine into the new oracle o′.
Purely Sequential Semantics
Here we provide a description of Core−U ’s purely sequential semantic. Note that the language
semantic reduces expressions to final values of the form (fn#a) where constant fn denotes
the current flow type while constant a denotes the result of the computation, either a value
(constant or address) or a pair (fn1, a1) to embed a control flow fn1 with another value a1.
The type of each final value can be obtained by a semantic function type(a). Syntactically
a ::= k | l | (fn, a).
For the dynamic semantics to follow through, we have introduced an intermediate con-
struct: BLK({−→v }, e1) where e1 denotes a residual code of the current block. This new construct
is used for handling try-catch constructs, method calls and local blocks. Its main purpose is
to provide a lexical scope for local variables that are removed once the expression has been
completely evaluated.
The full set of transitions is given in Figure 2.4. Take note that, following the translation
to Core−U , v.f is exception-free, meaning that if v was null, a nullPtrExc exception would
have been previously raised. Consequently, our rules for v.f and v1.f :=v2 do not test for null-
ness. In the rules, s(v) retrieves the value of variable v present on the stack using lookup(s, v).
We also provide an overloaded function s(ft) for ft ::= c | ty(v) | fv which is defined as
s(c)=c and s(ty(v))=type(lookup(s, v)) and s(fv)=lookup(s, fv). A reminder that the se-
quence operation e1; e2 used in the semantic steps for the do-while construct is just syntactic
sugar for try e1 catch norm e2. Take note that the symbol ⊥, appearing in the rules, stands
for uninitialized.
The semantic steps for local variable declaration, method call and try catch, use the newid()
function to return a fresh identifier, and the [u′/u] notation to represent the substitution of u by
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(
(s, h, b), fn#v
) 7→((s, h, b), s(fn)#s(v))(
(s, h, b), fn#(fv, v)
) 7→((s, h, b), s(fn)#(s(fv), s(v)))(
(s, h, b), v.f
) 7→((s, h, b), norm#(h(s(v)).f))(
(s, h, b), fn#a
) 7→((s, h, b), s(fn)#a)(
(s, h, b), v1:=v2
) 7→((s[v1 7→s(v2)], h, b), norm#())(
(s, h, b), v1.f :=v2
) 7→((s, h[s(v1).f 7→s(v2)], b), norm#())
l = inc break(h)(
(s, h, b), fn#new c
) 7→((s, [l 7→c(−→⊥)]h, b), s(fn)#l)
u=newid()
s′ = s+[u7→⊥]
e′ = BLK({u}, e[u/v])(




e′ = BLK({fu, u}, e2[u/v, fu/fv])(
(s, h, b), try c1#a1 catch c@fv#v e2
)
7→((s′, h, b), e′)
¬(c1<:c)(
(s, h, b), try c1#a1 catch c@fv#v e2
) 7→((s, h, b), c1#a1)(
(s, h, b), e
) 7→((s1, h1, b1), e1)(
(s, h, b), try e catch c@fv#v e2
) 7→((s1, h1, b1), try e1 catch c@fv#v e2)
if s(v) then e′ = e1 else e′ = e2(
(s, h, b), if v then e1 else e2
) 7→((s, h, b), e′)
t0 mn (
−→




e′ = BLK({−→u ′}, e[−−→u′/u])(
(s, h, b),mn(−→v )) 7→((s′, h, b), e′)
(
(s, h, b), e
) 7→((s1, h1, b1), e1)
e′ = BLK({−→v }, e1)(
(s, h, b), BLK({−→v }, e)) 7→((s1, h1, b1), e′)(
(s, h, b), BLK({−→v }, c#a)) 7→((s−{−→v }, h, b), c#a)
Figure 2.4: Small-Step Semantics
u′. In order to avoid dynamic binding, every variable whose binding is added to the stack is
substituted by a fresh identifier. For instance, in the case of the method call, after performing
the renaming of the callee formal parameters, the mappings for the fresh identifiers are tem-
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porarily added to the stack, s. These bindings will be removed after the evaluation of the callee
body.
2.4 Specification Language
Predicate spred ::= [self::]c〈−→v 〉 ≡ Φ [inv (pi,−→v )]
Barrier bar ::= [self::]bname〈−→v 〉 ≡ ∨ (requires Φpre ensures Φpost)
Formula Φ ::=
∨
i(∃−→vi · (κi ∧ pii)) ∆ ::=
∨
i(κi ∧ pii ∧ βi)
Heap form. κ ::= emp | v ::cvf 〈−→v 〉 | κ ∗ κ
Pure form. pi ::= γ ∧ φ ∧ µ ∧ τ
Flow types ft ::= c | predef flow
Flow form. β ::= fv=ft | fv1=fv2
Current flow µ ::= flow = fset fset = Ex(ft) | ft− {ft1, .., ftn}
Frac form. τ ::= vf ⊕ vf = vf | v = χ | τ ∧ τ
Pointer form. γ ::= v = v | v = null | v 6= v | v 6= null | γ ∧ γ
Presburger arith. φ ::= arith | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | ¬φ | ∃v · φ | ∀v · φ
arith ::= a = a | a 6= a | a < a | a ≤ a
a ::= z | v | z × a | a + a | −a | max(a, a) | min(a, a)
where v, w are variable names;
c is a data type name or a predicate name or barrier name;
z is an integer constant;
τ represents the fractional permission constraints
χ represents constant fractional shares
Figure 2.5: Specification Language
Figure 2.5 outlines the syntax of our specification language, a rich separation logic based
language that supports user-defined disjunctive predicates together with constraints over con-
trol flow types(for explicitly capturing flow types) and other various domains like linear and non
linear arithmetics. It also includes support for tracking access permissions to shared resources
in the form of partial ownership annotations, plus a novel specification feature for capturing
barrier behaviour and for homogeneous reasoning about both heap and barrier resources.
The specification language is equipped with an expressive means for encoding complex
abstract data structure properties in the form of user-defined inductive predicates. Predicates
are defined as separation formulae that describe the shape of data structures and associated
properties (e.g., list length, tree height, and bag of values contained in a list). Predicate defini-
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tions make use of the self special variable to denote the pointer to the root of the data structures
they abstract. Predicate invariants can increase the precision of the verification (e.g., length ≥
0). An invariant for a predicate instance has two parts: a pure formula describing arithmetic
constraints on the arguments and the set of non null pointer arguments (e.g. the outward pointer
for a list segment). For example, given a node data structure defined as:
data node { int val ; node next }
It is possible to express a predicate abstraction for a list segment constructed of node instances.
The following predicate captures both the shape and the size, n, of the segment and the outward
pointer, p:
pred self :: lseg〈n, p〉 ≡ self = p ∧ n = 0
∨ self :: node〈 , r〉 ∗ r :: lseg〈n− 1, p〉 inv n ≥ 0, p.
Furthermore, the user defined predicates can be incorporated in any formula. For example,
given an append method that takes a null terminated list segment and appends another list
segment, the pre/post conditions can be expressed using the lseg predicate as follows:
void append (node x, node y)
requires x :: lseg〈n, null〉 ∗ y :: lseg〈m, p〉 ensures x :: lseg〈n+m, p〉
Note that the formulae describing the predicate body and the method specifications contain
both heap and arithmetic constraints. In the following paragraphs we will expand further on
formulae structure and give more details on each component.
In order to be able to reason about barrier behaviour we equip the specification language
with barrier definitions. Akin to predicate definitions which specify properties of abstract data
structures associated with concrete memory resources, barrier definitions are a novel mech-
anism for encoding the complex resource invariants associated with barrier usage. Barrier
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definitions consist of sets of formula pairs, acting as pre/post conditions. Barrier definitions
and predicate definitions are similar in that they describe properties associated with resources,
heaps and barriers, however, they differ in that predicate definitions describe a property of the
current state while barrier definitions describe the behaviour of a barrier call in that program
state. For a clearer presentation we defer the in-depth presentation of barrier definitions and
their usage until Chapter 4.
Secondly, as both programming languages presented earlier handle two classes of resources:
heap and barriers, we propose to extend the syntax typically used for heap specification to cover
barrier resources as well. In our language, each disjunct within a disjunctive formula Φ con-
sists of a resource describing subformula κ, and pi, the pure subformula that represents the
resource-independent part of the formula with constraints over several domains: arithmetic,
bag/list, etc.
κ describes the resource footprint which is composed of ∗-separated resource nodes written
as p::avf 〈−→v 〉 and interpreted as the current thread owns fraction vf of a resource of type a
pointed to by variable p with arguments−→v . The vf argument is optional. If none is specified, it
is implied that the resource is fully owned. Depending on a, the node can be either an instance
of a user-defined data structure, in which case the −→v arguments correspond to the structure
fields, or it can be an instance of a user-defined predicate, in which case −→v correspond to the
predicate arguments, or it could be a barrier, in which case the first argument, v1, gives an
indication of the barrier state while the rest v2... denote the shared variables guarded by the
barrier.
Bornat et al. introduced the concept of fractional share to handle the necessary accounting
of fractional ownership [14]. Shares form a disjoint multi-unit separation algebra 1; a full share
(complete ownership of a resource) can be broken into various partial shares; these shares can
then be rejoined into the full share. The empty share is the identity for shares. With respect
1Dockins et al. described in [28] a disjoint multi-unit separation algebra (hereafter just “DSA”) . Briefly, a
DSA is a set S and an associated three-place partial join relation⊕, written x⊕y = z, such that⊕ is commutative,
associative, a function ( x⊕y = z1∧x⊕y = z2 ⇒ z1 = z2), cancelative (x1⊕y = z∧x2⊕y = z ⇒ x1 = x2),
has multiple units (∀x. ∃ux. x⊕ ux = x) and exhibits disjointedness (x⊕ x = y ⇒ x = y).
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to resource ownership, we often need non-empty (strictly positive) shares. We require the full
share to modify a resource however we only require a positive share to read from one. There is
no danger of a data race even though we do not require the full share to read: if a thread has a
positive share of some location, no other thread can have a full share for the same location.
Here we use the following notations : the full share `; two distinct nonempty partial shares,
?and ? , and the empty share @. The key point is that ?⊕ ? = `. Also we will use χ
to denote generic constants of this domain. Also note that if a denotes a predicate, then the
notation p::avf 〈−→v 〉 indicates that p points to a memory region whose shape is described by
the definition of a and that all heap nodes abstracted by this predicate instance are owned with
permission vf .
We allow the pure part pi to capture pointer equalities/inequalities (γ), linear arithmetic
(φ), a share subformula (τ ) and the current flow constraint (µ). The share subformula contains
constraints expressing share facts of the form vf1 ⊕ vf2 = vf3, v1 = v2 or v = χ. The current
flow constraint µ expresses the control flow type associated with the respective program state.
It is captured by a special variable flow whose domain is the set of subtrees in the control
flow hierarchy. With this hierarchy, we can be as precise as required for verifying different
exception safety guarantees: the possible values of control flow are either Ex(ft) to denote an
exact control flow type (not including its subclasses), or ft− {ft1, .., ftn} to denote a control
flow from ft but not from subclasses ft1, .., ftn.
Note that for simplicity we also introduce ∆, to denote a composite formula that is en-
hanced with an extra pure component β to capture the bindings for flow type variables other
than flow . In Chapter 3 we will show how such bindings are generated and how are they
handled.
Lastly, each variable in our specification logic may be expressed in either primed form
(e.g. v′) or unprimed form (e.g. v). The former denotes the latest value of the corresponding
variable, while the latter denotes the original value of the same variable. When used in the




We interpret the assertions in the specification language with respect to the state model pro-
posed for Core−U : states σ are triples of a store, heap, and barrier map (σ = (s, h, b)) with the
addition that heaps are partial functions to pairs of shares and values and barrier maps are par-
tial functions to pairs of shares and barriers. Furthermore, barriers expose an integer variable
denoting the barriers state. The semantic model for our formulae is defined below. It follows
the models given in [86, 75].
Definition 2.4.1 (State join). Given two states σ1 = (s1, h1, b1) and σ2 = (s2, h2, b2) it is
possible to define an extension of the ⊕ operator from the share domain to the state domain:
σ1 ⊕ σ2 = (s1 ⊕ s2, h1 ⊕ h2, b1 ⊕ b2, ) where:
• s1 ⊕ s2 is defined only if s1 = s2 and s1 ⊕ s2 = s1;
• h1 ⊕ h2 = h such that dom(h) = dom(h1) ∪ dom(h2) and:
– x ∈ dom(h1)/dom(h2) then h(x) = h1(x)
– x ∈ dom(h2)/dom(h1) then h(x) = h2(x)
– else if h1(x) = (pi1, v1) and h2(x) = (pi2, v2) then if v1 = v2 and ∃pi ·pi1⊕pi2 = pi
then h(x) = (pi1 ⊕ pi2, v1). We observe that if v1 6= v2 then the join fails
• The definition of b1 ⊕ b2 = b, follows identically the definition of h1 ⊕ h2 = h
Here function dom(f) returns the domain of function f .
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Definition 2.4.2 (Model for Separation Constraint).
s, h, b |=Φ1∨Φ2 iff s, h, b |= Φ1 or s, h, b |= Φ2
s, h, b |=∃−→v ·κ∧pi iff ∃−→ν ·s[−→v 7→−→ν ], h, b |=κ and s[−→v 7→−→ν ]|=pi
s, h, b |=emp iff dom(h) = ∅
s, h, b |= v0 ::cvf 〈−→v 〉 iff c is a data structure c {t1 f1, .., tn fn}
and pi = s(vf ) and r=c[f1 7→s(v1), .., fn 7→s(vn)]
and h=[s(v0) 7→(pi, r)]
s, h, b |= v0 ::cvf 〈−→v 〉 iff c is a predicate (c(−→w )≡Φ)
Φ′ = set perm(Φ, vf ) and s, h, b |= Φ′[−→v /−→w ]
s, h, b |= v0 ::cvf 〈−→v 〉 iff c is a barrier
b(s(v0)) = (s(vf ), r) and r.state = s(v1)
s, h, b |=κ1∗κ2 iff ∃h1, h2, b1, b2 · (s, h1, b1)⊕ (s, h2, b2) = (s, h, b)
and s, h1, b1 |= κ1 and s, h2, b2 |= κ2
s |= pi1 ∧ pi2 iff s |= pi1 and s |= pi2
s |= v1  v2 iff s(v1) s(v2), where  ∈{=, 6=}
s |= v  null iff s(v) 0, where  ∈{=, 6=}
s |= a0 iff [[a]]s0, where  ∈{=,≤, 6=}
. . .
The semantic entailment relation Φ1 |= Φ2 holds, if and only if, forall stacks s, heaps h
and barrier maps b, we have s, h, b |= Φ1 =⇒ s, h, b |= Φ2.
2.5 Translation to the Core Language
In this section we present the translation from SrcLang to Core−U . The translation is based
on rewrite rules and illustrates how advanced language features, such as try−finally and
multi-return functions, can be easily captured by the core language. Moreover, we prove two
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important properties of the translation, namely completeness and termination.
We also provide a set of optimization rules for Core−U designed to reduce the implemen-
tation overhead. These rules are specified at a high-level thus facilitating both human under-
standing and the construction of correctness proofs. For all the rules we supply correctness
proofs.
2.5.1 Translation Steps
The translation from SrcLang to our core language consists of several steps. These steps are
preceded by a preprocessing phase dedicated to checking the validity of local control flows.
More specifically, we check that the continue [L] construct appears inside loops, break [L]
and continue [L] mention only accessible labels, and, in the case of the multi-return function
declaration with n return points, each of its return instruction must be of the form (ret−i e)
such that i≤n. Furthermore, method call must also be invoked with n− 1 return points.
Following the Stratego approach [98], we base the translation from SrcLang to Core−U on
rewrite rules. The translation process is split into four independent steps such that, in each of
the steps, there is no interference between the rules to be applied. In other words, each rule
will neither trigger nor block the application of any other rule from the same rewrite set. Addi-
tionally, the rules from each phase will not trigger the application of any rule from a previous
phase. As a consequence of this non-interference property, the order in which the rules are
applied in each of the steps is irrelevant. The non-interference property is also important for
guaranteeing the termination of the rewriting process.
Phase I: Preprocessing
In the first step, we transform expressions that appear in a more complex form than allowed
by the core language. For example, we may encounter if e then e1 else e2, while our core
language can only accept a simpler if v then e1 else e2. This mismatch can be handled in
a standard way with the help of the local let binding construct that always generates a fresh
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new variable.
(c) e ⇒T let v=e in (c) v ¬V ar(e)
if e then e1 else e2 ⇒T let v=e in if v then e1 else e2 ¬V ar(e)
throw e ⇒T let v=e in throw v ¬V ar(e)∧¬New(e)
ret−i e ⇒T let v=e in ret−i v ¬V ar(e)∧¬New(e)
∧¬Const(e)
These rules contain guards, which are meant to restrict their applicability. For instance, the rule
corresponding to the cast construct, (c) e, contains the guard ¬V ar(e), meaning that it can only
be applied if the expression e is not a variable. Otherwise, the translation is not needed as the
construct is already in the expected Core−U form. Similarly, ¬New(e) and ¬Const(e) check
that the expression e is different from a new construct or a primitive constant, respectively. Take
note that the guards were used in order to restrict the introduction of new variables, wherever
possible.
The above rewrite rules would require local type inference to determine a suitable type
declaration for each of the intermediate variables. Intermediate variables allow us to support
a syntactically minimal core language that should be easier for formal reasoning. For com-
putational purpose, their overheads can be eliminated (after analysis) by applying either the
converse transformation or through better re-use of variables.
Phase II: Main Translation
In the main translation step, we aim to use Core−U ’s expressivity in order to uniformly manip-
ulate several of the SrcLang constructs. For this purpose, we will exploit a basic construct of
our core language, ft#x, where x denotes a simple term that would directly produce a value,
e.g. v, k, new c or (fv, v), while ft denotes the desired control flow. Using it, we can easily
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translate a number of constructs from the source language, as shown below.
x ⇒T norm#x
break ⇒T brk#()
break L ⇒T brk−L#()
continue ⇒T cont#()
continue L ⇒T cont−L#()
ret−i x ⇒T ret−i#x
throw v ⇒T ty(v)#v
throw new c ⇒T c#new c
(c) v ⇒T if ty(v)<:c then norm#v
else ClassCastExc#v
For the throw command, we have to decide which flow type to raise. In case of new c, we can
determine that it is an exact type of class c. In case of v, we have to use ty(v) to retrieve the
runtime type of the object. Assuming the well-typedness of source programs, we expect these
flow types from throw commands to be subtypes of exc.
The other unified construct is for supporting a generalised try−catch mechanism. Its
format is try e1 catch (c@fv)#v e2 where c is the type of flow captured, must be a subtype
of c−flow, fv is a variable that binds to the concrete control flow type captured and v is a
variable capturing the thrown value. However, we may sometimes ignore the bound variables
fv and v. For convenience, we allow the following shorthands:
try e1 catch c#v e2 ≡ try e1 catch c@ #v e2
try e1 catch c e2 ≡ try e1 catch c@ # e2
The unified try-catch construct can be used to:
• translate the try-catch construct from the source language:
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An important feature of Java for exception handling is the try construct with multiple
catch handlers. An example of its usage is the following construct with two handlers:
try {e}
catch (c1 v1) {e1}
catch (c2 v2) {e2}
It is tempting to think that the above feature can be directly implemented in our language,
as a nested pair of try−catch constructs, as follows:
try (try e catch (c1@ #v1) e1) catch (c2@ #v2) e2
However, this translation is not correct, since an exception raised inside e1 may be caught
by the second handler for the target (nested) code but not the source (unnested)
code. To avoid this problem, we must attach a side-condition which ensures that
∀ c ∈ throwsAll(e1) · ¬(c<:c2 ∨ c2<:c), where throwsAll(e1) statically computes all
the flow types that may escape from e1, before we allow the above translation.
Alternatively, we will use the following more general translation:






try e catch (c1@fv1#v1) embed(spec, e1)
[ catch (ci@fvi#vi) embed(spec, ei) ]
n
i=2
) catch (spec@fv#v) v.1#v.2
We provide the notation embed(ft, e) as a shorthand for :
try e catch ((c−flow@fv)#v) ft#(fv, v)
For each flow that can be caught, it embeds the flow and its value into a pair (fv, v)
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and attaches them to the flow ft taken as parameter. In the context of the previous
translation, all the flows that can be caught from ei, 1≤i≤n, will be embedded with their
corresponding values, and attached to a flow type named spec. Consequently, every
outcome from evaluating ei will indeed skip the outer handlers ej , i<j≤n, and will
only be caught by the outermost handler. Operations v.1 and v.2 are used to extract the
components of the pair denoted by v. Take note that the translation of a try catch with n
handlers will result in n+1 try catch constructs.
• translate the finally construct:
Let us consider the finally construct from Java, used in the following two code frag-
ments below:
try { return 2 } catch (Exception v) {print “catch′′}
finally { print “tidy up′′}
try { System.exit(0)}catch (Exception v){print “catch′′}
finally { print “tidy up′′ }
A frequent doubt is whether the finally block would be executed after the occurrence of
non-exceptional control flows, such as return or System.exit. We can unambiguously
and succinctly specify the intention of the finally construct by the following translation
to our core language:
e1 finally e2
⇒T try e1 catch ((c−flow@fv)#v) (e2; fv#v)
Any control flow (including norm) that escapes e1 and can be caught (under the c−flow
subtype) will lead to the execution of the finally block. For the above mentioned Java ex-
ample, we would model return by flow type ret−1, while System.exit, to terminate
the Java Virtual Machine, is modelled by flow type halt in our language. Our translation
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therefore indicates that the finally e2 block is executed for the first code fragment but not
the second code fragment, since ret−1<:c−flow and ¬(halt<:c−flow).
• translate the multi-return function call and declaration:
(m −→v ) with λv2.e2 . . . λvn.en
⇒T try (m −→v ) catch ret−2#v2 e2
. . .
catch(ret−n#vn) en
The translation to our core language explicitly captures the choice of the return point,
based on the control flow that is caught after the evaluation of the inner application,
(m −→v ).
Note that the first return of each method declaration is considered to be the normal value
that is to be returned directly to its callers’ sites. This is achieved by changing ret−1
to the norm control flow, for each method declaration, as follows:
m [with n] (
−→
t v) {e}
⇒T m [with n] (−→t v){try e catch ret−1#v norm#v}
• translate the local binding construct:
let v=e1 in e2 ⇒T try e1 catch norm#v e2
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• handle abnormal controls due to breaks and continues for loops:
L : while e1 {e2}
⇒T try {bool v; v:=e1;
while v {





The try-catch mechanism provides a uniform way to deal with non-local control flows,
such as break and continue via exception handling. If these mechanisms had not
been used, our language would resort to lower-level constructs, such as goto statements,
for formal reasoning. The unstructured goto construct may be useful for efficient im-
plementation, but has a lower abstraction level for formal reasoning.
• handle abnormal controls due to breaks for labelled expressions:
L : e⇒T try e catch brk−L norm#()
Phase III: Wrapping-up the Translation
For this phase, the unified try−catch construct is used to replace the sequence operator
e1; e2, and to simplify the RHS of the assignment construct (to a variable), as shown below.
e1; e2 ⇒T try e1 catch norm e2
w := e ⇒T try e catch norm#v w := v
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The placement of these two rules in a separate phase is meant to maintain the non-interference
property of the translation process. This is due to the fact that some of the translations rules
from the previous phase trigger the application of the assignment and sequence translation
rules.
Phase IV: Handling Implicitly Raised Exceptions
To complete our translation, in the last rewriting step, we provide a set of rules to deal with
constructs that may implicitly raise some exceptions, such as null dereferencing or memory
overflow. These rules can help make all raised exceptions explicit.
v.f ⇒T if v=null then nullPtrExc#v
else v.f
v.f := v2 ⇒T if v=null then nullPtrExc#v
else v.f := v2
ft#new c ⇒T if enoughMem(c) then ft#new c
else OutofMemoryExc#null
ty(v)#v ⇒T if v=null then nullPtrExc#v
else ty(v)#v
As a wrap-up step unrelated to control flow handling, loops are transformed to tail-recursive
methods where the parameters are passed by reference.
Note that the translated codes can be more efficiently implemented than the original code,
since they can be specialised as exception-free code. Furthermore, there is potential for a
systematic optimization to eliminate some of the checks that have been explicitly inserted. For
example, we could use a nullness analysis to help statically determine those nullness tests that
are known to be redundant. Similarly, it is possible to aggregate a series of tests on memory
sufficiency to be replaced by a bigger test at the beginning. These steps can lead to simpler
(and more efficient) core programs.
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It is possible to provide a semantics for Core−U and another semantics for SrcLang, be-
fore proving that the translation rules are fully abstract [89] by preserving observational equiv-
alence between the source and target programs under their respective semantics. This would
have proven the correctness of the translation rules between the two languages. However, since
the core language is at a relatively high level and can be viewed as a subset of the source lan-
guage, we could also define the semantics of the SrcLang directly in terms of the Core−U .
With this simplified approach, the translation rules would be correct by construction. This ap-
proach is not at all new. For example, the Haskell language [54] is largely defined in this way,
by translating more complex language features into a simpler core.
Nevertheless, we will prove two important properties of our translation rules. Firstly, we
shall show that given any arbitrary SrcLang expression, we can always translate it into a
Core−U counterpart. Secondly, we shall prove that the application of the translation rules
always terminates.
Lemma 2.5.1 (Completeness of Translation). Consider any term e ∈ SrcLang. Repeated
applications by our transformation rules via e ⇒∗T e′ would eventually result in e′ ∈ Core−U
, when the transformation terminates.
Proof [(sketch)] There is at least one transformation rule for each syntactic construct of
SrcLang, except for the local block {t v; e} which remains unchanged in Core−U . Fur-
thermore, each target form in the RHS of the translation rules belongs to Core−U or can
be transformed as so in a subsequent step. Hence, by induction on the syntactic structure of
SrcLang, we can prove that the final expression belongs to Core−U , should the transformation
terminate. 2
Lemma 2.5.2 (Termination of Translation). The transformation e ⇒∗T e′ always terminates.
Proof [(sketch)] Let us first note that all the rewrite rules used in the translation process
follow a common design, namely the RHS does not contain the pattern from the LHS that
triggers the application of the rule. This property ensures that each application of a rewrite
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rule will eliminate one occurrence of a specific trigger. Moreover, none of the rules trigger the
application of any other rule from the same set, nor the application of a rule from any of the
previous steps. Consequently, the rewriting process, for each of the four steps, must terminate.
2
2.5.2 Optimization Rules
We shall now provide a set of equivalence rules for our language that can be used for formal
reasoning and optimization. One feature of our rules is that they are formulated at a relatively
high-level based on our core language. We expect such high-level rules to be easier to under-
stand and prove correct.
Our first rule is inspired by the associativity property of sequential composition, namely




try (try e catch c1 e1) catch c2 e2
⇔ try e catch c1 (try e1 catch c2 e2)
This re-ordering may be used to help group a nested series of expressions with a similar prop-
erty together, so that we may have a larger expression with the same property. For example,
if expressions e1 and e2 are free of dynamic control flows (namely exceptions), we may group
them closer via the above rule. Grouping together expressions without exceptions can give us
larger code blocks that can be better optimized.
The second optimization rule ensures the elimination of redundant catch handlers. This can
occur if the try block never raises any of the control flows that are caught by a given handler.
Take note that, throws(e) is intended to capture the entire set of exceptions (or control flows)
that may escape from the expression e. The auxiliary function overlap(c1, c2) signifies the
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val = (s(ft), s(x))(
(s, h, b), jump L(ft, x)
) 7→((s, h, b), jump−L#val)
¬(c1<:c)(
(s, h, b), try c1#a1 catch c L(fv, v):e2
) 7→((s, h, b), c1#a1)
e = jump−L#(c1, a1) u = newid() fu = newid()
e′ = BLK({u, fu}, e2[u/v, fu/fv])(
(s, h, b), try e catch c L(fv, v):e2
) 7→((s+[fu7→c1, u7→a1], h, b), e′)
c1<:c
u = newid() fu = newid()
e′ = BLK({u, fu}, e2[u/v, fu/fv])(
(s, h, b), try c1#a1 catch c L(fv, v):e2
) 7→((s+[fu7→c1, u7→a1], h, b), e′)
Figure 2.6: Semantics for the Jump Construct
condition that c1 shares some common subtypes with c2, overlap(c1, c2)=c1<:c2∨c2<:c1.
[Catch Elimination Rule]
∀c ∈ throws(e) · ¬overlap(c, c1)
try e catch c1@fv1#v1 e1 ⇒ e
Our next rule is intended to optimize the stack unwinding mechanism that is typically used
to propagate a raised exception to its handler. Occasionally, it is possible to determine that
the invocation of a particular exception (or control flow) will always be caught by a given
handler. If this scenario is detected, we can transform a raised exception into a direct jump to
its handler’s code. Such a jump feature shall be added directly to the target compiled language.
As our core language also supports the capture of both a control flow and its thrown value,
we will have to pass these items to the handler during such a jump. Argument passing can be
implemented with the help of a parameterized jump. A jump(L(−→v )) command is said to be
parameterized by −→v if it carries a list of arguments for its labelled location. Correspondingly,
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a labelled location jump(L(−→v ) : e) is said to be parameterized with −→v , if variables −→v in code
e can be initialized by its corresponding jump. Our parameterized label shall always be used
in the context of a catch handler of the form try e catch c@fv#v L(fv, v):e2, which shall
be abbreviated as try e catch c L(fv, v):e2.
In real languages, the jump instruction would be a machine primitive that changes the
current program counter to the address of the labelled instruction. However, for convenience,
we shall model the jump construct (in the same way as break construct) with an abnormal
control flow that would be caught by its labelled handler. Using this interpretation, the jump
construct, jump L(ft, x), is essentially modelled using jump−L#(ft, x), where each flow
type jump−L will only be captured by its handler at the labelled location L. In Figure 2.6 we
provide the semantics for the newly introduced jump construct. Take note that the formalised
semantic mirrors the state transition relation for the actual machine.
We shall now consider the optimization itself. As a simple example, consider the code
fragment:
try try
(try exc#3 catch (nullPtrExc) e1)
catch (exc#v) e2
catch (norm) e3
An exception exc#3 is being thrown that will be caught by the second catch handler. We
may directly link this throw with its corresponding catch handler by the following transformed
code:
try try
(try jump L1(exc, 3) catch (nullPtrExc) e1)
catch (exc) L1( , v) : e2
catch (norm) e3
This is a desirable optimization since a jump command can usually be implemented much
more efficiently. The rule for linking a throw with its corresponding catch handler can be
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formally expressed, as follows:
[Throw−Catch Linking Rule]
escape(C[], fc) Γ(ft) = fc fc<:c
try C[ft#x] catch c@fv#v e ⇒
try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch c L(fv, v) : e
Note that we assume a prior type inference algorithm. Consequently, Γ denotes the type en-
vironment, with its corresponding runtime stack capturing both values and control flows. For
each flow, ft, Γ(ft) will capture the flow type. We use a context notation C[] to denote an
expression with a single hole [], and C[e] to denote the replacement of the hole by e for the
given context. Formally, the context notation is defined as:
C[] ::= [] | {t v; C[]} | if v then C[] else e
| if v then e else C[] | try C[] catch @fv#v e
| try e catch c@fv#v C[] | do C[] while v
We also provide an operator escape(C[], fc) that can determine if a control flow fc will escape
its given context C[]. This operation is defined, as follows:
escape([], fc) = true
escape(try C[] catch c e, fc) | overlap(fc, c) = false
escape(try C[] catch c e, fc) | ¬overlap(fc, c)
= escape(C[], fc)
escape(E, fc) = escape(C[], fc)
where E ::= if v then C[] else e | if v then e else C[]
| do C[] while v | {t v; C[]} | try e catch c C[]
After some throw-catch linkings, it may be possible to obtain code involving a series of con-
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secutive jumps. In order to shortcut such a series of jumps, we consider the scenario under
which a parameterized jump can be inlined. This can occur if control flows from e are never
caught by the context (try C[] catch c L(fv, v) : e), as defined in the rule below:
[Jump Inlining Rule]
∀c1 ∈ throws(e) · (escape(C[], c1) ∧ ¬overlap(c, c1))
try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch c L(fv, v) : e
⇒ try C[[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e] catch c L(fv, v) : e
To avoid name capture during this non-local inlining, we have to ensure that the variables from
(free(e)− {fv, v}) do not clash with the bound variables from the context C[]. This can be
ensured by uniquely renaming the bound variables in C[].
Soundness of Optimization Rules
Definition 2.5.1 (Semantics Preserving Transformation). An expression e′ is said to be a
semantics preserving transformation of e if, whenever the evaluation of e terminates and
(
e, h, s
) 7→∗(c#a, h1, s1),
then the evaluation of e′ terminates and
(
e′, h, s
) 7→∗(c#a, h1, s1).
Definition 2.5.2 (Sound Optimization Rule). An optimization rule rewriting an expression
exp into an expression exp′ is said to be sound if exp′ is a semantics preserving transformation
of exp.
Def. 2.5.1 and Def. 2.5.2 are used to state the soundness of the optimization rules. When
sketching the proofs of the soundness lemmas, we will make use of some notational conven-
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tions. The initial expression, before optimization, will be denoted by exp, while the optimized
one, obtained after rewriting, will be denoted by exp′. Additionally, h will stand for the current
heap, and s for the current stack.
Lemma 2.5.3 (Soundness of Re-Ordering Rule (⇒ direction)). If c2<:c1 then the following
expression:
try e catch c1@fv1#v1 (try e1 catch c2@fv2#v2 e2)
is a semantics preserving transformation of:
try (try e catch c1@fv1#v1 e1) catch c2@fv2#v2 e2
Proof: According to the hypothesis that the evaluation of exp terminates and to the seman-
tics of the try catch construct, we can assume that e gets evaluated to c#a. Consequently, there
are two possibilities:
• c<:c1. In this case, the evaluation of exp is reduced to the evaluation of the handler e1
in a try e1 catch c2 e2 construct. On the other hand, when considering the expression
exp′ obtained after optimization, e gets evaluated in a similar way and, assuming that
c<:c1, everything is reduced again to try e1 catch c2 e2. 2
• ¬(c<:c1). Conform to the semantics, the handler e1 is not reachable in exp. Moreover,
due to the assumption that c2 <: c1, the handler e2 is also unreachable. Therefore, exp is
evaluated to c#a. On the other hand, in exp′, the handler try e1 catch c2@fv2#v2 e2
is also unreachable. Hence, exp′ also evaluates to c#a. 2
Take note that the [Re-Ordering Rule] rule claims the equivalence of the two expressions, exp
and exp′. Therefore, we need another lemma for proving soundness when the rule is applied
from right to left.
Lemma 2.5.4 (Soundness of Re-Ordering Rule (⇐ direction)). If c2<:c1 then the following
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expression:
try (try e catch c1@fv1#v1 e1) catch c2@fv2#v2 e2
is a semantics preserving transformation of:
try e catch c1@fv1#v1 (try e1 catch c2@fv2#v2 e2)
Proof: Similar to the proof for Lemma 2.5.3. 2
Lemma 2.5.5 (Soundness of Catch Elimination Rule). Assuming that
∀c ∈ throws(e) · ¬overlap(c, c1)
then expression e is a semantics preserving transformation of
try e catch c1@fv1#v1 e1
Proof: We show that exp′ is a semantics preserving transformation of exp by proving that
the handler e1 of exp is unreachable. Let us assume that e evaluates to c#a. According to the
assumption that all the exceptions are checked (any exception escaping from a method’s body
must be declared in its throws list), to the semantics for try catch, and the hypothesis that all
the control flows of e escape from exp, the handler e1 is unreachable. 2
Lemma 2.5.6. Soundness of Throw-Catch Linking Rule: If the following conditions hold:
escape(C[], fc) and Γ(ft) = fc and fc<:c
then the expression: try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch c L(fv, v) : e is a semantics preserving
transformation of the expression
try C[ft#x] catch c@fv#v e.
2. PRELIMINARIES 51
Proof: By structural induction on the context of the try block C[].
• Case []. Straightforward.
• Case try C[] catch c e. Conform to the semantics, the evaluation of both exp and exp′
implies first the evaluation of the inner try block. According to the hypothesis that
Γ(ft) = fc and that the control flow fc escapes the context C[] being caught by the
external handler, both expressions will be reduced to the following machine configura-
tion: 〈(s+[fv 7→ft, v 7→x], h, b), e〉, where s , h and b denote the stack, heap and barrier
map after the evaluation of the try block. The conclusion is immediate.
• Case do C[] while v. The initial expression exp is reduced to:
try C[ft#x]; if v then (do C[ft#x] while v) else ()
catch c@fv#v e
which is syntactic sugar for:
try (try C[ft#x] catch norm
if v then (do C[ft#x] while v)
else ()) catch c@fv#v e
On the other hand, exp′ is reduced to:
try (try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch norm
if v then (do C[jump L(ft, x)] while v)
else ()) catch c L(fv, v) : e
The conclusion follows from the hypothesis that escape(C[], fc) and Γ(ft) = fc and
fc<:c and from the dynamic semantics.
• Case t v; C[]. We conclude immediately from the semantics and the hypothesis that
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Γ(ft) = fc and the control flow fc escapes the context C[] and it is caught by the exter-
nal handler. Both exp and exp′ are reduced to
〈(s+[fv 7→ft, v 7→x], h, b), e〉
where s,h and b denote the stack, heap and barrier map after the evaluation of the try
block, respectively.
• Case if v then C[] else e1. According to the semantics for the if construct, there are
two cases:
– s(v)=true. The two expressions, exp and exp′, are reduced respectively to:
try C[ft#x] catch c@fv#v e
and try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch c L(fv, v) : e
Conclusion follows immediately.
– s(v)=false According to the semantics:
∗ exp is reduced to: try e1 catch c@fv#v e
∗ exp′ is reduced to: try e1 catch c L(fv, v) : e
The conclusion follows from the semantics, as e1 does not contain any jump construct.
• Case if v then e1 else C[]. Similar to the previous case.
• Case try e1 catch (c1@fv1)#v1 C[]. According to the semantics, there are two cases:
– the evaluation of e1 generates a control flow c′ and c′<:c1. From the dynamic
semantics, the handlers C[ft#x] and C[jump L(ft, x)] are to be evaluated, re-
spectively. The conclusion follows from the induction hypothesis.
– the evaluation of e1 generates a control flow c′ and ¬(c′<:c1). The conclusion
follows from the fact that e1 does not contain any jump construct.
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2
Lemma 2.5.7 (Soundness of Jump Inlining Rule:). Assuming that the following conditions
hold:
∀c1 ∈ throws(e) · (escape(C[], c1) ∧ ¬overlap(c, c1))
then expression
try C[[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e] catch c L(fv, v) : e
is a semantics preserving transformation of the expression
try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch c L(fv, v) : e.
Proof: By structural induction on the context of the try block C[].
• Case []. Straightforward.
• Case try C[] catch c e. Conform to the semantics, the evaluation of both exp and exp′
implies first the evaluation of the inner try block. The conclusion comes from the as-
sumption that all the control flows from e escape the context C[] and from the induction
hypothesis.
• Case do C[] while v. The initial expression exp is reduced to:
try (C[jump L(ft, x)];
if v then (do C[jump L(ft, x)] while v) else ())
catch c L(fv, v) : e
which is syntactic sugar for:
try (try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch norm
if v then (do C[jump L(ft, x)] while v)
else ()) catch c L(fv, v) : e
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On the other hand, exp′ is reduced to:
try (try C[[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e] catch norm
if v then (do C[[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e] while v)
else ()) catch c L(fv, v) : e
From the semantics and the assumption that all the control flows from e escape both the
context C[] and the external try catch, the two expressions will be reduced to:
[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e.
• Case t v1; C[]. The two expressions, exp and exp′, are reduced to
try (t v1; C[jump L(ft, x)]) catch c L(fv, v) : e
and try (t v1; C[[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e]) catch c L(fv, v) : e, respectively. According to
the semantics and the assumption that all the control flows from e escape both the context
C[] and the external try catch construct, the two expressions will evaluate e. Note that,
for the latter case, the stack will also contain the local variable v1. In order to avoid
name clashing, we uniquely rename the free variables of e. Consequently, the result of
the evaluation is the same regardless of whether or not v1 is on the stack.
• Case if v then C[] else e1. According to the semantics for the if construct, there are
two possibilities:
– s(v)=true. The conclusion follows immediately from the induction hypothesis as
the two expressions, exp and exp′, are reduced respectively to:
try C[jump L(ft, x)] catch c L(fv, v) : e
and try C[[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e] catch c L(fv, v) : e.
– s(v)=false. Both expressions reduce to:
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try e1 catch c L(fv, v) : e.
• Case if v then e1 else C[]. Similar to the previous case.
• Case try e1 catch (c1@fv1)#v1 C[]. According to the semantics, there are two possi-
bilities:
– the evaluation of e1 generates a control flow c′ with the property c′<:c1. From the
dynamic semantics, the handlers C[jump L(ft, x)] and
C[[fv 7→ft, v 7→x]e] are to be evaluated, respectively. The conclusion follows from
the induction hypothesis.
– the evaluation of e1 generates a control flow c′ and ¬(c′<:c1). Both expressions





So far we have introduced the input language, we defined a novel core language which unifies
various control flow types under one formalism and we showed how the input language can be
translated to the core language.
In this chapter we will elaborate on common expectations for exception safety guarantees,
and show how easily they can be captured in our specification language. We then introduce a
set of elegantly simple rules for verifying programs with exceptions. We conclude by reporting
on experimental results of introducing our verification logic into the HIP verifier.
3.1 Motivation
Exception handling is considered to be an important but yet controversial feature for many
modern programming languages. It is important since software robustness is highly dependent
on the presence of good exception handling codes. Exception failures can account for up to
2/3 of system crashes and 50% of system security vulnerabilities [72]. It is controversial since
its dynamic semantics is often considered too complex to follow by both programmers and
software tools.
Goodenough provides in [41] a possible classification of exceptions according to their us-
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age. More specifically, they can be used:
• to permit dealing with an operation’s failure as either domain or range failure. Domain
failure occurs when an operation finds that some input assertion is not satisfied, while
range failure occurs when the operation finds that its output assertion cannot be satisfied.
• to monitor an operation, e.g. to measure computational progress or to provide additional
information and guidance should certain conditions arise.
In the context of Spec#, the authors of [67] use the terms client failures and provider fail-
ures for the domain and range failures, respectively. Client failures correspond to parameter
validation, whereas provider failures occur when a procedure cannot perform the task it is
supposed to. Moreover, provider failures are divided into admissible failures and observed
program errors. To support admissible failures, Spec# provides checked exceptions and throws
sets. In contrast, an observed program error occurs if the failure is due to an intrinsic error in
the program (for e.g. an array bounds error) or a global failure that is not tied to a particular
procedure (for e.g. an out-of-memory error). Such failures are signaled by Spec# with the use
of unchecked exceptions, which do not need to be listed in the procedure’s throws set. Likewise
for Java, its type system has been used to track a class of admissible failures through checked
exceptions.
However, omitting the tracking of unchecked exceptions is a serious shortcoming, since
it provides a backdoor for some programmers to deal exclusively with unchecked exceptions.
This shortcut allows programmers to write code without specifying or catching any exceptions.
Although it may seem convenient to the programmer, it sidesteps the intent of the exception
handling mechanisms and makes it more difficult for others to use the code. A fundamental
contradiction is that, while unchecked exceptions are regarded as program errors that are not
meant to be caught by handlers, the runtime system continues to support the handling of both
checked and unchecked exceptions.
Here we show how it is possible to ensure a higher level of exception safety, as defined by
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Stroustrup [94] and extended by Li and co-authors [70], which takes into consideration both
checked and unchecked exceptions. According to Stroustrup, an operation on an object is said
to be exception safe if it leaves the object in a valid state when it is terminated by throwing an
exception. Based on this definition, exception safety can be classified into four guarantees of
increasing quality:
• No-leak guarantee: For achieving this level of exception safety, an operation that throws
an exception must leave its operands in well-defined states, and must ensure that every
resource that has been acquired is released. For example, all memory allocated must be
either deallocated or owned by some object whenever an exception is thrown.
• Basic guarantee: In addition to the no-leak guarantee, the basic invariants of classes are
maintained, regardless of the presence of exceptions. To illustrate, consider the following
Java example: a wrapper class List with two members, (i) ll, an instance of a linked
list class Ll and (ii) size, an integer capturing the size of the linked list. Assuming that
the append operation in the Ll class might throw an error, then we can define an append
operation in the List that does not satisfy the basic guarantee:
void append(List lst wrap; Object o)
{ lst wrap.size + +;
lst wrap.ll.append(o); }
By incrementing size irrespective of the outcome of ll.append(o) then the invariant
that size captures the length of the ll list might be broken.
• Strong guarantee: In addition to providing the basic guarantee, the operation either
succeeds, or has no effects when an exception occurs. That is, for the exceptional case,
all intermediary steps taken need to be unrolled. In other words, if an exception occurs,
the only observable effects of the operation should be the raising of the exception.
• No-throw guarantee: In addition to providing the basic guarantee, the operation is guar-
anteed not to throw an exception.
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We propose a methodology for program verification that can guarantee higher levels of ex-
ception safety. Our approach can deal with all kinds of control flows, including both checked
and unchecked exceptions, thus avoiding the unsafe practice of using the latter to circumvent
exception handling. Another aspect worth mentioning is that some of the aforementioned ex-
ception safety guarantees might be expensive. For instance, strong guarantee might incur the
high cost of roll-back operations as it pushes all the recovery mechanism into the callee. How-
ever, such recovery may also be performed by the caller, or there might be cases when it is
not even required. Consequently, in §3.2 we improve on the definition of strong guarantee for
exception safety.
Moreover, verifying a strong guarantee is generally more expensive than the verification of
a weaker guarantee, as it is expected to generate more complex proof obligations (details can
be found in §3.4). Hence, according to the user’s intention, our system can be tuned to enforce
different levels of exception safety guarantees.
3.2 Examples with Higher Exception Safety Guarantees
We next illustrate our new specification mechanism through a few examples. Let us first con-
sider the following class and predicate definitions.
class node { int val; node next}
pred self::ll〈n〉 ≡ self=null ∧ n=0 ∨
∃r·self::node〈 , r〉 ∗ r::ll〈n−1〉 inv n≥0;
Predicate ll defines a linear-linked list of length n. As elaborated earlier, each predicate
describes a data structure, which is a collection of objects reachable from a base pointer denoted
by self in the predicate definition. The expression after the inv keyword captures a pure
formula that always holds for the given predicate.
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Let us now consider the method list alloc allocating memory for a linear-linked list
to be pointed by x. The precondition requires x to be null, while the postcondition asserts
that either no error was raised, i.e. the flow is norm, and the updated x points to a list with n
elements, or an out of memory exception was raised, i.e. the flow is out of mem exc, and x
remains null.
Method list alloc calls an auxiliary method list alloc helper which recursively al-
locates nodes in the list. If an out of memory exception is raised, the latter performs a rollback
operation, inside a try-catch block, during which it frees all the memory that was acquired up to
that point. Take note that, in the following examples, for illustration purposes, we provide an al-
ternative set of library methods with explicit memory deallocation (via method list dealloc)
that coexists with our Java like language.
void list alloc(int n, ref node x)
requires x=null ∧ n≥0
ensures (x′::ll〈n〉 ∧ flow=norm) ∨ (x′=null ∧ flow=out of mem exc);
{list alloc helper(n, 0, x); }
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void list alloc helper(int n, int i, ref node x)
requires x::ll〈i〉 ∧ n≥i ∧ i≥0




{ x = new node(0, x); }
catch(out of mem exc exc)
{ list dealloc(i, x);
raise (new out of mem exc());
}
list alloc helper(n, i+1, x);
}
}
According to [94], method list alloc is said to ensure a strong guarantee on exception
safety, as it either succeeds in allocating all the required memory cells, x′::ll〈n〉 ∧flow=norm,
or it has no effect, x′=null ∧ flow=out of mem exc. However, this rollback operation can
be expensive if we have been building a long list. Moreover, there can be cases when such
rollbacks are not needed. For instance, in the context of the aforementioned method, a caller
might actually accept a smaller amount of the allocated memory.
We propose to improve Stroustrup’s definition on strong guarantee as follows: An operation
is considered to provide a strong guarantee for exception safety if, in addition to providing
basic guarantees, it either succeeds, or its effect is precisely known to the caller. Given this
new definition, the method list alloc helper prime defined below is also said to satisfy
the strong guarantee. Compared to method list alloc helper, the newly revised method
has an extra pass-by-reference parameter, no cells, to denote the number of memory cells
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that were already allocated. Through this output parameter, the caller is duly informed on the
length of list that was actually allocated. This method has two possible outcomes :
• it succeeds and all the required memory cells were allocated:
x′::ll〈n〉 ∧ no cells′=n;
• an out of memory exception is thrown and no cells captures the number of success-
fully allocated memory cells. The caller is duly informed on the amount of acquired
memory through the no cells parameter, and could either use it, run a recovery code to
deallocate it, or mention its size and location to its own caller.
void list alloc helper prime(int n, int i, ref node x, ref int no cells)
requires x::ll〈i〉 ∧ n≥i ∧ i≥0
ensures (x′::ll〈n〉 ∧ no cells′=n ∧ flow=norm)∨




{ x = new node(0, x); }
catch(out of mem exc exc)
{ no cells=i;
raise (new out of mem exc());
}




Next, we will illustrate how to make use of our verification mechanism for enforcing the
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no-throw guarantee from [94]. For this purpose, let us consider the following swap method
which exchanges the data fields stored in two disjoint nodes.
void swap(node x, node y)
requires x::node〈v1, q1〉∗y::node〈v2, q2〉
ensures x::node〈v2, q1〉∗y::node〈v1, q2〉 ∧ flow=norm;




The precondition requires the nodes pointed by x and y, respectively, to be disjoint, while
the postcondition captures the fact that the values stored inside the two nodes are swapped.
Additionally, the postcondition asserts that the only possible flow at the end of the method is the
normal flow, flow=norm, i.e. no exception was raised. This specification meets the definition
of no-throw guarantee given in [94]. Any presence of exception, including an exception caused
by null pointer dereferencing, would require the postcondition to explicitly capture each such
exceptional flow. Conversely, any absence of exceptional flow in our logic is an affirmation for
the no-throw guarantee. We have shown how our specification language can capture various
kinds of control flow types and how this can be used to specify different levels of exception
safety guarantees. In the next section we will outline a Hoare logic that can be used to verify
such specifications.
3.3 Verification for Unified Control Flows
As we mentioned in the previous chapters, we construct our Hoare logic with the Core−U as
the target language. The beauty of having a properly designed high level core language as a
stepping stone is that it allows really clean and simple forward verification rules.
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The rules describe the construction of Hoare-style triples ` {∆1} e {∆2}, where ∆1 is a
captured program state whereby flow =>, while ∆2 is a disjunctive heap state capturing the
entire set of control flows that may escape during the execution of e. For example, we may
have:
∆2 = (x
′=x+1 ∧ flow=norm) ∨ (x′=x∧flow=exc)
to denote two possible final states, a state with normal control flow describing an increment in
variable x and a second state in which an exception occurs and the state of x is unchanged.
In the remainder of the current section we will focus mainly on the verification of the
unified throw construct, #, and the try-catch construct. We give the formulations for the rules
for these constructs in Figure 3.1. We delay the presentation of the barrier rule until Chapter 4.
Also since the other rules are largely conventional we omit them.
[FV−[SPLIT]]
split(∆, c, fv, v) =
( ∃flow .[res7→v]∆ ∧ flow <: c ∧ flow = fv,
∆ ∧ ¬(flow <: c)
)
[FV−[TRY−CATCH]]
` {∆} e1 {∆1} (∆2,∆3) = split(∆1, c, fv, v) ` {∆2} e2 {∆4}
` {∆} try e1 catch (c@fv v) e2 {∆3 ∨ ∃v, fv ·∆4}
[FV−[OUTPUT]]
resolve(∆, ft) = fset
∆1=∃res.(∆ ∧ flow = fset) ∧ res = a
` {∆} ft#a {∆1}
resolve(∆, Ex(ft)) = Ex(ft) resolve(∆ ∧ (fv=ft), fv) = ft
∆ ` ∃fv.v=(fv, )
resolve(∆, fv) = ft
resolve(∆, v.1) = ft
v was declared of type ft
resolve(,ty(v)) = ft
Figure 3.1: Some Verification Rules
Notice that the # statement sets on one hand the control flow to a value denoting one of the
subtrees from the control flow hierarchy and on the other hand it also captures the result of the
operation. To capture this behaviour, we require each control flow variable to be resolved to an
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appropriate flow set (fset) value, before we can set it as the current control flow by assigning
it to the flow variable. We rely on an auxiliary operation, resolve to obtain the corresponding
control flow set from a given program state.
The verification system makes use of the res variable in order to store the result of the
current operation. Note that for the (fv#v) statement, the result value is indicated by v, which
is bound to the res variable as seen in the [OUTPUT] rules.
Regarding the [FV−TRY−CATCH] rule, we first compute the post-state of expression e1 as
∆1. Since ∆1 may capture a range of control flows, it has to be split into two components,
∆2 and ∆3, with the help of the [FV−SPLIT] rule. The ∆2 component will model the program
states with control flows that can be captured by the catch handler, whereas ∆3 will model
those states with control flows that escape from the catch handler. Moreover, for the case when
the control flow is being caught by the handler, the control flow type is bound to fv, and its
thrown value is bound to v. These bindings are kept in ∆2 which is made available as the pre-
state for e2. Keeping the bindings ensures that although flow has been quantified away in ∆2
the information can still be available to the catch handler through fv. As these local variables
are only valid in the catch handler, we quantify them away in the resulting postcondition.
Before further extending our verification logic to handle barriers as well, we first report on
integration of exception handling constructs into HIP/SLEEK, an existing verification toolset.
3.4 Experiments
In order to prove the viability of our verification method we tried our prototype implementa-
tion against a few examples from SPECjvm2008[1], a widely used Java benchmark created
by SPEC. Due to the focus of our work, we only considered those tests from SPECjvm2008
that are related to exception handling. After annotating the tested methods with pre and post
conditions, we were able to successfully verify all the tests. Due to the fact that the KeY[6]
approach is semi-automated in the sense that it occasionally prompts the user for choice of
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rewriting rules, while our approach is fully-automated, we cannot perform a direct comparison
of the verification timings.
Among these examples, MyClass is a Java program emphasizing the use of exception han-
dling in the presence of user defined exceptions. Its aim is to detect mishandling of the excep-
tion class hierarchy. The main objective of While and ContLabel examples is testing abrupt
termination in the presence of loops. PayCard is a Java class from a real life Java application
that makes heavy use of exceptions while modelling the behaviour of a credit card.
Figure 3.2 contains the timings obtained when using our system to verify the aforemen-
tioned examples.
Programs CODE ANN Time Focus
LOC LOC (seconds)
Break (KeY) 17 3 0.11 break handling
MyClass (KeY) 31 2 0.10 exception hierarchy
While (KeY) 91 49 2.47 while loops and break
ContLabel (KeY) 82 18 0.95 imbricated while loops and continue
PayCard (KeY) 54 16 0.91 general exception handling
SPECjvm2008 175 15 1.20 general exception handling
Figure 3.2: Verification Times
We also verified the examples presented throughout chapter. Method list alloc was
verified in 0.41 seconds, list alloc helper prime in 0.26 seconds and method swap in
0.09 seconds. Take note that the verification of list alloc helper prime, which ensures
an improved strong exception safety guarantee as according to our approach, is faster by 36%
than the verification of list alloc which enforces the original strong guarantee defined in
[94].
3.5 Summary
We have presented a new approach to the verification of exception-handling programs based
on a specification logic that can uniformly handle exceptions, program errors and other kinds
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of control flows. The specification logic is currently built on top of the formalism of separa-
tion logic, as the latter can give precise descriptions to heap-based data structures. Our main
motivation for proposing this new specification logic is to adapt the verification method to help
ensure exception safety in terms of the four guarantees of increasing quality introduced in [94]
and extended in [70], namely no-leak guarantee, basic guarantee, strong guarantee and no-
throw guarantee. During the evaluation process, we found the strong guarantee to be restrictive
for some scenarios, as it always forces a recovery mechanism on the callee, should exceptions
occur. Hence, we propose to generalise the definition of strong guarantee for exception safety.
Our approach has been formalised and implemented in a prototype system, and tested on a
suite of exception-handling examples. We hope it would eventually become a useful tool to
help programmers build more robust software.
Chapter 4
Barrier Verification
In this chapter we further extend the verification logic introduced in the previous chapter by
adding support for barrier synchronization. To this aim we introduce barrier definitions, a novel
mechanism for describing barrier behaviours. We were able to introduce a Hoare rule for veri-
fying barrier calls which is surprisingly simple when compared to the complex synchronization
pattern the barriers introduce.
4.1 Motivation
In a shared-memory concurrent program, threads communicate via a common memory. Pro-
grammers use synchronization mechanisms, such as critical sections and locks, to avoid data
races. In a data race, threads “step on each others’ toes” by using the shared memory in an
unsafe manner. Recently, concurrent separation logic has been used to formally reason about
shared-memory programs that use critical sections and (first-class) locks [80, 51, 43, 50]. Pro-
grams verified with concurrent separation logic are provably data-race free.
What about shared-memory programs that use other kinds of synchronization mechanisms,
such as semaphores? The usual assumption is that other mechanisms can be implemented
with locks, and that reasonable Hoare rules can be designed based on the particular implemen-
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tation. Indeed, the first published example of concurrent separation logic was implementing
semaphores using critical sections [80]. Unfortunately, not all synchronization mechanisms
can be easily reduced to locks in a way that allows for a reasonable Hoare rule to be derived.
In this chapter we introduce a Hoare rule that natively handles one such synchronization mech-
anism, the Pthreads-style barrier.
Pthreads (POSIX Threads) is a widely-used API for concurrent programming, and includes
various procedures for thread creation/destruction and synchronization [17]. When a thread is-
sues a barrier call it waits until a specified number (typically all) of other threads have also
issued a barrier call; at that point, all of the threads continue. Although barriers do not get
much attention in theory-oriented literature, they are very common in numerical applications
code. PARSEC is the standard benchmarking suite for multicore architectures, and has thirteen
workloads selected to provide a realistic cross-section for how concurrency is used in practice
today; a total of five (38%) of PARSEC’s workloads use barriers, covering the application do-
mains of financial analysis (blackscholes), computer vision (bodytrack), engineering (canneal),
animation (fluidanimate), and data mining (streamcluster) [10].
A common use for barriers is managing large numbers of threads in a pipeline setting. For
example, in a video-processing algorithm, each thread might read from some shared common
area containing the most recently completed frame while writing to some private area that will
contain some fraction of the next frame. (A thread might need to know what is happening in
other areas of the previous frame to properly handle objects entering or exiting its part of the
current frame.) In the next iteration, the old private areas become the new shared common area
as the algorithm continues.
Our key insight is that a barrier is used to simultaneously redistribute ownership of re-
sources (typically, permission to read/write memory cells) between multiple threads. In the
video-processing example, each thread starts out with read-only access to the previous frame
and write access to a portion of the current frame. At the barrier call, each thread gives up its
write access to its portion of the (just-finished) frame, and receives back read-only access to
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the entire frame.
Separation logic (when combined with fractional permissions [14, 28]) can elegantly model
this kind of resource redistribution. Let Prei be the precondition satisfied by thread i when it
enters the barrier, and Post i be the postcondition that will hold after thread i is released; then
the following equation, stating that all the resources in the preconditions are carried unchanged






Pipelined algorithms often operate in stages. Since barriers are used to ensure that one
computation has finished before the next can start, the barriers need to have stages as well—a
piece of ghost state associated with the barrier. We model this by building a finite automaton
into the barrier definition. We then use the assertion, written b::bnamepi〈cs,−→v 〉, which says
that the barrier pointed to by b, of type bname corresponding to a barrier definition1, owned
with fractional permission pi, is currently in state cs . Furthermore, arguments −→v are used to
denote the memory locations guarded by the barrier. The state of a barrier changes exactly as
the threads are released from the barrier. We can correct equation (4.1) by noting that barrier b
is transitioning from state cs (current state) to state ns (next state), and that the other resources
(frame F ) are not modified:
∗
i
Prei = F ∗ b::bname `〈cs,−→v 〉
∗
i
Post i = F ∗ b::bname `〈cs,−→v 〉
(4.2)
We use the symbol ` to denote the full (∼100%) permission, which we require so that no thread
has a “stale” view of the barrier state. Although the on-chip (or erased) operational behavior
of a barrier, as described in Chapter 2, is conceptually simple2, it may be already apparent that
1the barrier name, bname, is akin to the predicate names for user-defined predicates. In §4.2 we will give a
concrete example of a barrier definition
2Suspend each thread as it arrives; keep a counter of the number of arrived threads; and when all of the threads
have arrived, resume the suspended threads.
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the verification can rapidly become quite complicated.
4.2 Example
In this section we use an example to outline the key observations and give the intuitions behind
our approach to barrier verification. Our example consists of two threads implementing a
simple map-reduce operation: at each iteration through a loop, the two threads work in parallel
to first produce some data and store it in shared variables x and y (one for each thread) while
using data from variable i; secondly one thread centralizes the data produced and generates a
new value for i. The x, y and i variables have type c which is a data structure with one integer
field named val.
Note that in this two thread example, other synchronization primitives could be employed
with similar overhead as barriers. However, also note that if the example is extended to a larger
number of threads, barriers would handle the thread count increase without any change however
the other synchronization schemes would need significant changes, implicitly increasing the
complexity of the synchronization. We give the code outline for the two threads in Figure 4.1.
In Figure 4.1 we give a pictorial representation of the state machine associated with the bar-
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 ≡  ∃ x,y,i,T. i: : c◩〈T〉 ∗ b: : bname◩〈1, x, y, i〉   ∧ T ≥ 30 
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This pictorial representation is used to express the pre- and postconditions for a given
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0: {x ::c `〈0 〉 ∗ y ::c `〈0 〉 ∗ i ::c `〈0 〉 ∗ b::bname `〈0 , x , y , i〉}
0’: {x ::c ?〈0 〉 ∗y ::c ?〈0 〉 ∗i ::c ?〈0 〉 {x ::c? 〈0 〉 ∗y ::c? 〈0 〉 ∗i ::c? 〈0 〉
∗b::bname ?〈0 , x , y , i〉} ∗b::bname? 〈0 , x , y , i〉}
1: barrier b; barrier b; // b transitions 0→1
2: while i.val < 30 { while i.val < 30 {
3: x.val := i.val + 1; y.val := i.val + 2;
4: barrier b; barrier b; // b transitions 1→2
5: i.val := (x.val+2∗y.val);
6: barrier b; barrier b; // b transitions 2→1
} }
7: barrier b; barrier b; // b transitions 1→3
8: i.val := 0;
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Figure 4.1: Example: Code and Barrier Diagram
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barrier transition. Each row is a pictorial representation (values, barrier states, and shares)
of a formula in separation logic as indicated above. In the above pictorial representation, the
preconditions are given in the upper block (one per row) and the postconditions in the lower
block.
In our pictorial representation, each row is associated with a specification; specification
Spec1 is a pair of the precondition Spec
pre
1 and the postcondition Spec
post
1 , etc. A barrier that
is waiting for n threads will have n specs; n can be less than the total number of threads. We
do not require that a given thread always satisfies the same specification each time it reaches a
given barrier transition.
Note that only the permissions on the memory cells change during a transition; the contents
(values) do not.1 The exception to this is the special column on the right side, which denotes
the assertion associated with the barrier itself. As the barrier transitions, this value changes
from the previous state to the next; we require that the sum of the preconditions includes the
full share of the barrier assertion to guarantee that no thread has an out-of-date view of the
barrier’s state. Observe that all of the preconditions join together, and, except for the state of
the barrier itself, are exactly equal to the join of the postconditions.
Each thread owns part of the entire state, described on line 0. The partitioning is given on
line 0’, with the left thread (A) and right thread (B) owning the shares ?and ? , respectively
of each resource.
The real action starts with the barrier call on line 1, which ensures that both threads start at
the same time. Thread A satisfies spec 1 and thread B satisfies spec 2. Afterwards, thread A
has full ownership over x and thread B has full ownership over y; the ownership of i remains
split between A and B. While the ownership of the barrier is unchanged, it is now in state 1.
We then enter the main loop on line 2. On line 3, both threads read from the shared cell
i and both threads update their fully-owned cell. The barrier call on line 4 ensures that these
1We use the same quantified variable names before and after the transition because an outside observer can tell
that the values are the same. A local verification can use ghost state to prove the equality; alternatively we could
add the ability to move the quantifier to other parts of the diagram, e.g., over an entire pre-post pair.
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updates have been completed before the threads continue. Since the value T at memory location
i is less than 30, only the 1–2 transition is possible; the 1–3 transition requires T≥ 30. Thread
A satisfies spec 1 and thread B satisfies spec 2; afterwards, both threads have partial shares of
x and y, thread A has the full share of i; the barrier is in state 2.
On line 5 , thread A updates cell i. The barrier on line 6 ensures that the update on line
5 has completed before the threads continue; thread A satisfies spec 2 while thread B satisfies
spec 11. Afterwards, the threads have the same permissions they had on entering the loop: A
has full ownership of x, B has full ownership of y, and they share ownership of i; the barrier is
again in state 1.
After 30 iterations, the loop exits and control moves to the barrier on line 7. Observe that
since the (shared) value T at memory location i is greater than or equal to 30, only the 1–3
transition is possible; the 1–2 transition requires T< 30. Thread A satisfies spec 1 while thread
B satisfies spec 2; afterwards, both threads are sharing ownership of x, y (since the transition
from 1 to 3 does not mention x and y, they are unchanged). Thread A has full permission over
the condition variable i; the barrier is in state 3. Finally, on line 8, thread A updates i; the
barrier on line 8 ensures that thread B’s read of i associated with the while condition test on
line 2 has already occurred.
4.3 Barrier Definitions and Consistency Requirements
Conceptually, a barrier definition is as a set of barrier states, each barrier state containing a set
of possible transitions described by specifications. In this section we use two data structure
types, one for barrier transitions and one for barrier definitions in order to clearly describe
and group the consistency requirements imposed on barrier definitions. The two structures are
outlined in Figure 4.2.
1Note that the threads are not constrained by the rules of our logic to always satisfy the same spec for a given
transition.
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BarDef ≡ { bd bname : String barrier id
(barrier definition) bd limit : Nat # of threads
bd transitions : list BarSpecList} transition list
BarSpecList ≡ {bt ns : Nat next state
(transition) bt cs : Nat current state
bt specs : list (assert× assert)} pre/post pairs
Figure 4.2: Barrier Definitions
Definition 4.3.1 (Wellformed barrier definitions). A barrier definition (BarDef) consists of a
barrier name, the number of threads synchronized, and a transition list; such that all transitions
are well-formed and for any given state, outgoing transitions are mutually exclusive.
Definition 4.3.2 (Wellformed barrier transition). A transition (BarSpecList) contains a bar-
rier name (bname), the current state identifier (cs), a next state identifier (ns), and the list of
precondition/postcondition pairs (the spec list bt specs). We require that:
1. the length of list of specs (the bt specs list) matches the limit in the containing BarDef.
1
2. all of the pre/postconditions in the spec list ignore the store (stack), focusing only on the
memory and barrier map. Since stores are private to each thread (on a processor these
would be registers), it does not make sense for them to be mentioned in the “public”
pre/post conditions.
3. all of the preconditions in the spec list are precise. Precision is a technical property
involving the identifiability of states satisfying an assertion. An assertion P is precise
when:




1A command to dynamically alter the number of threads managed by a barrier might allow different
states/transitions to wait for different numbers of threads. However, in this proposal we do not consider such a
command.
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That is, P can hold on at most one substate of an arbitrary state σ3. 1
4. each precondition P includes some positive share of the barrier assertion with b, cs and
−→v , i.e., ∃pi. P ⇒ > ∗ b::bnamepi〈cs,−→v 〉.
5. the sum of the preconditions must equal the sum of the postconditions, except for the
state of the barrier; moreover, the sum of the preconditions must include the full share of
the barrier, that is the individual shares of barrier b owned by the threads synchronizing
on b must add-up to the full share ` (equation (4.2), repeated here):
∗
i
Prei = F ∗ b::bname `〈cs,−→v 〉
∗
i
Post i = F ∗ b::bname `〈cs,−→v 〉
Item 1 is simple bookkeeping; items 2–4 are similar to technical requirements present in
other variants of concurrent separation logic [80, 50, 43]. As previously mentioned, property 5
of Definition 4.3.2 is the fundamental insight of this approach .
Although the requirement that assertions are ”tokens” might seem a too restrictive, in prac-
tice it did not prove to be a hindrance on barrier reasoning. In particular during our experiments
it has not affected the relative completeness of our reasoning. Furthermore, we postulate that
”token” assertions are expressive enough to maintain relative completeness.
We define the function lookup spec in order to simplify the lookup of a spec in a BarDef:
lookup spec(bd , cs,ns, spec) returns the pre/post pair on position spec in the spec list corre-
sponding to the transition from state cs to state ns in barrier definition bd .
Using this notation, we can express the important requirement that all transitions from the
1Precision may not be required; another property (tentatively christened “token”) that might serve would be if,
for any precondition P , P ∗ P ≡ false. Note that precision in conjunction with item (3) implies P is a token.
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barrier state cs of the barrier definition bd are mutually exclusive:
∀tr1, tr2, spec1, spec2, pre1, pre2.
tr1 6= tr2 ∧ lookup spec(bd , cs, tr1, spec1) = (pre1, ) ∧
lookup spec(bd , cs, tr2, spec2) = (pre2, ) ⇒
(> ∗ pre1) ∧ (> ∗ pre2) ≡ false
In other words, it is impossible for any of the preconditions of more than one transition (of a
given state) to be true at a time. The simplest way to understand this is to consider the 1–2 and
1–3 transitions in the example program. The 1–2 transition requires that the value in memory
cell i be strictly less than 30; in contrast, the 1–3 transition requires that the same cell contains a
value greater than or equal to 30. Plainly these are incompatible; but in fact the above property
is stronger: both of the specs on the 1–2 transition, and both of the specs on the 1–3 transition
include the incompatibility. Thus, if thread A takes transition 1–2, it knows for certain that
thread B cannot take transition 1–3. This way we ensure that both threads always agree on the
barrier’s current state.
4.4 Hoare Logic
In this section we extend the verification rules presented in §3.3 to include barrier support. Our
Hoare judgment has the form Γ ` {P} c {Q}, where Γ is a list of barrier definitions as given in
§4.3, P and Q are assertions in separation logic, and c is a command. Our Hoare rules come in
three groups: standard Hoare logic (Skip, If, Assignment, Consequence); standard separation
logic (Frame, Store, Load, New, Free); and the barrier rule. While the first two groups are
rather standard the highlight of this proposal is the barrier rule, as given below:
Γ[b] = bd lookup spec(bd , cs, tr , spec) = (P,Q)
Γ ` {P} barrier b {Q} Barrier
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The Hoare rule for barriers is so simple that at first glance it may be hard to understand. The
ghost variables for the current state cs , transition tr , and specification spec appear to be free in
the lookup spec! However, things are not quite as unconstrained as they initially appear. Recall
from §4.3 that one of the consistency requirements for the precondition P is that P implies an
assertion about the barrier itself: P ⇒ Q ∗ b::bnamepi〈cs,−→v 〉; thus at a given program point
we can only use transitions and specifications from the current state. Similarly, recall from §4.3
that since the transitions are mutually exclusive, tr is uniquely determined.
This leaves the question of the uniqueness of spec. If a thread only satisfies a single pre-
condition, then the spec spec is uniquely determined. Unfortunately, it is simple to construct
programs in which a thread enters a barrier while satisfying the preconditions of multiple specs.
What saves us is that we are developing a logic of partial correctness. Since preconditions to
specs must be precise and nonempty (i.e., token), only one thread is able to satisfy a given
precondition at a time. The pigeonhole principle guarantees that if a thread holds multiple pre-
conditions then some other thread will not be able to enter the barrier; in this case, the barrier
call will never return and we can guarantee any postcondition.
We now apply the Barrier rule to the barrier calls in line 6 from our example program; the
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lookup specs are direct from the barrier state diagram:
Thread A

lookup spec(b, 2, 1, 2) = (P,Q)
P = x ::c
?〈A〉 ∗ y ::c ?〈C 〉 ∗ i ::c `〈T 〉∗b::bname ?〈2 , x , y , i〉
Q = y ::c `〈C 〉 ∗ i ::c ?〈T 〉∗b::bname ?〈1 , x , y , i〉
Γ ` {P} barrier b {Q}
Thread B

lookup spec(b, 2, 1, 1) = (P,Q)
P = x ::c
? 〈A〉 ∗ y ::c? 〈C 〉∗b::bname? 〈2 , x , y , i〉
Q = x ::c `〈A〉 ∗ i ::c? 〈T 〉∗b::bname? 〈1 , x , y , i〉
Γ ` {P} barrier b {Q}
Note that in this line of the example program, the frame is emp in both threads and that in the
retrieved pre/post conditions (P, Q) variables x, y, i, A, C, T are existentially quantified over
P and Q respectively. However, through the common view of the barrier predicate for b it is
ensured that the bindings for x, y and i are consistent in the precondition P and postcondition
Q.
4.5 Soundness Results
This section outlines the machinery developed for proving the soundness of our verification
logic. We start by adding more comprehensive , albeit virtual, resource tracking features to the
operational semantic presented earlier1. We outline the Coq proof of soundness for our veri-
fication logic with respect to the unerased semantics and finally we observe that the unerased
semantic is a conservative approximation of the erased one, thus showing that the soundness
result holds for both semantics.
1We use the term unerased for the resulting resource-aware concurrent operational semantics.
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Various complex yet unrelated language features have already been properly formalized
and their handling proved sound [4, 51] therefore including them in our proofs would not
generate any ground breaking new insights with respect to the problem at hand but would serve
only to clog-up the proof. In order to simplify the proof machinery, we discard several of the
Core−U features orthogonal to the core issue of exception and barrier handling. Therefore we
maintain in the programming language the following commands: skip (do nothing, syntactic
sugar for norm#TRUE), x := e (local variable assignment), x := [e] (load from memory),
[e1] := e2 (store to memory), x:= new e (memory allocation), free e (memory deallocation),
if e then c1 else c2 (if-then-else),e1#e2 (sets current control flow type and return value),
try e1 catch (ft[@v1] v2) e2 and barrier b (wait for barrier b).
We define five kinds of (tagged) values v: TRUE, FALSE, ADDR(N), DATA(N) and
FLOWS(N list). FLOWS capture a flow type value, represented as a positive integer or an
embedding of such values as lists of naturals. We have two (tagged) expressions e: C(v) and
V(x), where x are local variable names. For simplicity, we model barrier names as positive
integers. numbers, bname ∈ N.
We also restrict the assertion language to: points-to assertions (e1
pi7−→ e2), barrier assertions
and flow assertions.
We follow the model presented in §2.4 and interpret the assertions with regard to thread
states σ, triples of a store, heap, and barrier map (σ = (s, h, b)). The fractional points-to
assertion, e1
pi7−→ e2, means that the expression e1 is pointing to an address a in memory; a is
owned with positive share pi, and contains the evaluated value v of e2. The fractional points-to
assertion does not include any ownership of the break. The barrier assertion, b::bnamepi〈s〉,
means that the barrier b, owned with positive share pi, is in state s. For simplicity but without
a great loss of generality, we will assume that the set of shared variables is globally fixed
for each barrier instance, therefore the barrier assertions have only one argument, the barrier
state. Tracking these extra arguments would just serve to burden the proof with extra variable
renaming tracking. Flow assertions describe the current flow type. By convention, we use one
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fixed location in the stack as a special register recording the current flow indicated by the flow
variable.
Our expressions e are evaluated only in the context of the store; we write s ` e ⇓ v to
mean that e evaluates to v in the context of the store s. We denote the empty heap (which
lacks ownership for both all memory locations and the distinguished break location) by h0.
Finally, the barrier map b is a partial function from barrier numbers to pairs of barrier states
(represented as natural numbers) and positive shares; we denote the empty barrier map by b0.
An assertion is a function from states to truth values. As is common, we define the
usual logical connectives via a straightforward embedding into the metalogic; for example,
the object-level conjunction P ∧Q is defined as λσ. (Pσ) ∧ (Qσ). We will adopt the conven-
tion of using the same symbol for both the object-level operators and the meta-level operators
to avoid symbol bloat; it should be clear from the context which operator applies in a given
situation. We provide all of the standard connectives (>,⊥,∧,∨,⇒,¬,∀,∃).
We model the connectives of separation logic in the standard way:
emp = λ(s, h, b). h = h0 ∧ b = b0
P ∗ Q = λσ. ∃σ1, σ2. σ1 ⊕ σ2 = σ ∧ P (σ1) ∧ Q(σ2)
e1
pi7−→ e2 = λ(s, h, b). ∃a, v. (s ` e1 ⇓ ADDR(a)) ∧ (s ` e2 ⇓ v) ∧
b = b0 ∧ h(a) = (v, pi) ∧ dom(h) = {a} ∧ break(h) = @
barrier(bn, pi, s) = λ(s, h, b). h = h0 ∧ b(bn) = (s, pi) ∧ dom(b) = {bn}
flow (e) = λ(s, h, b). h = h0 ∧ b = b0 ∧ ∃fl. (s ` e ⇓ FLOWS(fl)
∧ s(0) = FLOWS(fl))
We also lift program expressions into the logic: e ⇓ v, which evaluates e with σ’s store (i.e.,
λ(s, h, b). h = h0 ∧ b = b0 ∧ s ` e ⇓ v); [e], equivalent to e ⇓ TRUE; and x = v, equivalent to
V(x) ⇓ v. These assertions have a “built-in” emp.
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4.5.1 Unerased Semantics
In this section we introduce the unerased operational semantics which we use to prove the
soundness of the verification logic. As with the erased version presented in Chapter 2 our
unerased semantics is divided into three parts: purely sequential, concurrent and oracle. The
main changes are related to the purely sequential and the concurrent semantics.
Purely sequential semantics. The bulk of the unerased purely sequential semantics is iden-
tical to the one presented in §2.3.2. The only “tricky” part is that the machine gets stuck if one
tries to write to a location for which one does not have full permission or read from a location
for which one has no permission; e.g., here is the store rule:
s ` e1 ⇓ C(ADDR(n)) s ` e2 ⇓ v
n < break(h) h(n) = ( `, v′) h′ = [n 7→ ( `, v)]h(
(s, h, b), [e1] := e2; c
) 7→ ((s, h′, b), c) sstep− store
The test that n < break(h) ensures that the address for the store is “in bounds”—that is, less
than the current value of the break between allocated and unallocated memory; since we are
updating the memory we require that the permission associated with the location n be full ( `).
We say that this step relation is unerased since these bounds and permission checks are virtual
rather than on-chip.
Concurrent semantics. We define the notion of a concurrent state in Figure 4.3. A concur-
rent state contains a scheduler Ω (modeled as a list of natural numbers), a distinguished heap
called the allocation pool, a list of threads, and a barrier pool1. The allocation pool “owns” all
of the unallocated memory cells and the “break” that indicates the division between allocated
and unallocated cells. Before a thread runs, the allocation pool is transferred into the local heap
1There is also a series of consistency requirements such as the fact that all of the heaps in the threads and barrier
pool join together with the allocation pool into one consistent heap
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Cstate ≡ { cs sched : list N schedule
cs allocpool : heap alloc pool
cs thds : list Thread thread pool
cs barpool : Barpool} barrier pool
Thread ≡ { th stk : store
th hp : heap
th bs : BarrierMap local view of barrier states
th ctl : conc ctl} running or waiting
conc ctl ≡ | Running(c) executing code c
|Waiting(bn, tr, spec, c) waiting on bn
Barpool ≡ { bp bars : list DyBarStatus dynamic barrier status
bp st : store× heap× BarrierMap} current state
DyBarStatus ≡ { dbs bn : N barrier id
dbs wp : Waitpool waiting thread pool
dbs bd : BarDef}
Waitpool ≡ { wp tr : option N transition id
wp slots : option (list slot) taken slots
wp limit : N
wp st : store× heap× BarrierMap} current state
slot ≡ (thread id× heap× BarrierMap) waiting slot
Figure 4.3: Concurrent state
owned by the thread so that new can transfer a cell from this pool into the local heap of a thread
when required. When a thread is suspended, (what is left of) the allocation pool is transferred
from the threads heap so that it can be passed to the next thread.
A thread contains a (sequential) state (store, heap, and barrier map) and a concurrent
control, which is either Running(c), meaning the thread is available to run command c, or
Waiting(bn, tr , spec, c), meaning that the thread is currently waiting on barrier bn to take
specification spec while making transition tr ; after the barrier call completes the thread will
resume running with command c.
The barrier pool (Barpool) contains a list of dynamic barrier statuses (DBSes) as well as
a state which is the join of all of the states inside the DBSes. Each DBS consists of a barrier
number (which must be its index into the array of its containing Barpool), a barrier definition
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(from §4.3), and a waitpool (WP). A waitpool consists of a transition option (None before the
first barrier call in a given state; thereafter the unique transition to the next state), a limit (the
number of threads synchronized by the barrier, and comes from the barrier definition in the
enclosing DBS), a slot list, and a state (which is the join of all of the states in the slot list). A
slot is a heap and barrier map (the store is unneeded since barrier pre/postconditions ignore it)
as well as a thread id (the thread from which the heap and barrier map came as a precondition,
and to which the postcondition will return).
The concurrent step relation has the form (Ω, ap, thds, bp) ; (Ω′, ap′, thds ′, bp′), where
Ω, ap, thds , and bp are the scheduler, allocation pool, thread list, and barrier pool respectively.
The concurrent step relation has only four cases; the following case CStep-Seq is used to run
all of the sequential commands:
thds[i] = (s, h, b,Running(c)) h⊕ ap = h′ ((s, h′, b), c) 7→ ((s′, h′′, b), c′)
h′′′ ⊕ ap′ = h′′ isAllocPool(ap′) thds ′ = [i 7→ (s′, h′′′, b,Running(c′))]thds
(i :: Ω, thds, ap, bp) ; (i :: Ω, thds ′, ap′, bp) CStep-Seq
That is, we look up the thread whose thread id is at the head of the scheduler, join in the
allocation pool, and run the sequential step relation. If the command c is a barrier call then
the sequential relation will not be able to run and so the CStep-Seq relation will not hold;
otherwise the sequential step relation will be able to handle any command. After we have
taken a sequential step, we subtract out the (possibly diminished) allocation pool, and reinsert
the modified sequential state into the thread list. We observe that the resulting semantics does
not allow interleavings on the non-synchronization related code sequences. Since we quantify
over all schedulers and our language does not have input/output, it is sufficient to utilize a
non-preemptive scheduler; for further justification on the use of such schedulers see [50].
The second case of the concurrent step relation handles the case when a thread has reached
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the last instruction, which must be a skip:
thds[i] = ( , , ,Running(skip))
(i :: Ω, thds, ap, bp) ; (Ω, thds, ap, bp)
CStep-Exit
When we reach the end of a thread we simply context switch to the next thread.
The interesting cases occur when the instruction for the running thread is a barrier call; here
the CStep-Seq rule does not apply. The concurrent semantics handles the barrier call directly
via the last two cases of the step relation; before presenting these cases we will first give a
technical definition called fill barrier slot:
thds[i] = (stk, hp, bs, (Running (barrier bn; c)))
lookup spec(bp.bp bars[bn], tr, spec) = (pre, post)
hp′ ⊕ hp′′ = hp bs′ ⊕ bs′′ = bs pre(stk, hp′, bs′)
bp inc waitpool (bp, bn, tr, spec, (i, (hp′, bs′))) = bp′
thds′ = [i→ ( stk, hp′′, bs′′, (Waiting (bn, tr, spec, c)))] thds
fill barrier slot (thds, bp, bn, i) = (thds′, bp′)
The predicate fill barrier slot gives the details of removing the (sub)state satisfying the precon-
dition of the barrier from the thread’s state, inserting it into the barrier pool, and suspending
the calling thread. The predicate bp inc waitpool does the insertion into the barrier pool; the
details of manipulating the data structure are straightforward but lengthy to formalize.
We are now ready to give the first case for the barrier, used when a thread executes a barrier
but is not the last thread to do so:
fill barrier slot (thds, bp, bn, i) = (thds′, bp′)
¬ bp ready (bp′, bn)
((i :: Ω), ap, thds, bp) ; (Ω, ap, thds′, bp′)
CStep-Suspend
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After using fill barrier slot, CStep-Suspend checks to see if the barrier is full by counting the
number of slots that have been filled in the appropriate wait pool by using the bp ready predi-
cate, and then context switches.
If the barrier is ready then instead of using the CStep-Suspend case of the concurrent step
relation, we must use the CStep-Release case:
fill barrier slot (thds, bp, bn, i) = (thds′, bp′)
bp ready (bp′, bn)
bp transition (bp′, bn, out) = bp′′
transition threads (out, thds′) = thds′′
((i :: Ω), ap, thds, bp) ; (Ω, ap, thds′′, bp′′)
CStep-Release
The first requirement of CStep-Release is exactly the same as CStep-Suspend: we suspend the
thread and transfer the appropriate resources to the barrier pool. However, now all of the threads
have arrived at the barrier and so it is ready. We use the bp transition predicate to go through
the barrier’s slots in the waitpool, combine the associated heaps and barrier maps, redivide
these resources according to the barrier postconditions, and remove the associated resources
from the barrier pool into a list of slots called out. Finally, the states in out are combined with
the suspended threads, which are simultaneously resumed by the transition threads predicate.
The formal definitions of the bp transition and transition threads predicates are extremely
complex and very tedious and we refer interested readers to the mechanization.
4.5.2 Soundness Proof Outline
Our soundness argument falls into several parts. We define our Hoare tuple in terms of our
oracle semantics using a definition by Appel and Blazy [4]; this definition was designed for
a sequential language and we believe that other standard sequential definitions for Hoare tu-
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ples would work as well1. We then prove (in Coq) all of the Hoare rules for the sequential
instructions; since the os-seq case of the oracle semantics provides a straight lift into the purely
sequential semantics this is straightforward.
Next, we prove (in Coq) the soundness for the barrier rule. This turns out to be much
more complicated than a proof of the soundness of (non-first-class) locks and took the bulk
of the effort. There are two points of particular difficulty: first, the excruciatingly painful
accounting associated with tracking resources during the barrier call as they move from a source
thread (as a precondition), into the barrier pool, and redistribution to the target thread(s) as
postcondition(s). The second difficulty is proving that a thread that enters a barrier while
holding more than one precondition will never wake up; the analogy is a door with n keys
distributed among n owners; if an owner has a second key in his pocket when he enters then
one of the remaining owners will not be able to get in.
After proving the Hoare rules for the sequential language statements sound with respect
to the oracle semantics, the remaining task is to prove oracle soundness. That is, to connect
the oracle semantics to the concurrent semantics. Oracle soundness says that if each of the
threads on a machine is safe with respect to the oracle semantics, then the entire concurrent
machine combining the threads together is safe. The (very rough) analogy to this result in
Brookes’ semantics is the parallel decomposition lemma. Here we use a progress/preservation
style proof closely following that given in [50, pp.242–255]; the proof was straightforward and
quite short to mechanize.
A direct consequence of oracle soundness is that if each thread is verified with the Hoare
rules, and is loaded onto a single concurrent machine, then if the machine does not get stuck
and if it halts then all of the postconditions hold.
Erasure One can justly observe that our concurrent semantics is not especially realistic; e.g.,
we: explicitly track resource ownership permissions (i.e., our semantics is unerased); have
1We change Appel and Blazy’s definition so that our Hoare tuple guarantees that the allocation pool is available
for verifying the Hoare rule for x:= new e.
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an unrealistic memory allocator/deallocator and scheduler; ignore issues of byte-addressable
memory; do not store code in the heap; and so forth. We believe that we could connect our
semantics to a more realistic semantics that could handle each of these issues, but most of
them are orthogonal to barriers. For brevity we will comment only on erasing the resource
accounting since it forms the heart of our soundness result.
We have defined, in Coq, the erased sequential and concurrent semantics presented in
§2.3.2. An erased memory is simply a pair of a break address and a function from addresses
to values. The run-time state of an erased barrier is simply a pair of naturals: the first tracking
the number of threads currently waiting on the barrier, and the second giving the final num-
ber of threads the barrier is waiting for. We define a series of erase functions that take an
unerased type (memory/barrier status/thread/etc.) to an erased one by “forgetting” all permis-
sion information. The sequential erased semantics is quite similar to the unerased one, with the
exception that we do not check if we have read/write permission before executing a load/store.
The concurrent erased semantics is much simpler than the complicated accounting-enabled se-
mantics explained above since all that is needed to handle the barrier is incrementing/resetting
a counter, plus some modest management of the thread list to suspend/resume threads. Crit-
ically, our erased semantics is a computable function, enabling program evaluation. Finally,
we have proved that our unerased semantics is a conservative approximation to our erased one:
that is, if our unerased concurrent machine can take a step from some state Σ to Σ′, then our
erased machine takes a step from erase(Σ) to erase(Σ′).
4.6 Tool Support for Barriers
We have integrated our program logic for barriers into HIP/SLEEK, an existing program veri-
fication toolset [76, 38]. SLEEK is an entailment checker for separation logic and HIP applies
Hoare rules to programs and uses SLEEK to discharge the associated proof obligations.
Currently HIP and SLEEK support all the features in the specification language described
90 4. BARRIER VERIFICATION
in §2.4 except for fractional shares and barrier definitions. We proceeded as follows:
1. We developed an equational solver over the sophisticated fractional share model of Dock-
ins et al. [28]. Permissions can be existentially or universally quantified and arbitrarily
related to permission constants.
2. We integrated our equational solver over shares into SLEEK to handle fractional permis-
sions on separation logic assertions (e.g., points-to, etc.). We believe that SLEEK is the
first automatic entailment checker for separation logic that can handle a sophisticated
share model (although some other tools can handle simpler share models).
3. We developed an encoding of barrier definitions (diagrams) in SLEEK, which now auto-
matically verifies the side conditions from §4.3.
4. We modified HIP to recognize barrier definitions (whose side conditions are then verified
in SLEEK) and barrier calls and apply the barrier rule presented in §4.4.
Next we describe our equational solver for the Dockins et al. share model before giving a
more technical background to the HIP/SLEEK system and describing our modifications to it in
detail.
4.6.1 A Solver for Shares
SLEEK discharges the heap-related proof obligations but relies on external decision procedures
for the pure logical fragments it extracts from separation logic formulae. For example, SLEEK
utilizes Omega for Presburger arithmetic, Redlog for arithmetic in R, and MONA for monadic
second-order logic. Adding fractional permissions required an appropriate equational solver
for fractional shares.
Solvers for simple fraction share models such as rationals between 0 and 1 need only solve
systems of linear equations. The more sophisticated fractional share model of Dockins et al.
[28] requires a more sophisticated solver.
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Dockins et al. represent shares as binary trees with boolean-valued leaves. The full share
` is a tree with one true leaf • and the empty share @ is a tree with one false leaf ◦. The
left-half share ?is a tree with two leaves, one true and one false: • ◦; similarly, the right-half
share ? is a tree with two leaves, one false and one true: ◦ •. The trees can continue to be split
indefinitely: for example, the right half of ?is ◦ • ◦. Joining is defined by structural induction
on the shape of the trees with base cases ◦ ⊕ ◦ = ◦, • ⊕ ◦ = •, and ◦ ⊕ • = • (emphasis: ⊕ is
partial). When two trees do not have the same shape, they are unfolded according to the rules
• ∼= • • and ◦ ∼= ◦ ◦; for example:
◦ • ◦ ⊕ • ◦ ◦ • = ◦ • ◦ ◦ ⊕ • ◦ ◦ • = • • ◦ • = • ◦ •
SLEEK takes a formula in separation logic with fractional shares and extracts a specialized
formula over strictly positive shares whose syntax is as follows:
φ ::= ∃v.φ | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 ∧ φ2 | v1 ⊕ v2 = v3 | v1 = v2 | v = χ
Our share formulae φ contain share variables v, existentials ∃, conjunctions ∧, disjunctions ∨,
join facts⊕, equalities between variables, and assignments of variables to constants χ. The tool
also recognizes v∈[χ1, χ2], pronounced “v is bounded by χ1 and χ2”, which is semantically
equal to:
((v = χ1) ∨ (∃v′. χ1 ⊕ v′ = v)) ∧ ((v = χ2) ∨ (∃v′′. v ⊕ v′′ = χ2))
Disjunctions are needed because share variables can only be instantiated with positive shares:
∀v. 6 ∃v′.v ⊕ v′ = v. Handling bounds checks “natively” rather than compiling them into se-
mantic definitions increases efficiency by reducing the number of existentials and disjunctions.
SLEEK asks the solver questions of the following forms:
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1. (UNSAT) Is a given formula φ unsatisfiable?
2. (∃-ELIM) Given a formula of the form ∃v. φ(v), is there a unique constant χ such that
∃v. φ(v) is equivalent to φ(χ)?
3. (IMPL) Given two formulae φ1 and φ2, does φ1 entail φ2?
All of these questions can be reduced to solving a series of constraint systems whose equa-
tions are of the form v1 ⊕ v2 = v3, v∈[χ1, χ2], and v = χ. Solving constraint systems in sep-
aration algebras (i.e., cancellative partial commutative monoids) is not as straightforward as it
might seem because many of the traditional algebraic techniques do not apply. Our lightweight
constraint solver finds an overapproximation to the solution, returning either (a) the constant
UNSAT or (b) for each variable vi either an assignment vi = χ or a bound vi ∈ [χ1, χ2] such
that:
• (FALSE) If the algorithm returns UNSAT, then the formula is unsatisfiable. The algo-
rithm will return UNSAT if it discovers a bound whose “lower value” is higher than its
“upper value”, or if it discovers a falsehood (e.g., after constant propagation one of the
equations becomes `⊕ ` = `).
• (COMPLETE) All solutions to the system (if any) lie within the bounds.
• (SAT-PRECISE) A solution is precise when all variables are given assignments. If a
solution is precise, then the formula is satisfiable.
Note that, for this presentation we have chosen an incomplete but fast method for solving
these constraints. However in a separate investigation, we have proven the problem to be
decidable and provided the first sound and complete solver, albeit considerable slower, for
constraints over this share domain [66].
SLEEK queries are given in share formulae that must be transformed into the equational
systems understood by our constraint solver. To do this transformation, first we put the relevant
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formulae into disjunctive normal form (DNF). Each disjunct becomes an independent system
of equations. Given one disjunct we form this system by simply treating each basic constraint
(i.e., v = v′, v = χ, v ∈ [χ1, χ2], and v1 ⊕ v2 = v3) as an equation. Our solver approximates
each system independently and can then answer SLEEK’s questions as follows:
• (UNSAT): Return False when the algorithm returns UNSAT for each constraint system
obtained from the formula; otherwise return True.
• (∃-ELIM): If the variable v has the same assignment in all constraint systems derived
from the DNF, then return that value. It is sound to substitute that value for v and elimi-
nate the existential. (If the formula is satisfiable, then that is the unique assignment that
makes it so; if the formula is false then after the assignment it will still be false.)
• (IMPL): Return True only when either:
– the solver returns UNSAT for all systems derived from the antecedent
– the solver returns a precise solution for each system of equations derived from the
antecedent, and the solver also returns the same precise solution for at least one of
the consequent systems.
The constraint solver works by eliminating one class of constraints at a time:
1. First we substitute v = χ constraints into the remaining equations.
2. We handle ⊕ constraints with exactly one variable as follows:
• χ1 ⊕ χ2 = v: we check if the join is defined, and if so substitute the sum for v in
the remaining equations; otherwise, we return UNSAT.
• χl ⊕ v = χr or v ⊕ χl = χr: we check if χr contains χl, and if so substitute the
difference χr−χl for v in the remaining equations; otherwise return UNSAT. (“−”
has the property that if χ1 − χ2 = χ3 then χ3 ⊕ χ2 = χ1).
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3. Constraints involving constants (χ1 ⊕ χ2 = χ3 and χ∈[χ1, χ2]) are dismissed if the
equality/inequalities hold; otherwise return UNSAT.
4. We attempt to dismiss certain kinds of unsatisfiable systems via a consistency check as
follows. We first compute the transitive closure of variable substitutions, resulting in
facts of the form v1⊕ . . .⊕vn⊕χ1⊕ . . .⊕χm = χ. Nonempty shares cannot join with
themselves. Therefore, if the vi contain duplicates we return UNSAT. We also return
UNSAT if the constants χi do not join or if χ does not contain χ1 ⊕ . . .⊕ χm.
5. Variables in the remaining constraints are given initial domains of ( @, `).
6. Each ∈ constraint is used to restrict the domain of its corresponding variable.
7. At this point only a1 ⊕ a2 = a3 constraints involving at least two variables remain. The
algorithm then proceeds by iteratively selecting an equation, checking it for consistency,
and then refining the associated domains via a forward and backward propagation. The
algorithm iterates until either a fixpoint is reached or a consistency check fails. To check
an equation for consistency, the algorithm verifies that:
• for each variable, the lower bound is less than the upper bound
• the current lower bounds of the LHS variables join together
• the join of the LHS lower bounds is below the RHS upper bound
• the join of the LHS upper bounds is above the RHS lower bound
Forward propagation consists of (Fa) lowering the upper bound of the RHS by intersect-
ing away any subtree that does not appear in the upper bounds of the LHS, and (Fb)
increasing the lower bound of the RHS by unioning all subtrees present in the lower
bounds in the LHS. Backwards propagation consists of (Ba) lowering the upper bounds
of the LHS by intersecting away any subtree that does not appear in the upper bound on
the RHS. Increasing the lower bounds of the LHS (Bb) is trickier since we do not know
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which operand should be increased. There are several possibilities we could have taken,
but we selected the simplest: we simply leave the bounds as they were unless one of the
operands has been determined to be a constant, in which case we can calculate exactly
what the lower bound for the other variable should be. After each forward/backwards
propagation, if we have refined a domain to a single point, the variable is substituted for
a constant value of that point in the remaining equations.
Once we reach a fixpoint, the resulting variable bounds represent an over approxi-
mation of the solution.
4.6.2 An Introduction to SLEEK
SLEEK checks entailments in separation logic with user-defined predicates [78]. The an-
tecedent may cover more of the heap than the consequent, in which case SLEEK returns this
residual heap together with the pure portion of the antecedent. SLEEK can also discover in-
stantiations for certain existentials in the consequent, a feature that we elide here; details may
be found in [20, 38].
The core of the SLEEK entailment works by algorithmically discharging the heap obliga-
tions and then referring any remaining pure constraints to other provers. Entailments in SLEEK
are written as follows: ∆A`κV QC ∗∆R, which is shorthand for κ∗∆A`∃V ·(κ∗QC) ∗∆R The
entailment checks whether the consequent heap nodes QC are covered by heap nodes in an-
tecedent ∆A, and if so, SLEEK returns the residual heap ∆R, which consists of the antecedent
nodes that were not used to cover QC . The implementation performs a proof search and thus
returns a set of residues. For simplicity, assume that only one residue is computed. In the en-
tailment, κ is the history of nodes from the antecedent that have been used to match nodes from
the consequent, V is the list of existentially quantified variables from the consequent. Note that
κ and V are discovered iteratively: entailment checking begins with κ = emp and V = ∅.
The initial system behavior was described in detail in [78, 20, 38]. The main rules for
matching, folding, unfolding, and discharging of pure constraints are given here. The initial
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XPure(emp) ≡ (true, ∅)
IsData(c)
XPure(p::c〈−→v 〉) ≡ (p6=0; {p})
IsPred(c) (pred c〈−→v 〉 ≡ Q inv (pi1, pi2)) ∈ V
XPure(p :: c〈−→vp〉) ≡ ([p/self,−→vp/−→v ]pi1, [p/self,−→vp/−→v ]pi2)
XPure(κ1) ≡ (f1, s1) XPure(κ2) ≡ (f2, s2)
XPure(κ1∗κ2) ≡ (f1 ∧ f2, s1 ∪ s2)
Figure 4.4: XPure : Translating to Pure Form
main entailment checking rules are given in Figure 4.5. Later we show how we modified these
rules to accommodate fractional shares.
Entailment between separation formulae is reduced to entailment between pure formulae
by matching heap nodes in the RHS to heap nodes in the LHS (possibly after a fold/unfold).
Once the RHS is pure, the remaining LHS heap formula is soundly approximated to a pair
of pure formula and set of disjoint pointers by function XPure as defined in Figure 4.4. The
functions IsData(c) and IsPred(c) decide respectively if c is a data structure or a predicate.
The procedure successively pairs up heap nodes that it proves are aliased. SLEEK keeps the
successfully matched nodes from the antecedent in κ for better precision in the next iteration.
SLEEK discharges heap obligations in three ways: heap node matching, predicate folding,
and predicate unfolding. All three heap reducing steps start by establishing that there is a heap
node on the LHS of the entailment that is aliased with the RHS heap node that is to be reduced
(p1 = p2). In order to prove the aliasing, the LHS heap together with the previously consumed
nodes are approximated to a pure formula, and together with the LHS pure formula the p1 = p2
implication is checked. Similarly, when a match occurs (rule MATCH), equality between node
arguments needs to be proven.
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EMP
(ρ, S)=XPure(κ1∗κ)
ρ∧(∧x 6=yx,y∈S x 6= y)=⇒∃V·pi2












p1 :: c〈−→v1〉∗κ1∧pi1`κV (p2 :: c〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2) ∗∆
FOLD
IsPred(c2)∧IsData(c1) pred c2〈−→v 〉≡Q inv (pi1c2, pi2c2) ∈ V
fst(XPure(p1 ::c1〈−→v1〉∗κ1∗κ)) ∧ pi1=⇒p1=p2
p1 ::c1〈−→v1〉∗κ1∧pi1`κ∅ [p1/self,−→v1/−→v ]Q ∗∆r
∆r`κV (κ2∧pi2) ∗∆
p1 ::c1〈−→v1〉∗κ1∧pi1`κV (p2 :: c2〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2) ∗∆
UNFOLD
IsPred(c1)∧IsData(c2) pred c1〈−→v 〉≡Q inv (pi1c2, pi2c2) ∈ V
fst(XPure(p1 :: c1〈−→v1〉∗κ1∗κ)) ∧ pi1=⇒p1=p2
[p1/self,
−→v1/−→v ]Q∗κ1∧pi1`κV (p2 ::c2〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2) ∗∆
p1 :: c1〈−→v1〉∗κ1∧pi1`κV (p2 ::c2〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2) ∗∆
Figure 4.5: Separation Constraint Entailment
Fold/unfold operations handle inductive predicates in a deductive manner. SLEEK can
unfold a predicate instance that appears in the LHS if the unfolding exposes a heap node that
can match with a node in the RHS. Similarly, several LHS nodes can be folded into a predicate
instance if the resulting predicate instance can be matched with a RHS node. To guarantee
termination, SLEEK needs to ensure that (i) each predicate fold or unfold must be immediately
followed by a match, and (ii) no two fold operations for the same predicate are performed in
order to match one node. These restrictions ensure that each successful fold, unfold, and match
operation decreases the number of RHS nodes. Well-formedness conditions imposed on the
predicate definitions ensure that after a fold or unfold a matching always takes place; these
conditions have been elided for this presentation. The unfold rule presents the replacement
of a predicate instance in which the predicate definition is reduced to a disjunctive form and
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FXPure(emp, τ) ≡ (true, ∅)
IsData(c) τ ⇒ vf = cs
FXPure(p::cvf 〈−→v 〉, τ) ≡ (p6=0; {(p, cs)})
FXPure(κ1, τ) ≡ (f1, s1) FXPure(κ2, τ) ≡ (f2, s2)
FXPure(κ1∗κ2, τ) ≡ (f1 ∧ f2, s1 ∪ s2)
IsPred(c) (c〈−→v 〉 ≡ Q inv (pi1, pi2)) ∈ P
τ ⇒ vf = cs pi′1 = [p/self]pi1 pi′2 = {∀v ∈ pi2, ([p/self]v, cs)}
XPure(p :: cvf 〈−→v 〉, τ) ≡ (pi′1, pi′2)
Figure 4.6: FXPure: XPure with shares
in which the arguments have been substituted. The fold step requires the LHS to entail the
predicate definition. The residue of this entailment is then used as the new LHS for the rest of
the original entailment. Chin et al. give a more detailed explanation of the SLEEK entailment
process in [20].
4.6.3 Entailment Procedure for Separation Logic with Shares
Adding fractional permissions required several modifications to the entailment process.
• Empty heap. In a separation logic without shares, whenever (∃a, b.x7−→a∗y 7−→b) then
x 6= y. In SLEEK, this fact is captured in the EMP rule, which tries to prove the pure
part of the consequent after enriching the antecedent pure formula with pure information
collected from the previously consumed heap and the remaining LHS heap. It extracts
both the invariants of the heap nodes and constructs a formula that ensures that all point-
ers in the heap are distinct.
Introducing fractional permissions requires the relaxation of this constraint because
∃a, b.x xf7−→a∗y yf7−→b implies x 6= y only if the xf and yf shares overlap. We extended
the XPure function to (a) take into account fractional shares constraints, given through
an extra argument τ , and (b) return a pair of a pure formula, and a set of pairings be-
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FOLD
IsPred(c2)∧IsData(c1) c2〈−→v 〉≡Q inv(pi1c2, pi2c2) ∈ V
fst(FXPure(p1 ::c
f1
1 〈−→v1〉∗κ1∗κ, τ1)) ∧ pi1=⇒p1=p2







1 〈−→v1〉∗κ1∧pi1 ∧ τ1`κV (p2 :: cf22 〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2 ∧ τ2) ∗∆
UNFOLD
c1〈−→v 〉≡Q inv(pi1c2, pi2c2) ∈ V IsPred(c1)∧IsData(c2)
fst(FXPure(p1 :: c
f1
1 〈−→v1〉∗κ1∗κ, τ1)) ∧ pi1=⇒p1=p2
Q′ = set shares([p1/self,−→v1/−→v ]Q, f1)
Q′∗κ1∧pi1∧τ1`κV (p2 ::cf22 〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2∧τ2) ∗∆
p1 :: c
f1
1 〈−→v1〉∗κ1∧pi1∧τ1`κV (p2 ::cf22 〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2∧τ2) ∗∆
Figure 4.7: Folding/Unfolding in the presence of shares
tween pointers and the concrete fractional shares associated with the memory location
the pointers point to. The new formulation for FXPure is given in Figure 4.6. This ex-
tension allowes the EMP rule to be rewritten to enforce inequality only between pointers
that have conflicting shares:
(ρ, S)=FXPure(κ1∗κ, τ)
ρ∧(∧x 6=y∧(¬∃z·xf⊕yf=z)(x,xf ),(y,yf )∈S ·x 6= y)=⇒∃V·pi2
κ1 ∧ pi1 ∧ τ1`κV pi2 ∗ (κ1 ∧ pi1 ∧ τ1) EMP
• Folding/unfolding. By convention, all the heap nodes abstracted by a predicate instance
are owned with the same fractional permission as the predicate instance. Therefore,
unfolding a node first replaces the permissions of the nodes in the predicate definition
with the permission of that LHS node. Then the updated predicate definition replaces
the predicate instance. Similarly, folding a node replaces the permissions of all nodes in
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the definition with the permission of that RHS node before trying to entail the predicate
definition. The set shares(Q, v) function sets the permissions of all heap nodes in Q to
v. The new set of rules is shown in Figure 4.7.
• Matching. In order to properly handle a match in the presence of fractional shares, the
entailment process needs to (a) reduce both LHS and RHS nodes entirely, or (b) split the
LHS node and reduce one side, or (c) split the RHS and reduce one side.
(
fst(FXPure(p1 :: c
f1〈−→v1〉∗κ1, τ1)) ∧ pi1
)
=⇒ p1 = p2
κ′ = κ∗p1 :: cf1〈−→v1〉







κ1 ∧ pi1 ∧ τ1`κ′V κ2 ∧ pi2 ∧ τ2 ∧ ρ ∗∆
p1 :: c
f1〈−→v1〉∗κ1 ∧ pi1 ∧ τ1`κV (p2 :: cf2〈−→v2〉∗κ2 ∧ pi2 ∧ τ2) ∗∆
FULL-MATCH (a)
fst(FXPure(p1 :: c
f1〈−→v1〉∗κ1, τ1))∧pi1 =⇒ p1=p2
τ ′1 = τ1 ∧ fc1 ⊕ fr1 = f1
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fst(FXPure(p1 :: c
f1〈−→v1〉∗κ1, τ1))∧pi1 =⇒ p1=p2
V ′ = if f2 ∈ V then V ∪ {fc2, fr2} else V
τ ′1 = if f2 ∈ V then τ1 else (τ1∧fc2 ⊕ fr2 = f2)
τ ′2 = if f2 ∈ V then (τ2∧fc2 ⊕ fr2 = f2) else τ2










V ′ p2 :: c
fr2〈−→v2〉∗κ2∧pi2∧τ ′2 ∧ ρ∗∆
p1 :: c




Because the search can be computationally expensive, we have devised an aggressive
pruning technique. We try to determine to what extent the fractional constraints restrict
the fractional variables. It may be that (a) f1 = f2, in which case only FULL-MATCH
is feasible, or (b) f1 is included in f2, in which case RIGHT-SPLIT-MATCH is feasible,
or (c) f1 includes f2, in which case only
LEFT-SPLIT-MATCH is feasible.
4.6.4 Proving Barrier Soundness
The fractional share solver and enhancements to SLEEK’s entailment procedures discussed
above help with any program logic that needs fractional shares (e.g., concurrent separation
logic with locks, sequential separation logic with read-only data). In contrast, our other en-
hancements are specific to the logic for Pthreads-style barriers. Our initial goal is to automat-
ically check the consistency of barrier definitions—that is, whether a barrier definition meets
the side conditions presented in §4.3. The first step is to describe a barrier diagram to SLEEK.
Although the barrier diagrams presented in §4.3 are intuitive and concise, programs need
a more textual representation. Barrier diagrams describe the possible transitions a barrier state
can make and the specifications associated with those transitions. In a sense, a barrier definition
can be viewed as a disjunctive predicate definition where the body is a disjunction of possible
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transitions.
SLEEK already contains user-defined predicates so it is easy to introduce the “is a barrier”
assertion bn::bnamevf 〈−→v 〉. We extended SLEEK’s input language to accept barrier diagrams
in the form:
bdef ::= barrier bname[n] < −→v >== −−−−−−→transition
transition ::= (from state , to state ,
−−−−−−−−−→
pre-post-spec)
pre-post-spec ::= (Φpre , Φpost)
Where n denotes the number of threads synchronized by any instance of this barrier definition.
We have chosen this rather verbose form in order to allow the input to resemble more the
graphical diagrams presented in the previous sections rather than the more compact form from
Figure 2.5 in §2.4:
[self::]bname〈−→v 〉 ≡
∨
(requires Φpre ensures Φpost)
However the latter form is much more suitable for the verification process. It is straight
forward to translate from the former to the latter formulation and in fact SLEEK does that as a
preprocessing step.
SLEEK can now automatically check the well-formedness conditions on the barrier defini-
tions as follows:
• All transitions must have exactly n specifications, one for each thread
• For each transition, let from and to be the state labels, then:
– for each specification (Φpre , Φpost)
1. Φpre contains a fraction of the barrier in state from:
Φpre ` self :: bnvf 〈from〉 ∗ ∆
2. Φpost contains a fraction of the barrier in state to:
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Φpre ` self :: bnvf 〈to〉 ∗∆
3. Φpre∗Φpre ` False
The soundness proof assumes that each precondition P is precise. Unfor-
tunately, precision is not very easy to verify automatically. We believe that the
logic will be sound if we can assume the (strictly) weaker property “token”:
P ? P ` False instead of precision. At this stage, our prototype extension to
SLEEK verifies that preconditions are tokens rather than that they are precise.
We are in the process of attempting to update our soundness proof to require
that preconditions be tokens rather than precise; if we are unable to do so then
one solution would be for SLEEK to output a Coq file stating lemmas regard-
ing the precision of each precondition. Users would then be required to prove
these lemmas manually to be sure that their barrier definitions were sound.
In our experience, the Coq proofs of precision were very easily discharged as
compared with the soundness proof of the entire barrier definition. So the sav-
ings from using SLEEK to verify the soundness of a barrier definition should
still be quite substantial. Another choice would be to devise a heuristic al-
gorithm for determining precision; we suspect that such an algorithm could
handle the examples from this chapter.
– the star of all the preconditions contains the full barrier (recall that the entailment
` check in SLEEK can produce a residue)
∗ni=1Φipre ` self :: bn `〈from〉 ∗∆
– the star of all the postconditions contains the full barrier
∗ni=1Φipost ` self :: bn `〈to〉 ∗∆
– the star of all the preconditions equals the star of all postconditions modulo the
barrier state change for a transition. We check this constraint by carving the full
barrier out of the total heap using the residues ∆pre and ∆post of the entailments
given in the previous constraints. ∆pre and ∆post are then tested for equality by
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requiring bi-entailment with empty residue. That is, given
∗ni=1Φipre ` self :: bn `〈from〉∗∆pre
and
∗ni=1Φipost ` self :: bn `〈to〉∗∆post ,
we check
∆pre ` ∆post and ∆post ` ∆pre with empty residues.
– For states with more than one successor, we check mutual exclusion for the pre-
conditions as required by §4.3 by verifying that for any two preconditions of two
distinct transitions must entail False. This check was extremely tedious but SLEEK
can do it easily.
Once SLEEK has verified each of the above conditions, the barrier definition is well-formed
according to the well-formed Definitions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 given §4.3 (modulo precision).
4.6.5 Extension to Program Verification
Integrating our Hoare rule for barriers into HIP was the easiest part of adding our program
logic to HIP/SLEEK. As mentioned, following the concept of structured specifications [38],
we transform our barrier diagrams into disjunctions of the form
∨
(requires Φpre ensures Φpost),
where the disjunction contains all specifications in all transitions in the barrier definition. The
benefit of such an encoding lies in the insight that SLEEK’s entailment procedure is flexible
enough to discharge entailment obligations even if the consequent is presented in this complex
form [38].
In short and informal, given the entailment ∆ ` ∨(requires Φpre ensures Φpost),
SLEEK will first check which preconditions Φpre are entailed by ∆ , compute the residue
for each entailment, add the corresponding postcondition Φpost to the residue and return the
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possible outcomes as a disjunctive formula.
With this formulation the barrier rule presented in §4.4 becomes even simpler. In order
to verify a barrier call barrier b, it prescribed two operations: locating the proper barrier
definition in the barrier repository Γ and executing the lookup spec. In HIP these operations
correspond to: first locating in the current state, a node of the form b::bnamepi〈−→v 〉 which indi-
cate that b points to a barrier of type bname; secondly retrieving the bname barrier definition,
in the disjunctive form presented earlier and substituting the formal arguments substituted with
the −→v arguments; thirdly, the lookup spec is performed through a SLEEK entailment check
between a formula abstracting the current states and the barrier definition.
Thus ensuring that in one entailment check, the proper pre/post condition pair is selected,
the precondition is consumed, and the postcondition is added, in effect applying the barrier
Hoare rule in one simple go.
Note that the bulk of the work behind the verification of barrier calls elegantly reduces
to an entailment. However, based on the example application of the barrier rule in §4.4, one
might suggest that a simpler method be used, one with a more syntactic flavour. Unfortunately,
despite the fact that the entailment process is expensive, for the general case a syntactic filtering
is not sufficient, as the values critical for selecting the proper specification might not be given
as plain text constants in ∆. Thus a very costly, full entailment check is required.
As a final observation, the performance cost lies in the fact that entailment checks need to
take place for each precondition in the barrier definition. For our simple running example this
translates to eight entailments for each barrier call. In the next section we will show what are
the performance penalties induced when verifying programs with barriers. Also in Chapter 5
we will introduce a general technique which can greatly improve the performance by reducing
this disjunctive explosion.
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4.6.6 Tool Performance Outline
We have developed a small set of benchmarks for our HIP/SLEEK with barriers prototype.
Our SLEEK tests divide into two categories: entailment checks for separation logic formulae
containing fractional permissions and checking barrier consistency constraints as described in
§4.6.4. Individual entailment checks are quite speedy and our benchmark covers a number
of interesting cases (e.g., inductively defined predicates). Barrier wellformedness checks take
more time but the performance is more than adequate: for a set of 54 human generated entail-
ments focusing on corner cases of fractional share reasoning SLEEK took 2.1 seconds, while
for a set of 279 machine generated entailments obtained during the well-formedness checks of
various barrier definitions SLEEK took 3.69 seconds.
One of the barrier definitions used is the example barrier given in Figure 4.1. For a similar
example, it took 2,700 (highly tedious) lines of code and 48 seconds of verification time to
convince Coq that the example barrier definition met the soundness requirements1. SLEEK
verifies this example barrier definition and analyzes five others (some sound, others not) in
3.69 seconds without any interaction from the user2.
We have also developed a HIP benchmark suite. Through this suite we outline the impact
several parameters have on the verification time for programs with barriers. The parameters
we are interested in, are the number of threads synchronized, the number of memory resources
shared, the pattern of communications (both the barrier definition shape and the complexity of
the resource reshuffling) and finally the complexity of the arithmetic constraints imposed on
the content of the shared memory.
In Figure 4.8 we list the HIP verification times for several tests. For each test we also
note the number of threads and the number of shared memory cells. We note that the most
important variation between the examples lie in the structure of the barrier definitions, the
1Techniques such as those developed by Braibant et al. [15], Nanevski et al. [73], and Gonthier et al. [40]
can probably eliminate some (but not all) of the tedium of reasoning about the associativity and commutativity of
∗. Unfortunately, proofs of mutual exclusion for barrier transitions seem less tractable.
2As explained in §4.6.4, SLEEK verifies properties that are slightly different from those listed in §4.3.
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Test Threads Mem CODE SPEC Time
cells LOC LOC (s)
video 2 5 43 36 59.17
3 7 68 60 215
video-weak 2 5 43 36 60.35
video-strong 2 5 43 36 61.12
2 1 36 26 0.81
3 1 36 31 1.33
MISD 4 1 36 37 1.97
(without feedback) 5 1 36 43 2.81
6 1 36 51 3.88
2 2 47 27 3.22
3 3 52 28 4.04
MISD 4 4 87 42 9.28
(with feedback) 5 5 105 51 69.51
6 6 127 60 177
3 4 102 58 12.82
multi-loops 4 5 135 73 132
5 6 165 90 364
3 3 35 19 1.43
pipeline 4 4 44 26 2.52
5 5 56 33 4.25
6 6 66 40 7.08
Horner(v1) 3 7 73 43 181
3 4 74 37 8.04
Horner(v2) 4 5 95 48 97
5 6 118 58 279
Figure 4.8: Verification times for HIP with barriers
pattern of permission reshuffling, and the number of guarded memory locations and threads.
The examples are grouped in five classes of tests included in our HIP benchmark:
• various instantiations of a simplified video encoding algorithm that encodes a video
frame by frame. Encoding a frame consists of splitting the frame among several worker
threads and piecing together the result once the threads finish. The main challenge in
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verifying this type of algorithms lies in the fact that the encoding of each frame piece
depends both on the piece itself and on the entire previous frame, thus inducing a more
complex resource handling protocol. The outline of the synchronization pattern is:
while (cond)
{ compute & write to memory;
barrier;





{ compute & write to memory;
barrier;
read results of all threads;
barrier;
}
• a general communication architecture with one thread generating data that is fed into sev-
eral workers each executing a set of operations functionally equivalent yet structurally
distinct. This architecture resembles the multiple instructions/single data(MISD) struc-
ture defined the Flynn taxonomy[36]. Such an architecture is often used in safety critical
systems in which redundancy is required. We construct two types of examples based on
this architecture: i)one in which the output of the working threads is fed into subsequent
stages without interfering with the generator, ii) the worker output is also fed as feedback
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• various instantiations of a row-by-row matrix traversal in which several threads work
together to examine each element of the matrix. The main feature of this test consists
in a complex barrier definition, one containing two imbricated loops which mirror the
program code.
• a linear systolic machine for computing polynomials of various degrees by using Horner’s
algorithm.
• a generic pipeline architecture, each stage in the pipeline is modelled by a thread, the
output of one stage is used by the next stage. The barrier ensures that the threads advance
in a lockstep manner.
The video encoding tests use two threads that share 5 memory cells. Each test has a differ-
ent level of precision with respect to the barrier and method specifications: in the video tests,
we verify a trivial correctness property i.e., we verify the postcondition of True, meaning that
if the barrier calls succeed then the program finishes safely; we also verified two more complex
postconditions by using two more finely-grained barrier definitions: in video-weak, we ver-
ified a general relationship between the input frame piece and the resulting encoding; finally,
in video-strong we verified the precise values in the result after the loop terminates. As
expected, the tighter bounds require more verification time; however, the differences are rel-
atively small because most of the work is dealing with the heap constraints as opposed to the
pure constraints. Part of the time for each example is spent verifying the correctness of the
included barrier definition.
We also experimented with various thread count and shared memory footprints. For each of
the five test classes described, we include in Figure 4.8 verification timings for implementations
with various numbers of threads and shared memory cells. We observe that the thread count
by itself does not greatly influences the verification speed, as suggested by the MISD without
feedback tests. Neither does the increase in the memory footprint greatly affect the verification
speed, as indicated by the pipeline examples. This is due to the fact that both sets of examples
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rely on a relatively simple ownership change pattern.
However, for more complex examples like the MISD with feedback or the Horner imple-
mentations or the multi-loops, where the ownership patterns or the barrier definition graphs
are considerably more complex we can observe a sharp degradation of performance with the
increase in the number of tracked memory cells. This is because with more individual re-
sources being tracked while they are pushed through a complex ownership change pattern, the
generated heap constraints become more complex leading to more expensive entailments.
The previous results clearly point out that even for relatively small programs, in the current
form, barrier calls are fairly computationally expensive to verify due to the need to check mul-
tiple, possibly complex, entailments. We believe that the performance can be greatly improved
by applying the novel predicate specialization technique described in Chapter 5, thus ensuring
that our verification logic is both expressive end efficient enough to warrant wider adoption.
4.7 Summary
We have designed a sound program logic for Pthreads-style barriers. Our development includes
a formal design for barrier definitions and a series of soundness conditions to verify that a par-
ticular barrier can be used safely. Our Hoare rules can verify threads independently, enabling
a thread-modular approach. We have modified the verification toolset HIP/SLEEK to use our
logic to verify concurrent programs that use barriers.
Our prototype HIP/SLEEK verification tool is available at:
www.comp.nus.edu.sg/∼cristian/projects/barriers/tool.html
Acknowledgements. We thank Christian Bienia for showcasing numerous example programs
containing barriers, Christopher Chak for help on an early version of this work, Jules Villard
for useful comments in general and in particular on the relation of our logic to the logic of
his Heap-Hop tool, and Bart Jacobs for discovering how to verify our example program in his
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We have shown a Hoare logic that successfully verifies programs with exceptions and barriers
and we have shown how it can be included in an automatic verifier. However, in order for our
proposal to gain acceptance, it is not sufficient to work; it needs to work fast.
The last essential component of our proposal consists of a general predicate pruning target-
ing disjunctive predicates. In this chapter we will describe the novel predicate pruning calculus
and showcase how it can be applied to our verification logic with impressive results.
5.1 Motivation
Abstraction mechanisms are important for modelling and analyzing programs. Recent devel-
opments allow richer classes of properties to be expressed via user-defined predicates for cap-
turing commonly occurring patterns of program properties. Separation logic-based abstraction
mechanisms represent one such development. As an example, the following predicate captures
an abstraction of a sorted doubly-linked list.
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data node { int val; node prev; node next; }
self ::dll〈p,n,S 〉 ≡ self=null ∧ n=0 ∧ S={}
∨ ∃v, q, S1 · self ::node〈v , p, q〉 ∗ q ::dll〈self ,n−1 ,S1 〉
∧S = S1∪{v}∧∀a∈S1 · v≤a inv n≥0;
In this definition self denotes a pointer into the list, n the length of the list, S represents
its set of values, whereas p denotes a backward pointer from the first node of the doubly-linked
list. The invariant n≥0 must hold for all instances of this predicate.
We clarify the following points. Firstly, this abstraction mechanism is inherently infinite,
due to recursion in predicate definition. Secondly, a predicate definition is capable of capturing
multiple features of the data structure it models, such as its size and set of values. While this
richer set of features can enhance the precision of a program analysis, it inevitably leads to
larger disjunctive formulas.
This chapter focuses on a novel way of handling disjunctive formulas, in conjunction with
abstraction via user-defined predicates. While disjunctive forms are natural and expressive,
they are major sources of redundancy and inefficiency. The goal of this work is to ensure that
disjunctive predicates can be efficiently supported in a program analysis setting, in general, and
program verification setting, in particular.
To achieve this, we propose a specialization calculus for disjunctive predicates that sup-
ports symbolic pruning of infeasible states within each predicate instance. This allows for
the implementation of both incremental pruning and memoization techniques. As a methodol-
ogy, predicate specialization is not a new concept, since general specialization techniques have
been extensively used in the optimization of logic programs [84, 83, 69]. The novelty of our
approach stems from applying specialization to a new domain, namely program verification,
with its focus on pruning infeasible disjuncts, rather than a traditional focus on propagating
static information into callee sites. This new use of specialization yields a fresh approach to-
wards optimising program verification. This approach has not been previously explored, since
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pervasive use of user-defined predicates in analysis and verification has only become popular
recently (e.g. [75]).
Our key contributions are:
• We propose a new specialization calculus that leads to more effective program verifi-
cation. Our calculus specializes proof obligations produced in the program verification
process, and can be used as a preprocessing step before the obligations are fed into third
party theorem provers or decision procedures.
• We adapt memoization and incremental pruning techniques to obtain an optimized ver-
sion of the specialization calculus.
• We present a prototype implementation of our specialization calculus, integrated into
an existing program verification system. The use of our specializer yields significant
reductions in verification times, especially for larger problems.
• We adapt the specialization calculus for barrier definitions. We outline the impressive
speedup in verifying programs with barriers observed after the introduction of special-
ization.
5.2 Examples
Program states that are built from predicate abstractions are more concise, but may require
properties that are hidden inside predicates. As an example, consider :
x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉 ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉 ∧ x6=null
This formula expresses the property that the two doubly-linked lists pointed to by x and y have
the same length. Ideally, we should augment our formula with the property: y6=null, n>0,
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S1 6={} and S2 6={}, currently hidden inside the two predicate instances but may be needed by
the program verification tasks at hand.
A naive approach would be to unfold the two predicate instances, but this would blow up
the number of disjuncts to four, as shown:
x=null ∧ y=null ∧ n=0 ∧ S1={} ∧ S2={} ∧ x6=null
∨ y ::node〈v2 , p2 , q2 〉 ∗ q2 ::dll〈y ,n−1 ,S4 〉 ∧ x=null
∧ S1={} ∧ n=0 ∧ S2={v2} ∪ S4 ∧ n−1≥0 ∧ x6=null
∨ x ::node〈v1 , p1 , q1 〉 ∗ q1 ::dll〈x ,n−1 ,S3 〉 ∧ y=null ∧ n=0
∧ S1={v1} ∪ S3 ∧ S2={} ∧ n−1≥0 ∧ x6=null
∨ x ::node〈v1 , p1 , q1 〉 ∗ y ::node〈v2 , p2 , q2 〉 ∗ q1 ::dll〈x ,n−1 ,S3 〉
∗ q2 ::dll〈y ,n−1 ,S4 〉 ∧ S1={v1} ∪ S3∧ S2={v2} ∪ S4 ∧ n−1≥0 ∧ x6=null
As contradictions occur in the first three disjuncts, we can simplify our formula to:
x ::node〈v1 , p1 , q1 〉 ∗ y ::node〈v2 , p2 , q2 〉 ∗ q1 ::dll〈x ,n−1 ,S3 〉
∗ q2 ::dll〈y ,n−1 ,S4 〉 ∧ S1={v1} ∪ S3 ∧ S2={v2} ∪ S4 ∧ n−1≥0 ∧ x6=null
After removing infeasible disjuncts, the propagated properties are exposed in the above
more specialized formula. However, this naive approach has the shortcoming that unfolding
leads to an increase in the number of disjuncts handled, and its associated costs.
A better approach would be to avoid predicate unfolding, but instead apply predicate
specialization to prune infeasible disjuncts and propagate hidden properties. Given a pred-
icate v ::pred〈−→v 〉 that is defined by k disjuncts, we shall denote each of its specialized in-
stances by v ::pred〈−→v 〉@L, where L denotes a subset of the disjuncts, namely L ⊆ {1. . .k},
that have not been pruned. Initially, we can convert each predicate instance v ::pred〈−→v 〉 to
v ::pred〈−→v 〉@{1. . .k}, its most general form, while adding the basic invariant of the predicate
to its context. As an illustration, we may view the definition of dll as a predicate with two
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disjuncts, labelled informally by 1: and 2: prior to each of its disjuncts, as follows:
self ::dll〈p,n,S 〉 ≡ 1:(self=null ∧ n=0 ∧ S={})
∨ 2:(self ::node〈v , p, q〉 ∗ q ::dll〈self ,n−1 ,S1 〉 ∧ S = S1∪{v} ∧ ∀a∈S1 · v≤a)
We may convert each dll predicate by adding its invariant n≥0, as follows:
x ::dll〈p,n,S 〉 =⇒ x ::dll〈p,n,S 〉@{1, 2} ∧ n≥0
With our running example, this would lead to the following initial formula after the same
invariant n≥0 (from the two predicate instances) is added.
x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{1, 2} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{1, 2}∧ x6=null ∧ n≥0
This predicate may be further specialized with the help of its context by pruning away disjuncts
that are found to be infeasible. Each such pruning would allow more states to be propagated by
the specialized predicate. By using the context, x 6=null, we can specialize the first predicate
instance to x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{2} since this context contradicts the first disjunct of the dll
predicate.
In a general case, it would be desirable to have a pre-computed set of pruning conditions
which encode rules of the form: when a condition is contradicted, a set of labes can be dis-
carded. In the previous case, the desired pruning condition would be: x = null←2, if x is
guaranteed not to be null then label 2 is infeasible.
With the previous specialization, we may strengthen the context with a propagated state,
namely n>0 ∧ S1 6={}, that is implied by its specialized instance, as follows:
x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{2} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{1, 2} ∧ x6=null ∧ n>0 ∧ S1 6={}
Note that n≥0 is removed when a stronger constraint n>0 is added. The new constraint n>0
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now triggers a pruning of the second predicate instance, since its first disjunct can be shown to
be infeasible. This leads to a specialization of the second predicate, with more propagation of
atomic formulas, as follows:
x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{2} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{2}
∧ x6=null ∧ n>0 ∧ S1 6={} ∧ y6=null ∧ S2 6={}
As another example of predicate specialization, consider the following more general for-
mula:
x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{1, 2} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{1, 2} ∧ n≥0
Taken separately, neither of the two predicate instances can be further specialized. How-
ever, by analyzing the two predicate instances, we would notice that they share a pair of com-
mon pruning conditions, namely n=0 or n>0, that could be employed to simultaneously spe-
cialize both predicates. Furthermore, n=0∨n>0 is implied by the current context n≥0. We can
therefore perform a case analysis on the above formula to obtain two distinct program states,
as shown below:
x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{1, 2} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{1, 2} ∧ n=0
∨ x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{1, 2} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{1, 2} ∧ n>0
The above case analysis has managed to strengthen each of the two program states in isolation.
This strengthening can be harnessed to further specialize both program states as follows:
x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{1} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{1} ∧ n=0
∧x=null ∧ y=null ∧ S1={} ∧ S2={}
∨ x ::dll〈p1 ,n,S1 〉@{2} ∗ y ::dll〈p2 ,n,S2 〉@{2} ∧ n>0
∧x6=null ∧ y6=null ∧ S1 6={} ∧ S2 6={}
We refer to this general mechanism as case specialization. This mechanism is applicable when-
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ever we have a set of pruning conditions S that are common across two or more predicate
instances, and under the same context C as follows:
• Each of the pruning conditions is neither implied by, nor does it contradict the context C.
That is ∀α∈S · ¬(C =⇒ α ∨ C =⇒ ¬α). This condition ensures that all specialization
steps have been applied to each of the selected pruning conditions.
• Each pair of pruning conditions are mutually exclusive. That is:
∀αi∈S · ∀αj∈(S−{αi}) · αi∧αj =⇒ false
This condition ensures that each program state that is being split from the case analysis
is also disjoint from every other state.
• The context implies a disjunction for the selected set of pruning conditions for case
analysis. That is C =⇒ ∨α∈S α. This allows us to introduce the splitting required by
case analysis.
While case specialization allows more pruning to occur for some of the predicate instances,
it causes the program state to be represented as multiple disjuncts. One advantage is that more
of the infeasible disjuncts from the predicate instances are being pruned from our program
state. Also, when compared to unfolding, the original abstraction for each of the predicate
instances is still being kept. This allows the converse process of abstraction from the multiple
disjuncts, if required, to be more easily carried out.
In a nutshell, the goal of our approach is to apply aggressive specialization to our predicate
instances, without the need to resort to predicate unfolding, in the hope that infeasible disjuncts
are pruned, where possible. In the process, our specialization technique is expected to propa-
gate states that are consequences of each of the specialized predicate instances. We expect this
proposal to support more efficient manipulation of program states, whilst keeping the original
abstractions intact where possible.
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spred ::= p(−→v ) ≡ Φˆ; I;R
Φˆ ::=
∨
(∃−→w ·σˆ | C)∗ σˆ ::= κˆ ∧ pi
κˆ ::= emp | v ::cv〈−→v 〉 | v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | κˆ1 ∗ κˆ2
where p, v, w, c, pi denote the same as in Figure 2.5;
I is a family of invariants;
R is a set of pruning conditions.
C is a pure formula denoting a context computed in the specialization process.
Figure 5.1: The Annotated Specification Language.
5.3 Formal Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the basic concepts and terminology that will be used in this chapter.
First we would like to reiterate an observation related to the interplay of predicates and
fractional ownership. Given a predicate instance v ::pvf 〈−→v 〉 it is implied that all resources
abstracted by this predicate instance, as described by the predicate definition p are owned with
the same share vf . Therefore ownership annotations within predicate definitions are irrelevant.
Unannotated formulas, as described in Chapter 2 become annotated in the specialization
process. Figure 5.1 defines the syntax of the annotated specification language. Annotated
predicate definitions are generated by the nonterminal spred.
Definition 5.3.1 (Annotated Predicates and Formulas).
Given a predicate definition p(−→v ) ≡ ∨ (∃−→w ·κ ∧ pi)∗, the corresponding annotated predicate
definition has the form p(−→v ) ≡ ∨ (∃−→w ·κˆ ∧ pi | C)∗; I;R, where I is a family of invariants,
and R is a set of pruning conditions. Each disjunct ∃−→w ·κˆ ∧ pi |C now contains the annotated
counterpart κˆ of κ, and is augmented with a context C, which is a pure formula for which
C → pi always holds. Intuitively, C captures also the consequences of the specialized states
of κˆ. An annotated formula is a formula where all the predicate instances are annotated. An
annotated predicate instance is of the form v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R, where L⊆{1, .., n} is a set of labels
denoting the unpruned disjuncts, and where R ⊆ R is a set of remaining pruning conditions.
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The set of invariants I is of the form {(L→piL) | ∅⊂L⊆{1, .., n}}. For each set of labels L,
piL represents the invariant for the specialized predicate instance v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L. For a given
annotated predicate instance v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R, it is possible for L = ∅. When this occurs, it
denotes that none of the predicate’s disjuncts are satisfiable. Moreover, we have pi∅=false
which will contribute towards a false state (or contradiction) for its given context.
Definition 5.3.2 (Pruning Condition). A pruning condition is a pair of an atomic predicate
instance α and a set of labels L, written α←L. Its intuitive meaning is that the disjuncts in L
should be kept if α is satisfiable in the current context. The symbol R denotes a finite set of
such pruning conditions.
In the case of the dll〈p, n, S〉 predicate, a pruning condition can be S 6= {}←2. That is,
if the set of elements in the list is shown to be empty, then the inductive branch, labeled 2, can
be discarded as it is infeasible. Similarly n = 0←1 indicates that if the number of elements
in the list is not 0 then the base case, the first disjunct is infeasible. Lastly, we observe there
is no explicit limit on the pruning condition guards. They could be expressed on pointers as
well: self = null←1. The practical restriction is however that the conditions allow a fast
satisfiability check.
Given a predicate definition p(−→v ) ≡ ∨ni=1(∃−→w ·σˆi |Ci); I; R, we call Di =df (∃−→w ·σˆi |Ci)
the ith disjunct of p ; i will be called the label of its disjunct. We shall use Di freely as the ith
disjunct of the predicate at hand whenever there is no risk of confusion. We employ a notion of
closure for a given conjunctive formula. Consider a formula pi(−→w ) = ∃−→v ·α1∧· · ·∧αm, where
αi are atomic predicates, and variables −→w appear free. We denote by S = closure(pi(−→w )) a
set of atomic predicates (over the free variables −→w ) such that each element α ∈ S is entailed
by pi(−→w ). Some of the variables −→w may appear free in α but not −→v . To ensure this closure set
be finite, we also impose a requirement that weaker atomic constraints are never present in the
same set, as follows: ∀αi ∈ S ·¬(∃αj ∈ S · i 6=j∧αi =⇒ αj). Ideally, closure(pi(−→w )) contains
all stronger atomic formulas entailed by pi(−→w ), though depending on the abstract domain used,
this set may not be computable. A larger closure set leads to more aggressive pruning.
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We extend the semantic model of the assertion language, as presented in §2.4.1 to also
cover annotated predicates and formulas as follows:
Definition 5.3.3 (Extension of Assertion Model).
s, h, b |=∃−→v · σˆ |pi iff s, h, b |=∃−→v · σˆ∧pi
s, h, b |=∃−→v ·κˆ∧pi iff ∃−→ν ·s[−→v 7→−→ν ], h, b |= κˆ and s[−→v 7→−→ν ]|=pi
s, h, b |= κˆ1∗κˆ2 iff ∃h1, h2, b1, b2 · (s, h1, b1)⊕ (s, h2, b2) = (s, h, b)
and s, h1, b1 |= κˆ1 and s, h2, b2 |= κˆ2
s, h, b |=v0 ::pvf 〈−→v 〉@L#R iff (p(−→w )≡
∨n
i=1 (∃−→u · σˆi|pii); I;R) and
s, h, b |= ∨i∈L (∃−→u ·set perm(σˆi, vf )|pii) [−→v /−→w ]
Here v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R denotes an annotated predicate instance.
Our specialization calculus (§ 5.4) is based on the annotated specification language. We
have an initialization and inference process (§ 5.5) to automatically generate all annotations
(including I,R) that are required by specialization. For simplicity of presentation, we only
include normalized linear constraints in our language. Our system currently supports both
arbitrary linear arithmetic constraints, as well as set constraints. This is made possible by
integrating the Omega [85] and MONA solvers [63] into the system. In principle, the system
may support arbitrary constraint domains, provided that a suitable solver is available for the
domain of interest. Such a solver should be capable of handling conjunctions efficiently, as
well as computing approximations of constraints that convert disjunctions into conjunctions
(e.g. hulling).
5.4 A Specialization Calculus
Our specialization framework detects infeasible disjuncts in predicate definitions without ex-
plicitly unfolding them, and computes a corresponding strengthening of the pure part while
preserving satisfiability. We present this as a calculus consisting of specialization rules that
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can be applied exhaustively to convert a non-specialized annotated formula1 into a fully spe-
cialized one, with stronger pure parts, that can be subsequently extracted and passed on to a
theorem prover for satisfiability/entailment checking. Apart from being syntactically correct,
annotated formulas must satisfy the following well-formedness conditions.
Definition 5.4.1 (Well-formedness). For each annotated predicate v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R in the for-
mula at hand, assuming the definition p(−→v )≡∨ni=1 Di; I;R, we have that (a) L ⊆ {1, . . . , n} ;
(b) R ⊆ R ; and (c) forall α←L0 ∈ R we have L ∩ L0 6= ∅.
Definition 5.4.2 (Specialization Step). A specialization step has the form
Φˆ1 | C1 −sf→ Φˆ2 | C2, and denotes the relation allows the annotated formula Φˆ1 with context
C1 to be transformed into a more specialized formula Φˆ2 with context C2.
Our calculus produces specialization steps, which are applied in sequence, exhaustively,
to produce fully specialized formulas (a formal definition of such formulas will be given be-
low). Relation −sf→ depends on relation −sp→, which produces predicate specialization steps
defined by the following:
Definition 5.4.3 (Predicate Specialization Step). A predicate specialization step has form
(1) v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 | C1 −sp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | C2.
and signifies that annotated predicate v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 | C1 can be specialized into
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | C2, where L2 ⊆ L1, R2 ⊂ R1, and C2 is stronger than C1.
Here, the sets L1 and L2 denote sets of disjuncts of v ::pv〈−→v 〉 that have not been detected to
be infeasible. Each specialization step aims at detecting new infeasible disjuncts and removing
them during the transformation. Thus L2 is expected to be a subset of L1.
The sets of pruning conditions R1 and R2 may be redundant, but are instrumental in mak-
ing specialization efficient. They record incremental changes to the state of the specializer, and
1 The conversion of non-annotated formulas into annotated ones shall be presented in § 5.5.
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represent information that would be expensive to re-compute at every step. Essentially, a prun-
ing condition α←L0 states that whenever ¬α is entailed by the current context, the disjuncts
whose labels are in L0 can be pruned. The initial set of pruning conditions is derived when
converting formulas into annotated formulas, and is formally discussed in § 5.5.
In a nutshell, each specialization step of the form (1) detects (if possible) a pruning con-
dition α←L0 ∈ R such that if ¬α is entailed by the current context, then the disjuncts whose
labels occur in L0 are infeasible and can be pruned. Given the notations in (1), this is achieved
by setting L2 = L1 − L0. Subsequently, the current set of pruning conditions is reduced to
contain only elements of the form α′←L′0 such that L′0 ∩ L2 6= ∅. Thus, the well-formedness of
the annotated formula is preserved
A key aspect of a specialization step is that, as a result of pruning, the context of a predicate
can often be strengthened due to the fact that fewer disjuncts are now potentially feasible. The
strengthening procedure shall be discussed later in this section, when the calculus rules are
introduced. However, at this point, we would like to emphasize the important role that context
strengthening plays in the overall process of formula specialization. After having specialized
a predicate in the formula of interest, we can use the resulting stronger context to specialize
a second predicate. The new strengthening may create a new opportunity for specializing
the first predicate again, which in turn will strengthen the context enough to lead to yet another
specialization of the second predicate, and so on. In fact, context strengthening helps reveal and
prune mutually infeasible disjuncts in groups of predicates, which leads to a more aggressive
optimization as compared to the case where predicates are specialized in isolation.
Definition 5.4.4 (Fully Specialized Formula; Complete Specialization). An annotated
formula is fully specialized w.r.t a context when all its annotated predicates have empty pruning
condition sets. If the initial pruning condition sets are computed using a notion of strongest
closure, then for each predicate in the fully specialized formula, all the remaining labels in the
predicate’s label set denote feasible disjuncts with respect to the current context, and in that
sense, the specialization is complete.
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[SP−[FILTER]]
Rf = {(α←L0) | (α←L0)∈R, (L∩L0=∅)∨(C =⇒ α)}
C,L ` R −filter→ (R− Rf )
[SP−[PRUNE]]
C∧α =⇒ false (α←L0) ∈ R L ∩ L0 6= ∅ L2 = L− L0
C1 = Inv(v ::pv〈−→v 〉,L2) C ∧ C1,L2 ` R −filter→ R1
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | C −sp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R1 | C ∧ C1
[SP−[FINISH]]
C,L ` R −filter→ ∅ R 6= ∅
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | C −sp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#∅ | C
Figure 5.2: Single-step Predicate Specialization
This procedure is formalized in the calculus rules given in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Figure 5.2
defines the predicate specialization relation−sp→. This relation has two main components: the
one represented by the rule [SP−[FILTER]], which restores the well-formedness of an annotated
predicate, and the one represented by the rule [SP−[PRUNE]], which detects infeasible disjuncts
and removes the corresponding labels from the annotation. A third rule, [SP−[FINISH]] pro-
duces the fully specialized predicate. The rules in Figure 5.3 turn predicate specialization steps
into formula specialization steps. Let us examine the rules in detail.
The rule [SP−[FILTER]] restores the well-formedness of an annotated predicate, and is
necessary because, as the next rule will reveal, once a new set of labels L, and a new context
C have been inferred during a specialization step, some of the elements in the current pruning
condition set R become irrelevant.
The −filter→ relation collects pruning conditions that are no longer relevant to the newly
specialized set of labels into the set Rf and then removes them from the original set R.
The rule [SP−[PRUNE]] defines the part of the relation−sp→ that performs the actual prun-
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ing. In transforming the annotated predicate v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R, the rule picks a pruning condi-
tion α←L0 ∈ R such that C∧α is unsatisfiable, with the added requirement that L and L0 not be
disjoint. Having found such a pruning condition, it is necessarily the case that those disjuncts
of predicate p whose labels occur in L0 are infeasible in the current context C. Thus, replacing
L with L − L0 will not change the satisfiability of the predicate. Consequently, due to the fact
that we have fewer potentially feasible disjuncts, a new, stronger context can be computed for
v ::pv〈−→v 〉. This new context is based on the procedure Inv that is detailed in § 5.5. Intuitively,
this procedure computes a conjunction of atomic formulas entailed by all the disjuncts whose
labels are in L2. Obviously, it is desirable for this conjunction to be as strong as possible, and
the choices available for computing it shall be discussed in due course. For the time being,
however, we shall only assume that the result of Inv is stronger when the procedure is applied
to fewer disjuncts. The new context is obtained by conjoining the old one with the result of
the Inv procedure. Finally, the well-formedness of the predicate is restored by applying the
−filter→ relation. The set of pruning conditions effectively shrinks as a result, since the α←L0
element of R is indeed filtered out.
The rule [SP−[FINISH]] handles the case when all remaining pruning conditions are irrel-
evant for the current context and set of labels. It defines the part of the −sf→ relation that
transforms a predicate into a fully specialized one.
The predicate specialization relation can be weaved into the formula specialization rela-
tion given in Figure 5.3. The first rule, [SF−[PRUNE]], defines the part of the −sf→ relation
which picks a predicate in a formula and transforms it using the −sp→ relation, leaving the
rest of the predicates unchanged. However, the transformation of the predicate’s context is
incorporated into the transformation of the formula’s context. This rule realizes the poten-
tial for cross-specialization of predicates, eliminating disjuncts of different predicates that are
mutually unsatisfiable.
The rule [SF−[CASE−SPLIT]] allows further specialization via case analysis. It defines
the part of the −sf→ relation that produces two instances of the same formula, joined in a
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[SF−[PRUNE]]
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | C −sp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | C2
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R ∗ κˆ | C −sf→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 ∗ κˆ | C2
[SF−[CASE−SPLIT]]
` C =⇒ α1∨α2 ` α1∧α2 =⇒ false
∀i ∈ {1, 2} · κˆ | C∧αi −sf→ κˆi | Ci
κˆ |C −sf→ (κˆ1 |C1) ∨ (κˆ2 |C2)
[SF−[OR]]
κˆ1 | C1 −sf→ κˆ3 | C3
(κˆ1 |C1) ∨ (κˆ2 |C2) −sf→ (κˆ3 |C3) ∨ (κˆ2 |C2)
Figure 5.3: Single-step Formula Specialization
disjunction, each of the new formulas having a stronger context. Each stronger context is
produced by conjunction with an atom αi, i ∈ {1, 2}, with the requirement that the two atoms
be disjoint and their disjunction cover the original context C. This rule is instrumental in
guaranteeing that all predicates reach a fully specialized status. Indeed, whenever an annotated
predicate has a pruning condition α←L0, such that α is not entailed by the context C, yet α∧C
is satisfiable, the only way to further specialize the predicate is by case analysis with the atoms
α and ¬α. Finally, the rule [SF−[OR]] handles formulas with multiple disjunctions.
In the remainder of this section, we formalize the notion that our calculus produces termi-
nating derivations, and is sound and complete.
Property 1. Relations −sp→ and −sf→ preserve well-formedness. Thus, given two annotated
predicate instances v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 and v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2, if
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 | C1 −sp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | C2
can be derived from the calculus, and v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 is well-formed, then
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v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 is well-formed as well. Moreover, for all annotated formulas Φˆ1 and Φˆ2, if
Φˆ1 | C1 −sf→ Φˆ2 | C2
can be derived from the calculus, and Φˆ1 is well-formed, then Φˆ2 is well formed as well.
Proof sketch: The relation −filter→ is responsible for maintaining the well-formedness of
annotated formulas by filtering out exactly those pruning conditions that violate the well-
formedness requirements with respect to a newly computed set of labels. Filtering of the prun-
ing condition set is employed in both the [SP−[PRUNE]] and [SP−[FINISH]] rules, ensuring that
their output is well-formed.
In the case of the [SF−[PRUNE]], [SF−[CASE−SPLIT]], and [SF−[OR]] rules, the proof fol-
lows from the assumption that the relations given as a premises have the preservation property,
and the fact that neither of these rules make explicit changes in the predicate annotations. 2
A predicate specialization sequence is a sequence of annotated predicates such that each
pair of consecutive predicates is in the relation −sp→. A formula specialization sequence is
a sequence of annotated formulas such that each pair of consecutive formulas is in the −sf→
relation.
Definition 5.4.5 (Canonical Specialization Sequence). A canonical specialization sequence is
a formula specialization sequence where:
1. the first element is well-formed;
2. specialization rules are applied exhaustively ;
3. the [SF−[CASE−SPLIT]] relation is only applied as a last resort (i.e. when no other
relation is applicable);
4. the case analysis atoms for the [SF−[CASE−SPLIT]] relation must be of the form α, ¬α,
whereα←L0 is a pruning condition occurring in an annotated predicate v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R
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of the formula, such that L ∩ L0 6= ∅.
Property 2 (Termination). All canonical specialization sequences are finite and produce either
fully specialized formulas, or formulas whose context is unsatisfiable.
Proof sketch The proof is divided into two parts. The first part addresses the finiteness of spe-
cialization sequence. We note that the “driving” steps of the calculus are provided by the rules
[SP−[PRUNE]], [SP−[FINISH]], and [SF−[CASE−SPLIT]]. The rest of the rules are “weaving”
rules that establish how the “driving” steps are to operate in larger contexts. Thus, it is suf-
ficient to show that these three steps produce relations where some measure decreases. It is
obvious that in both the [SP−[PRUNE]] and [SP−[FINISH]] rules the size of the R annotation
is decreased for the predicate at hand. Since a formula has only a finite number of predicates,
each with a finite number of pruning conditions, the relations produced by these rules can only
be applied a finite number of times.
The [SF−[CASE−SPLIT]] rule poses a somewhat more complicated problem, since each ap-
plication of the resulting relation increases the size of the formula at hand. However, each split
will use up one pruning condition of the form α←L0, which cannot be subsequently reused.
To understand this, let us examine how the two branches, whose contexts are strengthened
respectively with ¬α and α, behave after the split. In the branch strengthened with ¬α, a spe-
cialization step will be immediately applicable, removing the labels in L0 from the predicate’s
L annotation. As a consequence, α←L0 will be filtered out as well, and subsequent case anal-
ysis steps on this branch will not be able to reuse this pruning condition. On the other hand,
in the branch strengthened with α, α is now entailed by the context and further ineligible for
case analysis, at least not without violating the canonical specialization sequence requirements.
Thus, even though a formula increases in size as a result of case analysis, it can only do so a
finite number of times for each predicate. As a result, the specialization sequence is necessarily
finite.
For the second part of the proof, let us assume a canonical specialization sequence whose
last element is a formula that is not fully specialized (i.e. R6=∅ for some predicate), and whose
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context is satisfiable. According to Property 1, this last element must be well formed. Since
the set R is not empty, one of the following cases must hold:
• There exists a pruning condition α←L0 that occurs in the annotation of some predicate
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | C, such that α∧C and ¬α∧C are both satisfiable, and also L∩L0 6=∅.
In this case, a case-analysis step is applicable.
• There exists a pruning condition α←L0 that occurs in the annotation of some predicate
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | C, such that α∧C is not satisfiable, and also L∩L0 6=∅. In this case, a
pruning step is applicable.
• Finally, either all the pruning conditions have α entailed by the current context, or
L0∩L = ∅. In this case, the [SP−[FINISH]] is applicable.
This shows that for any well-formed formula that is not fully specialized, some rule is applica-
ble. This contradicts the hypothesis that the specialization sequence was canonical. Thus, each
canonical sequence must end with a fully specialized formula. 2
Property 3 (Soundness). The −sp→ and −sf→ relations preserve satisfiability. Thus:
if v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 | C1 −sp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | C2 can be derived from the
calculus, then for all heaps h, stacks s and barrier maps b, it follows that
s, h, b |= v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 | C1 iff s, h, b |= v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | C2. Moreover, if
Φˆ1 | C1 −sf→ Φˆ2 | C2 can be derived from the calculus, then s, h, b |= Φˆ1|C1 iff
s, h, b |= Φˆ2|C2.
Proof It is sufficient to prove that each rule produces a relation that preserves the satisfiabil-
ity of its arguments. The satisfiability of a formula depends on the satisfiability of its annotated
predicates, which in turn depends on the set of labels L that represents the disjuncts that have
yet to be checked for infeasibility. Since the rule [SP−[PRUNE]] is the only one that specifi-
cally removes elements from L, it is sufficient to prove that this rule produces only relations
5. EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION THROUGH PREDICATE PRUNING 131
that preserve the satisfiability of the predicates given as arguments. This rule selects a pruning
condition α←L0 such that, given the pruning context C, we have that C ∧ α is unsatisfiable.
Since, by the construction1 of R, α is entailed by all the pure parts of disjuncts whose labels
are in L0, it follows immediately that those disjuncts are infeasible in the context C. Thus, by
replacing L with L2 = L − L0, the satisfiability of the predicate is preserved with respect to
the current context C. The next step is the strengthening of the context, which is performed by
computing an invariant C2 of the remaining disjuncts. Since C2 is entailed by all the disjuncts
represented in L2, conjoining it with the current context C will produce an equisatisfiable for-
mula. 2
We note here that the set R does not play a role in the way an annotated predicate is inter-
preted. Mishandling R (as long as no elements are added) may result in lack of termination or
incompleteness, but does not affect soundness.
Finally, we address the issue of completeness. This property, however, is dependent on
how “complete” the conversion of a predicate into its annotated form is. Thus, we shall first
give an ideal characterization of such a conversion, after which we shall endeavour to prove
the completeness property. Realistic implementations of this conversion shall be discussed in
§5.6.
Definition 5.4.6 (Strongest Closure). The strongest closure of unannotated formula Φ, denoted
by sclosure(Φ), is the largest set of atoms α with the following properties: (a) for all stacks
s, s |= α whenever there exists h, b such that s, h, b |= Φ, and (b) there exists no atom α′
strictly stronger than α – that is, it is not the case that for all s, s |= α whenever s |= α′. For
practical and termination reasons, we shall assume only closures which return finite sets in our
formulation.
1 A subtle point here is that the set R continue to enjoy this property after repeated applications of specialization
steps. This is indeed true since, via the −filter→ relation, each specialization step only removes elements from R.
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In our conversion of an unannotated predicate definition for p(−→v ) into the annotated defi-
nition p(−→v )≡∨ni=1 Di; I;R, we compute the following sets:
• Gi = sclosure(Di∧pi), for i = 1, .., n,
• HL = {α | forall i ∈ L, exists α′ ∈ Gi s.t. forall s, s |= α′ whenever s |= α}
• I={L→pi |L⊆{1...n}, pi = ∧α∈HL α}, and
• R = {α←L |L is the largest set s.t. α∈⋂i∈L Gi}.
Moreover, we introduce the notation Inv(v ::pv〈−→v 〉,L) = piL, where (L→piL)∈I. This notation
is necessary in applying the rule [SP−[PRUNE]].
In practice, either the assumption holds, or the closure procedure computes a close enough
approximation to the strongest closure so that very few, if any, infeasible disjuncts are left in
the specialized formula.
Property 4 (Completeness). Let v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#∅ ∗ σˆ|C be a fully specialized formula that
resulted from a specialization process that started with an annotated formula. Denote by pii,
1 ≤ i ≤ n the pure parts of the disjuncts in the definition of p(−→v ), and assume that C is
satisfiable. Then, for all i ∈ L, pii ∧ C is satisfiable.
Proof Let us assume that we have a formula specialization sequence whose last element,
while fully specialized, has a predicate with an annotation that contains the label of an infeasi-
ble disjunct. That is, the fully specialized formula has the form v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#∅ ∗ σˆ|C, and it
is the case that Di ∧ C is unsatisfiable. Since R is part of a well-formed annotation, there must
exist a set of pruning conditions of the form (α←L0)∈R such that the following three condi-
tions hold simultaneously: Di entails α, i∈L0, and α∧C is unsatisfiable. The fact that neither
of these pruning conditions could be used to prune the ith disjunct Di can only be attributed to
the fact that all these pruning conditions were filtered out before any of them had a chance to
be picked by a pruning step.
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Let us consider the step in the specialization sequence where the last of these pruning
conditions was filtered out. Assume that the transformation performed at this step relies on the
following predicate specialization relation:
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L1#R1 | C1 −sp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | C2,
and that the pruning condition of interest is filtered out in the process of computing R2 from R1
and L2. For the filtering operation to proceed as described, either of the following conditions
(preconditions to the rule [SP−[FILTER]]) must hold:
• L2∩L0 = ∅; this can only happen if the disjunct has already been pruned, which contra-
dicts the hypothesis that it was still present in the last element.
• C2 =⇒ α ; this contradicts the hypothesis that the context C of the fully specialized
formula, which can only be stronger than C2, would have the property that C∧α is un-
satisfiable.
Thus, the hypothesis that the fully specialized formula has infeasible disjuncts is false. 2
5.5 Inferring Specializable Predicates
We present inference techniques that must be applied to each predicate definition so that they
can support the specialization process. We refer to this process as inference for specializable
predicates. A predicate is said to be specializable if it has multiple disjuncts and it has a non-
empty set of pruning conditions. These two conditions would allow a predicate instance to be
specializable from one form to another specialized form. Our predicates are processed in a
bottoms-up order with the following key steps:
• Transform each predicate definition to its specialized form.
• Compute an invariant (in conjunctive form) for each predicate.
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• Compute a family of invariants to support all specialized instances of the predicate.
• Compute a set of pruning conditions for the predicate.
• Specialize recursive invocations of the predicate, if possible.
As a running example for this inference process, let us consider the following predicate
which could be used to denote a list segment of singly-linked nodes, for conciseness we use x
instead of self :
data snode { int val; snode next; }
x ::lseg〈p,n〉 ≡ x=p ∧ n=0 ∨ ∃q, m · x ::snode〈 , q〉 ∗ q ::lseg〈p,m〉 ∧ m=n−1
Our inference technique derives the following specializable predicate definition:
x::lseg〈p,n〉 ≡ x=p ∧ n=0 | x=p∧n=0 ∨
∃q, m · x ::snode〈 , q〉∗q ::lseg〈p,m〉∧m=n−1 | x 6=null∧n>0;
I = {{1}→x=p∧n=0, {2}→x 6=null∧n>0, {1, 2}→n≥0};
R = {x=p←{1}, n=0←{1}, x6=null←{2}, n>0←{2}}
Note that we have a family of invariants, named I, to cater to each of the specialized states.
The most general invariant for a lseg predicate instance is :
Inv(x ::lseg〈p,n〉, {1, 2}) = n≥0
This is computed by a fix-point analysis [24] on the body of the predicate. If we determine
that a particular predicate instance can be specialized to x ::lseg〈p,n〉@{2}, we may use a
stronger invariant Inv(x ::lseg〈p,n〉, {2}) = x6=null∧n>0 to propagate this constraint from
the specialized instance. Such a family of invariants allows us to enrich the context of the
predicate instances that are being progressively specialized.
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Furthermore, we must process the predicate definitions in a bottom-up order, so that pred-
icates lower in the definition hierarchy are inferred before predicates higher in the hierarchy.
This is needed since we intend to specialize the body of each predicate definition with the help
of specialized definitions that were inferred earlier. In the case of a set of mutually-recursive
predicate definitions, we shall process this set of predicates simultaneously. Initially, we shall
assume that the set of pruning conditions for each recursive predicate is empty, which makes its
recursive instances unspecializable. However, once its set of pruning conditions has been de-
termined, we can apply further specialization so that the recursive invocations of the predicate
are specialized as well.
[INIT−[MULTI−SPEC]]
κ∧pi −if→ κˆ∧pi |C1 κˆ | C1 −sf→∗ κˆ1 | C2
κ∧pi −msf→ κˆ1∧pi | C2
[ISP−[SPEC−BODY]]
spredold = (p(
−→v ) ≡ ∨ni=1(∃−→u i · σi)) ∀i∈{1, .., n} · σi −msf→ σˆi | Ci
sprednew = (p(




−→v ) ≡ ∨ni=1(∃−→u i · σˆi |Ci)) ρ = [invp(−→v ) 7→fix(∨ni=1 ∃−→u i · Ci)]
I = {(L→hull(∨i∈L ∃−→u i · ρCi) | ∅⊂L⊂{1..n}} ∪ {{1..n}→ρ(invp(−→v ))}
sprednew = (p(




−→v ) ≡ ∨ni=1(∃−→u i · σˆi |Ci); I) G = ⋃ni=1 closure(I({i}))
R =
⋃
α∈G{α←{i | 1≤i≤n ∧ I({i}) =⇒ α}} ∀i∈{1, .., n} · σˆi | Ci −sf→∗ σˆi,2 | Ci,2
sprednew = (p(
−→v ) ≡ ∨ni=1(∃−→u i · σˆi,2 |Ci,2); I; R)
spredold −isp→ sprednew
where −sf→∗ is the transitive closure of −sf→; and I({i}) = pii, given ({i}→pii) ∈ I.
Figure 5.4: Inference Rules for Specializable Predicates
The formal rules for inferring each specializable predicate are given in Figure 5.4. The
rule [INIT−[MULTI−SPEC]] converts an unannotated formula into its corresponding special-
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ized form. It achieves this by an initialization step via the −if→ relation given in Figure 5.5,
followed by a multi-step specialization using −sf→∗, without resorting to case specialization
(that would otherwise result in an outer disjunctive formula). This essentially applies a transi-
tive closure of −sf→ until no further reduction is possible.
The rule [ISP−[SPEC−BODY]] converts the body of each predicate definition into its spe-
cialized form. For each recursive invocation, it will initially assume a symbolic invariant,
named invp(−→v ), without providing any pruning conditions. This immediately puts each recur-
sive predicate instance in the fully-specialized form.
After the body of the predicate definition has been specialized, we can proceed to build
a constraint abstraction for its predicate’s invariant, denoted by invp(−→v ), in the
[ISP−[BUILD−INV−FAMILY]] rule. For example, we may denote the invariant of predicate
x ::lseg〈p,n〉 symbolically using invlseg(x, p, n), before building the following recursive con-
straint abstraction:
invlseg(x, p, n) ≡ x=p∧n=0 ∨ ∃q, m · x6=null∧n=m+1∧invlseg(q, p, m)
If we apply a classical fix-point analysis to the above abstraction, we would obtain a closed-
form formula as the invariant of the lseg predicate, that is invlseg(x, p, n) = n≥0. With
this predicate invariant, we can now build a family of invariants for each proper subset L of
disjuncts, namely 0⊂L⊂{1..n}. This is done with the help of the convex hull approximation.
The size of this family of invariants is exponential to the number of disjuncts. While this is not
a problem for predicates with a small number of disjuncts, it could pose a problem for unusual
predicates with a large number of disjuncts. To circumvent this problem, we could employ
either a lazy construction technique or a more aggressive approximation to cut down on the
number of invariants generated. For simplicity, this aspect is not considered in the present
work.
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Our last step is to build a set of pruning conditions for the disjunctive predicates using
the [ISP−[BUILD−PRUNE−COND]] rule. This is currently achieved by applying a closure
operation over the invariant I({i}) for each of the disjuncts. To obtain a more complete
set of pruning conditions, we are expected to generate a set of strong atomic constraints for
each of the closure operations. For example, if we currently have a formula a>b ∧ b>c,
a strong closure operation over this formula may yield the following set of atomic constraints
{a>b, b>c, a>c+1} as pruning conditions and omit weaker atomic constraints, such as a>c.
[INIT−[EMP]]
emp −ih→ emp | true
[INIT−[CELL]]
x ::p〈−→v 〉 −ih→ x ::p〈−→v 〉 | x6=null
[INIT−[PRED]]
p(−→v ) ≡ (∨ni=1(∃−→u i·σˆi |Ci)); I;R
C = Inv(v ::p〈−→v 〉, {1..n})
v ::p〈−→v 〉 −ih→ v ::p〈−→v 〉@{1..n}#R | C
[INV−DEF]
p(−→v ) ≡ (∨ni=1(∃−→u i·σˆi |Ci)); I;R
(L→C) ∈ I
Inv(v ::p〈−→v 〉, L) = C
[INIT−[HEAP]]
∀i∈{1, 2}·κi −ih→ κˆi | Ci
κ1∗κ2 −ih→ κˆ1∗κˆ2 | C1∧C2
[INIT−[FORMULA]]
κ −ih→ κˆ | C
κ∧pi −if→ κˆ∧pi |C∧pi
Figure 5.5: Initialization for Specialization
Definition 5.5.1 (Sound invariant and sound pruning condition). Given a predicate definition
p(−→v )≡∨ni=1 Di; I; R:
(1) an invariant L→pi is said to be sound w.r.t. the predicate p if
(1.a) ∅ ⊂ L ⊆ {1, .., n}, and
(1.b) v ::p〈−→v 〉@L# |= pi.
(2) a family of invariants I is sound if every invariant from I is sound and the domain of I is
the set of all non-empty subsets of {1, .., n};
(3) a pruning condition (α←L) is sound w.r.t. the predicate p if
(3.a) ∅ ⊂ L ⊆ {1, .., n},
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(3.b) vars(α) ⊆ {−→v }, and
(3.c) ∀i∈L·Di |= α.
(4) a set of pruning conditions R is sound if every pruning condition in R is sound w.r.t. the
predicate p.
Property 5. For each predicate p(−→v ), the family of invariants and the set of pruning conditions
derived for p by our inference process are sound, assuming the fixpoint analysis and the hulling
operation used by the inference are sound.
Proof Suppose the inference process produces the annotated predicate definition:
p(−→v )≡∨ni=1 Di; I; R, where Di = ∃−→wi·σˆi|Ci
(1) To prove the soundness of I, by Definition 5.5.1, we need to show the soundness of
each invariant in I. Given (L→piL) ∈ I, by the same definition, it is sufficient to show that:
• (1.a) ∅ ⊂ L ⊆ {1, .., n}
obvious from the [ISP−[BUILD−INV−FAMILY]] rule for constructing I
• (1.b) v ::p〈−→v 〉@L# |= piL.
This follows from an induction on |L|.
Base case (|L|=1): Let L = {i}. v ::p〈−→v 〉@L# = Di and I({i}) = ρCi. (1.b) clearly
holds since Di |= Ci and Ci |= ρCi. The latter comes from the fact that
invp(−→v ) =⇒ fix(invp(−→v )).
Inductive case (|L|=k+1): there exist some L0 and some i such that L=L0∪{i} and
|L0| = k. By induction hypothesis, we have v ::p〈−→v 〉@L0# |= I(L0). We also have
v ::p〈−→v 〉@{i}# |= I({i}) from base case. Therefore,
(v ::p〈−→v 〉@L# ∨ v ::p〈−→v 〉@L0# ) |= (I(L0)∨I({i}), from which (1.b) follows (in ad-
dition to the soundness of the hulling operation).
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(2) To prove the soundness of R, by Definition 5.5.1, we need to show the soundness of
each pruning condition in R. Given (α←L) ∈ R, by the same definition, we need to show:
• ∅⊂L⊆{1, .., n}, follows from [ISP−[BUILD−PRUN−COND]]
• vars(α) ⊆ {−→v }, follows from [ISP−[BUILD−PRUN−COND]]
• ∀i∈L·∃−→w ·Di|=α, follows from the soundness of I({i}) (which gives Di|=I({i})) and
that I({i} =⇒ α(from the aforementioned rule)
2
5.6 Specialization for Program Verification
We have designed our specialization calculus originally to improve an existing separation
logic-based program verification system. To support predicate specialization, we must pro-
vide a set of translation rules that would normalize and specialize each given formula. A
core set of the rules is given in Fig 5.6. The first rule ([NORM−[PURE−AND]]) shows how
a pure term is added to the context of its annotated formula, prior to its specialization via
the −sf→∗ transition. The second rule ([NORM−[SEP−AND]]) shows how two heap terms
are spatially conjoined together, with a conjunctive strengthening of their combined contexts.
Specialization is also applied to eliminate infeasible disjuncts, where possible. The third rule
([NORM−[UNFOLDING]]) can be used to unfold a specialized predicate by revealing only the
feasible disjuncts. This unfolding rule may be invoked by our entailment procedure to help
materialize a predicate instance. The disjunctive formula itself is distributed and recursively
normalized by the rule ([NORM−[DIST−OR]]).
The final step towards our goal consists in linking the specializer into the verification logic
we proposed in the previous chapters. One of the first changes we made to our verification
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[NORM−[PURE−AND]]
κˆ | C∧pi2 −sf→∗ κˆ2 | C2
(κˆ∧pi |C)∧pi2 −norm→ κˆ2∧(pi∧pi2) | C2
[NORM−[SEP−AND]]
(κˆ1∗κˆ2) | C1∧C2 −sf→∗ κˆ3 | C3
(κˆ1∧pi1 |C1) ∗ (κˆ2∧pi2 |C2) −norm→ κˆ3∧(pi1∧pi2) | C3
[NORM−[UNFOLDING]]
p(−→v ) ≡ ∨ni=1(∃−→ui · σˆi |Ci)
J ≡ (∨i∈L ∃−→ui · σˆi) |Ci J ∗ (σˆ |C) −norm→ Φˆ
((v ::p〈−→v 〉@L#R) ∗ σˆ) |C −norm→ Φˆ
[NORM−[DIST−OR]]
∀i∈{1..n} · (σˆi∗σˆ) |C∧Ci −norm→ σˆi,2 |Ci,2
(
∨n
i=1 ∃−→ui · (σˆi |Ci)) ∗ (σˆ |C) −norm→
∨n
i=1 ∃−→ui · (σˆi,2 |Ci,2)
Figure 5.6: Normalizing Specialized Separation Logic
system was to transform pre/post specifications into specialized form, as shown below:
Φpr −msf→ Φˆpr Φpo −msf→ Φˆpo
mn ((t v)∗; (ref t v)∗) requires Φpr ensures Φpo · · ·
=⇒ mn ((t v)∗; (ref t v)∗) requires Φˆpr ensures Φˆpo · · ·
This pre-processing step has several benefits. Firstly, it is able to strengthen the contexts of our
specifications. Secondly, the specialized formula is reusable at each of its caller’s site, reducing
computation costs. Lastly, we may eliminate constraints from the specification that are already
implied by the specialized predicates. This can help reduce some proof obligations needed. As
an example of these benefits, consider a specification formula, x ::dllv〈p,n,S 〉∧n>2∧x6=null.
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Applying our normalization and specialization to this formula would initially yield:
x ::dllv〈p,n,S 〉@{2}∧n>2∧x 6=null | n>0∧x6=null∧S6={}
We can remove the constraint x6=null as it is already implied by invariant of the specialized
predicate x ::dllv〈p,n,S 〉@{2},thus obtaining a more compact formula:
x ::dllv〈p,n,S 〉@{2}∧n>2 | n>0∧x6=null∧S6={}.
With the specialized pre/post specifications, we can now present Hoare-style forward ver-
ification rules ` {Φˆ1} e {Φˆ2}, where we expect Φˆ1 to be given before computing Φˆ2. We
highlight some verification rules in Figure 5.7. They are used to track heap states as ac-
curately as possible with path-sensitivity ([FV−[IF]]), flow-sensitivity and context-sensitivity
([FV−[CALL]]). For each call site, [FV−[CALL]] ensures that its method’s precondition is satis-
fied, while its postcondition is spatially conjoined with the prevailing program state. In all these
rules, we always normalize/specialize after each monotonic change to the program state. This
allows the specialized formula to be shared on a timely basis. Our new entailment checking
procedure is optimized to take advantage of this specialized form.
5.7 Improved Specialization
Thus far, we have described the core concepts behind predicate specialization, and how it
enables a more optimal representation of program states for static reasoning. In this section,
we explore two key optimization techniques that can make predicate specialization a practical
tool for program reasoning. The first technique, called memoization, is based on a trade-off
between re-proving a result with respect to a given context, or recalling its stored result from
a memoized set. The second technique, called incremental pruning, relies on incremental
computation that is made possible through our approach. Both optimizations are detailed in
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[FV−[IF]]
Φˆ∧v′ −norm→ Φˆ1 ` {Φˆ1} e1 {Φˆ3}
Φˆ∧¬v′ −norm→ Φˆ2 ` {Φˆ2} e2 {Φˆ4}
` {Φˆ} if v then e1 else e2 {Φˆ3∨Φˆ4}
[FV−[CALL]]
t0 m(t1 v1, .., tn vn) requires Φˆpr ensures Φˆpo {..}
ρ=[v′i/vi] Φˆ −norm→ Φˆ0 Φˆ0 ` ρΦˆpr ∗ Φˆ1
W = {v1, .., vn} (Φˆ1 ∗W ρΦˆpo) −norm→ Φˆ2
` {Φˆ}m(v1..vn) {Φˆ2}
Figure 5.7: Some Verification Rules
Figure 5.8 and shall be discussed in the remainder of this section.
5.7.1 Memoization
As the cost for invoking automated provers accounts for the bulk of the time taken by program
verification system, in general, we can improve our system by minimising the number of in-
vocations to these provers. One simple way to achieve this is to maintain two memoization
sets for each context C using a so-called syntactic context: S = (I,F). The first element I
denotes a set of atomic constraints that are implied by the context C, that is ∀α∈I · C =⇒ α.
The second element F denotes a set of atomic constraints that are in contradiction with con-
text C, that is ∀α∈F · C =⇒ ¬α. With these two memoization sets, we may now approximate
the check C =⇒ α by a membership test α∈I, and also approximate the contradiction check
C =⇒ ¬α by its corresponding membership test α∈F. These two membership tests are only
sound approximations of the corresponding implication checks. In case both membership tests
fail for a given pruning condition α, we could turn to automated provers (as a last resort) to
help determine C =⇒ ¬α.
Furthermore, the syntactic context S currently keeps track of both strong and weak atomic
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constraints for memoization purposes, whereas for implication checking we only need to use
the stronger constraints. To support this feature of using only the stronger atomic constraints,
where possible, our system keeps two implication sets, namely I = (IS, IW). The IS set is
expected to capture a set of stronger atomic constraints, while IW set can keep the weaker
atomic constraints that are already implied by IS.
As an example of how these two implication sets are maintained, consider a simple exam-
ple x ::dllv〈p,n,S 〉 ∧ x6=null. In the beginning, our specialization mechanism will add the
predicate invariant n≥0 to its current context. After specializing the predicate to
x ::dllv〈p,n,S 〉@{2}, our mechanism can add a stronger atomic constraint n>0 to the con-
text. This specialization step would cause the earlier atomic constraint n≥0 to be marked as
redundant. When this happens, we keep each new stronger atomic constraint (computed as
pio in rule [OSF−[ADD−INV]]) in the IS set, while each weaker atomic constraint (computed
as pii in the same rule) will be moved into the IW set. Both the memoization sets, IS and
IW, are for membership tests to approximate implication, but only the stronger set IS is used
by the automated prover. This allows us to use a more efficient Strong-Imply(S) =⇒ ¬α in-
stead of Imply(S) =⇒ ¬α where Strong-Imply(S) denotes ∧α∈IS α, while Imply(S) denotes∧
α∈(IS∪IW) α.
5.7.2 Incremental Pruning
To support the early elimination of infeasible states, our calculus is designed to prove if each
atomic constraint α contradicts a given context C by the implication C =⇒ ¬α. Furthermore,
the context C is allowed to evolve to a monotonically stronger context C1, such that C1 =⇒ C.
Hence, if indeed C =⇒ ¬α, we can be assured that C1 =⇒ ¬α will also hold. This mono-
tonic change of the context is the basis of the memoization optimization that allows previous
outcomes of implications and contradictions to be reused.
Another advantage of the above approach is that we can easily slice out relevant constraints
from (a satisfiable) C that are needed to prove an atomic constraint α. This slicing technique
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is allowed by our approach because we detect infeasible branches by proving only one atomic
pruning constraint at a time. For example, consider a context x6=null ∧ n>0 ∧ S6={}. If
we need to prove its contradiction with n=0, a naive solution is to use (x6=null ∧ n>0 ∧
S6={}) =⇒ ¬(n=0). A better solution is to slice out just the constraint n>0, and then proceed
to prove the contradiction using n>0 =⇒ ¬(n=0). Slicing out constraints from the context is
an integral part of incremental pruning and is enabled by our decision to use atomic constraints
as pruning conditions, and relying on monotonically stronger contexts.
To support this optimization, we propose to partition each context into sets of connected
constraints. Two atomic constraints in a context C are said to be connected if they satisfy the
following relation.
connected(α1, α2) :- (vars(α1)∩vars(α2)) 6= {}
connected(α1, α2) :- ∃α∈C · connected(α1, α)∧connected(α2, α)
With a continuous partitioning of connected constraints for the contexts, our system can easily
slice out a set of constraints (from the context) that are connected to each pruning condition.
This slicing mechanism has been shown to reduce analysis time significantly in our experi-
ments.
One other important optimization that is possible in our calculus is to take advantage of
provers with incremental solving capability, particularly from SMT provers like Yices [32]
and Alt-Ergo [12]. In these provers, it is possible to incrementally add new constraints into
an existing context before checking for satisfiability of the combined formula, and later pop
out constraints based on a stack-like discipline. The pre-processing done for each context is al-
ways kept when the prover returns to a prior state. In the case of our specialization calculus, the
strong constraints from our earlier context would have been added by incremental provers. To
check if each new pruning condition α contradicts with the current context, we need only push
constraint α into the prover before checking for a contradiction. This same α constraint can
later be popped out, before we explore the next pruning conditions in turn. The context may
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also be monotonically strengthened with new constraints, but this has to be checked for con-
tradiction too, since a false context should be detected explicitly. Furthermore, we may use
a set of simultaneous incremental provers, one for each set of connected constraints from the
context. This approach yields an even better performance gain for our specialization calculus.
In the improved specialization, we would attempt to minimize on the number of calls to
the prover. This is achieved by memoising on all atomic constraints that are either implied
by or contradicted with the current context. We represent each current context S by (I,F)
where I is the set of atomic constraints that are implied by the context, while F is the set of
atomic constraints that are in contradiction with the context. That is ∀α ∈ I · S =⇒ α and
∀α ∈ F · S =⇒ ¬α.
Furthermore, in the implied set I, we distinguish between strong and weak atomic con-
straints. A constraint from I is said to be strong if it is not implied by a different constraint in
I. In theory, we can compute the set of strong constraint by the following operator
strong-imply(I) =df {α1|α1 ∈ I,¬(∃α2∈I · α1 6=α2 ∧ α2 =⇒ α1)}
As this computation can be expensive, we shall instead use a marker to identify each atomic
constraint in I that is known to be redundant. The operator to select stronger atomic constraints
will simply omit those constraints that are marked as redundant.
5.8 Experiments
We have built a prototype system for our specialization calculus inside HIP [75].
Figure 5.9 summarizes a suite of programs tested which included the 17 small programs
(comprised of various methods on singly, doubly, sorted and circular linked lists, selection-sort,
insertion-sort and methods for handling heaps, and perfect trees). Due to similar outcomes, we
present the average of the performances for these 17 programs. We also experimented with
a set of medium-sized programs that included complex shapes and invariants, to support full
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[OSP−[FILTER]]
L⊆L0 ∨ α∈Imply(S)
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | S −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | S2
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#({α←L0}∪R) | S −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | S2
[OSP−[PRUNE1]]
α ∈ FailSet(S)
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@(L−L0)#R | S −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | S2
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#({α←L0}∪R) | S −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | S2
[OSP−[PRUNE2]]
` Strong-Imply(S) =⇒ ¬α
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@(L−L0)#R | S∧¬α −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | S2
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#({α←L0}∪R) | S −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | S2
[OSF−[HEAP]]
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | S −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R2 | S1
κ | S1 −osf→ κˆ | S2
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R ∗ κ | S −osf→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R2 ∗ κˆ | S2
[OSF−[ADD−INV]]
L2⊂L v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R | S −osp→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 | S1
pii = Inv(p(
−→v ), L2)− Inv(p(−→v ), L)
pio = Inv(p(
−→v ), L)− Inv(p(−→v ), L2)
I2 = ImplySet(S1)	pio unionmulti pii
F2 = FailSet(S1) ∪ {¬α | α ∈ pii}
κ | (I2,F2) −osf→ κˆ | S3
v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L#R ∗ κ | S −osf→ v ::pv〈−→v 〉@L2#R2 ∗ κˆ | S3




ImplySet(S)=df (IS, IW); FailSet(S)=dfF;




αi, I−pi=df I−{α1..αm}, I∪pi=df I∪{α1..αm},
((IS, IW),F)∧pi=df ((IS∪{α1, .., αm}, IW),F∪{¬α1, ..,¬αm})
Figure 5.8: Improved Specialization
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Progs (specified props) LOC HIP HIP+Spec
Time(s) Time(s)
17 small progs (size) 87 0.86 0.80
Bubble sort (size, sets) 80 2.20 2.23
Quick sort (size, sets) 115 2.43 2.13
Merge sort (size, sets) 128 3.10 2.15
Complete(size,minh) 137 5.01 2.94
AVL (height, size, bal) 160 64.1 16.4
Heap Trees(size, maxel) 208 14.9 4.62
AVL (height, size) 340 27.5 13.1
AVL (height, size, sets) 500 657 60.7
Red Black (size, height) 630 25.2 15.6
Progs (specified props) HIP HIP+Spec
Count Disj Size Count Disj Size
17 small progs (size) 229 1.63 12.39 612 1.13 2.97
Bubble sort (size, sets) 296 2.13 18.18 876 1.09 2.79
Quick sort (size, sets) 255 3.29 17.97 771 1.27 3.08
Merge sort (size, sets) 286 2.04 16.74 1079 1.07 2.99
Complete(size,minh) 463 3.52 43.75 2134 1.11 10.10
AVL (height, size, bal) 764 2.90 85.02 6451 1.07 9.66
Heap Trees(size, maxel) 649 2.10 56.46 2392 1.02 8.68
AVL (height, size) 704 2.98 70.65 7078 1.09 10.74
AVL (height, size, sets) 1758 8.00 86.79 14662 1.91 10.11
Red Black (size, height) 2225 3.84 80.91 7697 1.01 3.79
Figure 5.9: Verification Times and Proof Statistics (Proof Counts, Avg Disjuncts, Avg Size)
functional correctness. We measured the verification times taken for the original HIP system,
and also the enhanced system, called HIP+Spec, with predicate specialization. For the suite of
simple programs, the verifier with specializer runs about 7% faster. For programs with more
complex properties (with the exception of bubble sort), predicate specialization manages to
reduce verification times by between 12% and 90%. These improvements were largely due to
the presence of smaller formulae with fewer disjuncts, as captured in Figure 5.10. This graph
compares the characteristics (e.g. average disjuncts, sizes and timings) of formula encountered
by HIP+Spec, as a percentage relative to the same properties of the original HIP system. For
example, the average number of disjuncts per proof encountered went down from 3.2 to 1.1;
while the size of each proof (based on as the number of atomic formulae) also decreased from
an average of 48.0 to 6.5. This speed-up was achieved despite a six fold increase in the proof
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Figure 5.10: Characteristic (disjunct, size, timing) of HIP+Spec compared to the Original HIP
counts per program from 763 to 4375 used by the specialization and verification processes.
We managed to achieve this improvement despite the overheads of a memoization mechanism
and the time taken to infer annotations for specializable predicates. We believe this is due to
smaller and simpler proof obligations generated with the help of our specialization process.
We also investigated the effects of various optimizations on the specialization mechanism.
Memoizing implications and contradictions saves 3.47%, while memoizing each context for
state change saves 22.3%. For incremental pruning, we have utilized the slicing mechanism
which saves 48% on average. We have not yet exploited the incremental proving capability
based on strengthening of contexts since our current solvers, Omega and MONA, do not sup-
port such a feature. These optimizations were measured separately, with no attempt made to
study their correlation.
5.9 Barrier Logic with Specialization
Our novel specialization calculus is a great general purpose tool for improving verification
efficiency in the presence of disjunctive predicates. In the previous section we presented sev-
eral compelling results showcasing the efficiency improvements the specialization calculus can
generate. However we believe it could also produce impressive results when applied to our
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verification logic with exceptions and barriers.
In this section we will present the extensions necessary for applying the specialization
calculus to barrier definitions. As support, we will also present the considerable improvements
specialization generated in the performance of the HIP/SLEEK for the barrier examples.
We have already pointed out that barrier definitions and predicate definitions are similar
in that they both describe properties associated with resources, heaps and barriers. However
they differ in that predicate definitions describe a property of the current state while barrier
definitions describe how a barrier call would behave given the program state. Therefore, while
predicate specialization eagerly dismisses infeasible states thus decreasing the penalty of rea-
soning with unfolded predicates, barrier specialization will do an eager pruning of the infeasible
transitions minimizing the barrier call penalty.
As a quick reminder, in §4.6 we have shown that barrier definitions can be encoded as a set
of formula pairs :
[self::]bname〈−→v 〉 ≡
∨
(requires Φpre ensures Φpost)
We have also shown that applying the barrier verification rule for a barrier call barrier b
translates into locating the barrier node b::bnamepi〈−→v 〉 corresponding to b, retrieving the bar-
rier definition for bname and issuing a SLEEK entailment check with the barrier body as the
consequent.
This behaviour is very similar to the unfolding of disjunctive predicates. And unfortunately
induces a similar performance penalty. In the style of predicate definition annotations we enrich
the barrier definitions with the set of pruning conditions R:
[self::]bname〈−→v 〉 ≡
(∨
(requires Φˆpre ensures Φˆpost)
)
;R
As with predicate definitions we use R = {α←L} to express the conditions in which a par-
ticular specification in the barrier definition can be eagerly discarded before actually executing
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the entailment. In order to compute the R pruning conditions we apply a similar specialization
inference relation to the one presented for predicates in §5.5.
get inv(∃−→u · κˆ ∧ pi | C) = [invp(−→v )7→fix(∃−→u · Ci)]C
get inv(Φ1 ∨ Φ2) = hull( get inv(Φ1) ∨ get inv(Φ2))
[ISP−[BUILD−PRUNE−COND]]















α∈G{α←{i | 1≤i≤n ∧ get inv(Φˆipre)) =⇒ α}}
Φipost −msf→ Φˆipost










Figure 5.11: Inference Rules for Specializable Barriers
Note that the inference process takes into account only information from the preconditions,
which is intuitive since the preconditions contain the link to the current state. In the process
of building the barrier pruning conditions the invariants corresponding to the preconditions are
built as an intermediary step, however, they are not exposed. In the case of barrier definitions,
there are no invariant families, as barrier definitions describe the behaviour of an operation
rather than the properties of a state.
Once the pruning conditions have been computed, the actual barrier instance specialization
step varies little from the predicate specialization. The only change lies in the [SP−[PRUNE]]
step and consists in not adding any invariant after a pruning has been triggered.
[SP−[PRUNE]]
C∧α =⇒ false (α←L0) ∈ R L ∩ L0 6= ∅
L2 = L− L0 C,L2 ` R −filter→ R1
v ::bnamev〈−→v 〉@L#R | C −sp→ v ::bnamev〈−→v 〉@L2#R1 | C ∧ C1
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We would like to point out that so far we have considered only linear arithmetic constraints
as pruning conditions. However, as mentioned in the previous sections, it is possible to extend
the domain simply by ensuring a hulling operation for the desired domain. In particular we are
interested in also using fractional share constraints as pruning conditions. Although a proper
hulling could be devised, in our investigations we have observed that even a trivial approach
in which the hull returns the weakest result, true, works sufficiently well in practice and is
strong enough to prune all the necessary branches for our examples. This not surprising, since
most of the specifications could be pruned based on arithmetic constraints. For example, given
the context: b::bname
?〈2 , x1 , x2 , y1 , y2 , i〉where bname denotes the barrier definition from
our running example in §4.2, the arithmetic conditions would eliminate all specifications not
pertaining to the transition from state 2 to state 1 however this still leaves two specifications.
By adding the fractional shares pruning conditions, the specializer is able to properly reduce to
only one applicable specification (the second move). And thus cutting the search space from 8
possible specifications to only one.
Experimental validation. We run HIP and SLEEK with pruning support for barrier defini-
tions on the benchmarks used in §4.6.6 to test the initial extension for barrier verification.
Unsurprisingly, the timings obtained for the SLEEK example without barriers are slightly
higher, mainly due to the preprocessing overhead for predicate definitions: for the 54 entail-
ments focused on the fractional share support, the timing increased from 2.1 seconds to 2.34.
However, for the 279 entailments generated during the well-formedness checks of several bar-
rier definitions, the timing dropped from 3.69 seconds to 2.45 seconds.
Furthermore, in Figure 5.12, we list the timings obtained with pruning versus the timings
without pruning, for the HIP examples presented in §4.6.6 .
Note that for the HIP examples , specialization generated an average speedup of 12.5.
Another important observation is that the highest gain were attained for the examples with more
complex ownership transfer patterns and larger barrier definitions (e.g. multi-loops, Horner
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Test Threads Mem LOC No With Speedup
cells code+ Prun Prun
spec (s) (s)
video 2 5 79 59.17 2.38 24.86
3 7 128 215 6.06 35.59
video-weak 2 5 79 60.35 2.89 20.88
video-strong 2 5 79 61.12 2.99 20.44
2 1 62 0.81 0.69 1.17
MISD 3 1 67 1.33 0.95 1.40
(without 4 1 73 1.97 1.25 1.58
feedback) 5 1 79 2.81 1.65 1.70
6 1 87 3.88 2.12 1.83
2 2 74 3.22 1.64 1.96
MISD 3 3 80 4.04 1.95 2.07
(with 4 4 129 9.28 3.21 2.89
feedback) 5 5 156 69.51 5.18 13.42
6 6 187 177 7.9 22.41
3 4 160 12.82 3.8 3.37
multi-loops 4 5 208 132 6.31 20.92
5 6 255 364 9.76 37.3
3 3 54 1.43 1.03 1.39
pipeline 4 4 70 2.52 1.25 2.02
5 5 89 4.25 2.08 2.04
6 6 106 7.08 2.88 2.46
Horner(v1) 3 7 116 181 5.22 34.67
3 4 111 8.04 2.6 3.09
Horner(v2) 4 5 143 97 4.3 22.56
5 6 176 279 7.41 37.65
Figure 5.12: Verification times for HIP with specialized barriers
algorithm). This is extremely important as these factors often lead to massive performance
degradation.
Furthermore, note that introducing specialization to barrier reasoning makes it almost as
efficient as traditional verification for reasonable complex sequential programs of comparable
size (e.g. AVL or red black trees).
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5.10 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a specialization calculus for disjunctive predicates in a sep-
aration logic-based abstract domain. Our specialization calculus is proven sound and is termi-
nating. It supports symbolic pruning of infeasible states within each predicate instance, under
monotonic changes to the program context. We have designed inference techniques that can
automatically derive all annotations required for each specializable predicate. We have also
proposed various ways to optimize the specialization process, including memoization and in-
cremental pruning. Initial experiments have confirmed speed gains from the deployment of
our specialization mechanism to handle separation logic specifications in program verification.
Nevertheless, our calculus is more general, and is useful for program reasoning over any ab-
stract domain that supports disjunctive predicates. Apart from its efficiency benefits, predicate
specialization has the added advantage of providing an abstraction barrier that would allow
a modular approach to the program verification process. Similar to modular code develop-
ment practices, the sets of pruning conditions and family of invariants, once computed, can
be seen as an “interface” of the predicate, whereas the predicate definition can be seen as its
“implementation”. Program verification with specialized predicates requires only the use of
the “interface”. By not unfolding the predicate’s definition, we have made the “implementa-
tion” opaque. In a modular setting, a large verification problem could be split up not only by
code regions, but also by specifications, utilizing pre-specialized pre/post conditions and pred-
icate interfaces between modules. This modular approach to verification is being enabled by
predicate specialization.
Finally, we have shown how the specialization calculus naturally extends to barrier defini-
tions and that it ensures that the barrier reasoning mechanism does not incur any considerable
performance penalty.
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Chapter 6
Comparative Remarks
Next, we will outline some of the recent works relevant to our proposal and comment on their
respective merits. We will divide the discussion in three topics following the main contributions
of this thesis.
6.1 Barrier Verification
O’Hearn’s concurrent separation logic focused on programs that used critical regions [80, 16];
subsequent work by Hobor et al. and Gotsman et al. added first-class locks and threads [51,
43, 50]. Our basic soundness techniques (unerased semantics tracks resource accounting;oracle
semantics isolates sequential and concurrent reasoning from each other; etc.) follow Hobor et
al. Recently both Villard et al. and Bell et al. extended concurrent separation logic to channels
[7, 96]. The work on channels is similar to ours in that both Bell and Villard track additional
dynamic state in the logic and soundness proof. Bell tracks communication histories while
Villard tracks the state of a finite state automaton associated with each communication channel.
Of all of the previous soundness results, only Hobor et al. had a machine-checked soundness
proof, albeit an incomplete one.
An interesting question is whether is it possible to reason about barriers in a setting with
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locks or channels. The question has both an operational and a logical flavor. Speaking op-
erationally, in a practical sense the answer is no: for performance reasons barriers are not
implemented with channels or locks. If we ignore performance, however, it is possible to im-
plement barriers with channels or locks1. The logical part of the question then becomes, are the
program logics defined by O’Hearn, Hobor, Gotsman, Villard, or Bell (including their coau-
thors) strong enough to reason about the (implementation of) barriers in the style of the logic
we have presented? As far as we can tell each previous solution is missing at least one required
feature, so in a strict sense, the answer here is again no.
For illustration we examine what seems to be the closest solution to ours: the copyless
message passing channels of Villard et al. Operationally speaking, the best way to implement
barriers seems to be by adding a central authority that maintains a channel with each thread
using a barrier. When a thread hits a barrier, it sends “waiting” to the central authority, and then
waits until it receives “proceed”. In turn, the central authority waits for a “waiting” message
from each thread, and then sends each of them a “proceed” message. Fortunately Villard allows
the central authority to wait on multiple channels simultaneously.
The question then becomes a logical one. Although it should not pose any fundamental
difficulty, their logic would first need to be enhanced with fractional permissions; in fact we
believe that Villard’s Heap-Hop tool already uses the same fractional permission model (by
Dockins et al.) that we do. Since Villard uses automata to track state, we think it probable,
but not certain, that our barrier state machines can be encoded as a series of his channel state
machines.
There are some problems to solve. Villard requires certain side conditions on his channels;
we require other kinds of side conditions on our barriers; these conditions do not seem fully
compatible 2. Assuming that we can weaken/strengthen conditions appropriately, we reach a
second problem with the side conditions: some of our side conditions (e.g., mutual exclusion)
1Indeed, it is possible to implement channels and locks in terms of each other.
2For example, Villard requires determinacy whereas we do not; he would also require that the postconditions
of barriers be precise whereas we do not; etc.
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are restrictions on the shape of the entire diagram; in Villard’s setting the barrier state diagram
has been partitioned into numerous separate channel state machines. Verifying our side condi-
tions seems to require verification of the relationships that these channel state machines have
to each other; the exact process is unclear.
Once the matter of side conditions is settled, there remains the issue of verifying the indi-
vidual threads and the central authority. Villard’s logic seems to have all that is required for the
individual threads; the question is how difficult it would be to verify the central authority. Here
we are less sure but suspect that with enough ghost state/instructions it can be done.
There remains a question as to whether it is a good idea to reason about barriers via channels
(or locks). We suspect that it is not a good idea, even ignoring the fact that actual implemen-
tations of barriers do not use channels. The main problem seems to be a loss of intuition: by
distributing the barrier state machine across numerous channel state machines and the inclu-
sion of necessary ghost state, it becomes much harder to see what is going on. We believe that
one of the major contributions of our work is that our barrier rule is extremely simple; with
a quick reference to the barrier state diagram it is easy to determine what is going on. There
is a secondary problem: we believe that our barrier rule will look and behave essentially the
same way in a setting with first-class barriers in which it is possible to define functions that
are polymorphic over the barrier diagram; even assuming a channel logic enriched in a similar
way, the verification of a polymorphic central authority seems potentially formidable.
One interesting question is how our barrier rule would interact with the rules of other flavors
of concurrent separation logic (e.g., with locks or channels). We believe that the answer is yes,
at least in the context of a logic of partial correctness1, as long as the primitives used remain
strongly synchronizing (i.e., coarse-grained). It is not clear how our barrier rule might interact
with the kind of fine-grained concurrency that is the subject of Vafeiadis and Parkinson [95],
Dodds et al. [29], or Dinsdale-Young et al. [26]. We believe that our barrier rule is sound on a
1Of course, the more concurrency primitives a programmer has, the easier it is to get into a deadlock. We
hypothesize that concurrent program logics of total correctness may not be as compositional as concurrent program
logics of partial correctness.
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machine with weak memory as long as all of the concurrency is strongly synchronized.
Finally, work on concurrent program analysis is in the early stages; Gotsman et al., Calcagno
et al., and Villard et al. give techniques that cover some use cases involving locks and channels
but much remains to be done [42, 18, 97].
Connection to a result by Jacobs and Piessens. We recently learned that Jacobs and Piessens
have an impressive result on modular fine-grained concurrency [59]. Jacobs was able to reason
about our example program using his VeriFast tool by designing an implementation of barriers
using locks and reducing our barrier diagram to a large disjunction for a resource invariant.
However, VeriFast has some disadvantages compared to the HIP/SLEEK approach we pre-
sented. First, HIP/SLEEK required far less input from the user. In the case of our 30-line
example program, more than 600 lines of annotation were required in VeriFast, not including
the code/annotations for the barrier implementation itself. HIP/SLEEK were able to verify the
same program with approximately 30 lines of annotation (mostly the barrier definition). Sec-
ond, it was harder to gain insight into the program from the disjunction-form of the invariant;
in contrast we find our barrier diagrams straightforward to understand. Finally, it is unclear
to us whether the reduction is always possible or whether it was only enabled by the relative
simplicity of our example program. That said, Jacobs and Piessens have the only logic and tool
proven to be able to reason about barriers as derived from a more general mechanism.
6.2 Specialization Calculus
Traditionally, specialization techniques [61, 83, 69] have been used for code optimization by
exploiting information about the context in which the program is executed. Classical exam-
ples are the partial evaluators based on binding-time analysers that divide a program into static
parts to be specialized and dynamic parts to be residualized. However, our work focusses
on a different usage domain, proposing a predicate specialization for program verification to
prune infeasible disjuncts from abstract program states. In contrast, partial evaluators [61]
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use unfolding and specialised methods to propagate static information. More advanced partial
evaluation techniques which integrate abstract interpretation have been proposed in the con-
text of logic and constraint logic programming [84, 83, 69].They can control the unfolding of
predicates by enhancing the abstract domains with information obtained from other unfolding
operations. Our work differs in its focus on minimizing the number of infeasible states, rather
than on code optimization. This difference allows us to use techniques, such as memoization
and incremental pruning, that were not previously exploited for specialization.
Several symbolic pruning techniques [39, 2, 34, 44] have been proposed in the area of
model checking for ameliorating the state explosion problem, especially in the context of veri-
fying concurrent systems. Thus partial order reduction techniques [39, 2, 34] are used to prune
away redundant thread interleavings within each trace equivalence class, while property-driven
symbolic methods [62] are used to prune away property specific redundant interleavings be-
tween different trace classes. Similarly, symbolic model checking techniques, e.g. [23, 44, 62],
rely on underlying SAT or SMT solvers to prune infeasible states. SAT solvers usually use a
conflict analysis [92] that records the causes of conflicts so as to recognize and preempt the
occurrences of similar conflicts later on in the search. Modern SMT solvers (e.g. [79, 32]) use
analogous analyses to reduce the number of calls to underlying theory solvers. Compared to
our pruning approach, conflict analysis [92] is a backtracking search technique that discovers
contexts leading to conflicts and uses them to prune the search space. These techniques are
mostly complementary since they did not consider predicate specialization, which is important
for expressive logics. From a program verification perspective, our work falls in line with re-
cent trends of having an expressive specification mechanism. This is important for verification
systems, such as [101, 102], that aim for full functional correctness to be guaranteed.
The primary goal of our work is to provide a more effective way to handle disjunctive pred-
icates for separation logic [75, 77]. The proper treatment of disjunction (to achieve a trade-off
between precision and efficiency) is a key concern of existing shape analyses based on sepa-
ration logic [27, 65]. One research direction is to design parameterized heap materialization
160 6. COMPARATIVE REMARKS
mechanisms (also known as focus operation) adapted to specific program statements and to
specific verification tasks [88, 71, 87, 8, 82]. Another direction is to design partially disjunc-
tive abstract domains with join operators that enable the analysis to abstract away information
considered to be irrelevant for proving a certain property [45, 100, 19]. Techniques proposed
in these directions are currently orthogonal to the contribution of this work and it would be
interesting to investigate if they could benefit from predicate specialization, and vice-versa.
6.3 Exception Verification
Some proposals, [64, 60] have considered a core language with exceptions by adding both a
throw e construct and a simplified try e1 catch (c v) e2 construct from the Java language.
However, this simplified feature was not able to succinctly handle more advanced features, such
as try−finally nor try−with−multiple−catches. Another proposal [31] directly adds
these advanced features in their core language, but this is done at the price of a more complex
formalization. [60] employs two analyses of different granularity, at the expression and method
levels, to collect constraints over the set of exception types handled by each Java program. By
solving the constraint system using techniques from [33], they can obtain a fairly precise set
of uncaught exceptions. To overcome the above shortcomings, we proposed a more expressive
specification logic, which complements the type system through selective tracking on types
that are linked to control flows.
A recent approach towards exception handling in a higher-order setting, is taken in [11].
Exceptions are represented as sums and exception handlers are assigned polymorphic, exten-
sible row types. Furthermore, following a translation to an internal language, each exception
handler is viewed as an alternative continuation whose domain is the sum of all exceptions
that could arise at a given program point. Though CPS can be used to uniformly handle the
control flows, it increases the complexity of the verification process as continuations are first
class values.
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Spec# also has a specification mechanism for exceptions however exceptional specifica-
tions are currently useable only by the runtime checking module. The current Spec# prototype
for static verification would unsoundly approximate each exception as false, denoting an un-
reachable program state [68].
Another impressive verification system, based on the Java language, is known as the KeY
approach [6]. This approach is more complex ,due to their use of dynamic logic, since rewrit-
ing rules would have to be specified for each programming construct that is allowed in the
dynamic logic. For example, to support exception handling, a set of rewriting rules (that are
meaning-preserving) would have to be formulated to deal with raise, break and try-catch-finally
constructs, in addition to rewriting rules for block and conditionals and their possible combina-
tions. The KeY approach is meant to be a semi-automated verification system that occasionally
prompts the user for choice of rewriting rules to apply. In contrast, our approach is meant to be
fully-automated verification system, once pre/post specifications have been designed.
At a foundational level, Ancona et al [3] have added a limited form of exceptions into
Featherweight Java [56] to formally study the interaction between inheritance and exceptions.
Others [64, 31, 13] have provided a richer core language with exceptions but have still to
provide an unified view over the myriad of control flows, including that for normal execu-
tion. These proposals have formalised type systems that have been proven sound, though [64]
skipped the tracking of uncaught exceptions. Another important dimension is the inference of
uncaught exceptions [60, 33, 81]. For example, [60] employs two analyses of different granu-
larity, at the expression and method levels, to collect constraints over the set of exception types
handled by each Java program. By solving the constraint system using techniques from [33],
they can obtain a fairly precise set of uncaught exceptions.
Exception-based programs are generally harder to analyse, since they introduce extra con-
trol flows to the programs. Many previous approaches handle this challenge at a lower-level of
abstraction. For example, [93] describes the effects of exceptions on a control-flow, data-flow
and control dependence analysis and suggested using a control flow graph that will contain
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exceptional flows. For this approach to be concise, a prior type inference for exception types
must also be done. Along the same line, [22] introduced a form of a compact control flow graph
that includes exceptional control flow and demonstrated that it could be used to construct an
improved interprocedural analysis. Weimer and Necula [99] use a data flow analysis to detect
broken specifications for resource usage. Even in the verification setting, Barnett and Leino
[5] resorted to lower-level unstructured programs (with global variables) to model and analyse
exception-based programs. Though lower-level constructs can be made to work, they are typ-
ically harder to formulate and prove correct. Our proposal to unify both normal and abnormal
control flows in a core calculus is aimed at providing a higher-level of abstraction for reasoning
about exception-based programs, including those needed by advance program analyses.
To support deeper reasoning of exception-based programs, Huisman et al. [55] proposed
an extension for Hoare-style verification to handle exceptions and abnormal control flows.
Separate logical rules were formulated to support reasoning on total and partial correctness,
and for handling each kind of abnormal control flows. However, the myriad of logical rules
used can be complex to implement. In the case of our core calculus, we were able to provide
a unified specification mechanism for the outcomes of both normal and abnormal executions,
without having to treat exceptions in a special way.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis we have introduced a sound verification logic designed to efficiently handle pro-
grams with complex control flow patterns. On one hand, in the sequential setting, the logic
explicitly and precisely tracks control flows essential to the program verification. On the other
hand, it incorporates abstractions (e.g. barrier definitions) required to maintain modularity and
avoid the exponential blowup when reasoning in a multithreaded setting in the presence of so-
phisticated synchronization mechanisms. In order to maintain the tractability of verification in
the presence of barriers, we have introduced a novel calculus for pruning disjunctive predicates.
We have also described several contributions related to the integration of our verification logic
in order to broaden the applicability of the HIP/SLEEK verification tool chain, e.g. the first
solver for the distinct fractional shares domain.
7.1 Results Summary
Exception Verification. In Chapters 2 and 3 we have presented a new approach to the verifi-
cation of exception-handling programs based on a specification logic that can uniformly handle
exceptions, program errors and other kinds of control flows. During the implementation pro-
cess of our verification logic we have found it beneficial to make a fundamental language
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re-design. The unification of flow type handling, has allowed us to formalise a core calculus
that enables an elegant formulation of the verification rules.
The specification logic is currently built on top of the formalism of separation logic, as
the latter can give precise description to heap-based data structures. Our main motivation
for proposing this new specification logic is to adapt the verification method to help ensure
exception safety in terms of the four guarantees of increasing quality introduced in [94] and
extended in [70], namely no-leak guarantee, basic guarantee, strong guarantee and no-throw
guarantee. During the evaluation process, we found the strong guarantee to be restrictive for
some scenarios, as it always forces a recovery mechanism on the callee, should exceptions
occur. Hence, we propose to generalise the definition of strong guarantee for exception safety.
Barrier Verification. In Chapter 4, we have extended the exception logic with support for
Pthreads-style barriers. Our development includes a formal design for barrier definitions and a
series of soundness conditions to verify that a particular barrier can be used safely. Our Hoare
rules can verify threads independently, enabling a thread-modular approach.
Efficient Verification. In Chapter 5, we have proposed a sound specialization calculus for
disjunctive predicates in a separation logic-based abstract domain. The calculus supports sym-
bolic pruning of infeasible states within each predicate instance, under monotonic changes to
the program context. We have designed inference techniques that can automatically derive all
annotations required for each specializable predicate. We have also proposed various ways
to optimize the specialization process, including memoization and incremental pruning. Initial
experiments have confirmed speed gains from the deployment of our specialization mechanism
to handle separation logic specifications in program verification.
We have shown how the specialization calculus naturally extends to barrier definitions and
that it ensures that the barrier reasoning mechanism does not incur any considerable perfor-
mance penalty over traditional verification of sequential programs.
Our approach has been formalised and implemented in a prototype extension of HIP/SLEEK,
7. CONCLUSIONS 165
and tested on a suite of exception-handling and barrier synchronized concurrent examples. We
hope it would eventually become a useful tool to help programmers build more robust software.
7.2 Future Work
We observe several avenues for further research:
Barrier analysis With respect to barrier reasoning , we have described the necessary mech-
anisms for capturing and reasoning about barrier behaviour. However, the current assumptions
were that both barrier call placement and barrier definitions were given. We believe that it
could be possible to go two steps further: to first develop a program analysis that could infer
the sufficient set of program points at which barrier calls are needed and secondly to infer , at
least to some extent, both barrier definition shape and partial specifications.
Synchronization logic A second avenue of investigation is spurred by the observation that a
myriad of highly specialized, synchronization related, verification logics have been proposed,
each targeted at a specific synchronization technique: barriers, locks, semaphores. More so,
several others have not been investigated: various styles of monitors, dynamic barriers (X10-
style clocks), phasers[90]. One open question that arises is: could a general synchronization
mechanism together with a corresponding verification logic be designed such that they would
encompass the commonly used synchronization mechanisms and thus have one simple, practi-
cal, unifying formalism?
Reverse specialization One motivation for the specialization calculus was the fact that un-
fold operations are on one hand essential for obtaining more precise information and on the
other hand are quite expensive. We point out that the folding operation could also benefit
from the specialization calculus. For the sake of conciseness or abstraction in most instances
information is commonly discarded during folding. By making use of the specialization calcu-
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lus, this loss of information could be alleviated while still obtaining the conciseness required.
Apart from program verification, we suspect program analysis could also greatly benefit from
“reverse pruning”.
Specialization optimisation In §5.7.2 we have briefly discussed a secondary optimization
facilitated by the pruning mechanism. Although it did allow for significant gains by generating
a partition of the constraints into dependent groups and thus permitting an easy filtering of rel-
evant constraints and effectively shrinking the proof obligations sent to the provers we believe
there is still room for improvement. The observation is that the current construction is very
conservative in its partitioning due to the definition of the connected relation.
One proposal is to allow for a more flexible partitioning scheme in which the user is allowed
to partially sketch the partitions. For example he could specify that constraints pertaining to
certain variables be in distinct partitions. Simple annotations can be fitted into the specification
languages such that providing partitioning hints would be effortless while unannotated con-
straints would be processed by the current partitioning mechanism thus requiring the user to
specify only the partitions of interest.
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